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1  Tajikam Community / Announcements / Forum Upgraded! on: February 20, 2009, 02:10:01 PM
Dear users,

The forum is successfully upgraded. The new skin will steal your eyes soon.

With regards,

2  Creative Zone / Software / All Oxford Dictionary on: February 01, 2009, 10:36:22 AM

Oxford English Dictionary:

Oxford English Pro Dictionary:

Oxford Concise English Dictionary:

Oxford Acronymic Dictionary:

Oxford English Phrases Dictionary:

Oxford Irregular Verbs Dictionary:

Oxford Dictionary of Idioms:

Oxford Synonymous Dictionary:

Oxford French Dictionary:

Oxford Concise French Dictionary:

Oxford German Dictionary:

Oxford Concise German Dictionary:

Oxford Italian Dictionary:

Oxford Spanish Dictionary:

Oxford English-Spanish Pro Dictionary:

Oxford Concise Spanish Dictionary:

Oxford English-Spanish Phrases Dictionary:

Oxford Business Dictionary:

Oxford Medical Dictionary:

try one of these: 20335-00505

English dcitonary: 38444-54239

Oxford Dictionary of Idioms and

MSDictViewer(Series60) 07456-67111

Pocket Oxford English Dictionary and

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Oxford Medical Dictonary 07456-67111

MSDict Professional Dictionary Bundle (Series 60) serial number is: 20335-00505
he serial is 07481-27071. This is a purchased key so it should work

MSDict Professional Dictionary Bundle (Series 60) serial number is: 20335-00505
3  General / General Discussion / The Will of Darius The King of Persia on: December 22, 2008, 06:05:50 AM
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4  General / General Discussion / Discussions on Durand Line on: December 15, 2008, 06:16:37 PM

Part I:

Part II:
5  General / The Study of the Concept of Afghanistan / Nation Building in Afghanistan: Impediments, Lessons, and Prospects on: November 30, 2008, 03:47:05 PM
Marvin G. Weinbaum
April 13, 2004

Nearly a quarter century of armed conflict left the Afghan state broken, its national institutions virtually non-existent, and its economy in ruins. Traditional authority was undermined while many of the society’s norms seemed transformed. With the end of 2001, the country had become effectively a ward of the international community with the United States taking the lead in securing it from anti-regime elements. Progress was soon registered in establishing an interim leadership, a transitional government framework, and democratic goals. But the rebuilding of an Afghan state promises to be a slow and difficult project, dependent on a continued international commitment of assistance and the ability of Afghans to join together in overcoming, above all, their deep ethnic divisions.
6  General / General Discussion / MOVED: Sabar Tabish Qataghani songs on: November 30, 2008, 01:32:07 PM
This topic has been moved to Music.
7  Tajikam Community / Announcements / Tajikam | Persian is ONLINE! on: November 29, 2008, 09:47:52 PM

Do you know that Tajikam has just launched a persian version?

You can read a lot about the culture of Tajiks, political issues affecting Tajiks,.. and many more.

With regards,
8  General / Tajik History, Culture and Civilization / Factors Affecting Tajik Identity on: November 29, 2008, 03:40:15 PM
Iraj Bashiri, 1998

Formation of Tajik Identity

According to Tajik Academician Babajan Ghafurov, Tajik identity was formed under the rule of the Samanids of Bukhara (AD 875 - 999). In his view, the newly formed Tajik identity consisted of three things: 1) development of a centralized, independent government; 2) revival of the Persian language as official state language; and 3) reintroduction of ancient Iranian, primarily Sassanian, traditions into the predominantly Islamic lands of the Eastern Caliphate. Ghafurov's contention is that after an invasion the culture of the conquered people does not perish altogether; vestiges of it survive (Ghafurov, 1972, 370ff; cf., also Hirsch 1981, x). Ghafurov's views are supported by Holzner and Robertson who study modification of identity patterns in cultures that undergo upheavals. In this regard, they say, "constraints resulting from the underlying civilizational codes remain discernible" (Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 33). It is up to the custodians of the old culture, therefore, to identify the elements germane to survival and reintroduce them into the new milieu forcefully and purposefully.

By the time of the Samanids, three centuries of Arab overlordship had reduced the Persian language to a mere means of communication among the peasantry. Medicine and medical care, for the promotion of which the University of Gundishapur had been established, had fallen in the hands of witch doctors and hypocrites. Music, dance, and the plastic arts, too, had suffered major set backs.

The Samanids identified the Persian language as the most germane element to be rejuvenated; it was reinstalled as the official state language. They also established a vibrant educational system; assembled an informed medical community that drew on the expertise of physicians from China, India, the Arab world, and Iran and reintroduced music, emphasizing instrumentation and the arts, especially performance. Their Sivan al-Hikmat, modeled on the University of Gundishapur, contributed Ibn-Sina's Shifa, al-Biruni's Saidana, and, al-Razi's Hawi to world civilization. The translations of these works, themselves based on the achievements of the ancient Greeks, formed the core on which medieval European theorists drew for inspiration and substance.

The Samanids, however, were not the first to attempt a redefinition of Iranian identity. Alexander III the Great undertook a far-reaching reconstitution of the world, including a redefinition of the Greek and Iranian cultures. By combining the two cultures, the Macedonian warrior-king intended to forge a new breed of statesmen, warriors, jurists, and artists. But his Hellenism, although a mighty influential force, did not last long enough to absorb the deeply-set vestiges of Iranian culture, especially its most hated hierarchy of authority that was accentuated by the divine right of kings.

Thereafter, Parthians and Sassanians made a colossal attempt at reintroducing the Ahuric Order and the institutions that sustained it. But to no avail. Neither the Order nor the institutions could be meaningfully restored--a consequence of the nature of identity which will be discussed further below. Instead, the state underwent an internal redefinition of its own, dictated by decentralization, urbanization, and communism, all evidenced in the reforms of Mazdak. In addition, encroaching nomads--bedouin Arabs in the west and pastoral nomads in the east--coveted the wealth and the identity of the Khusraus.

Neither was the Arab Empire that succeeded Sassanian rule immune to the continuous erosion of authority. Unlike the Greeks who had relied on their experience in administering city-states under democratic rule, the Arabs employed brutal force, discrimination, and coercion to effect universal change. At the end, the un-Islamic nature of their actions--injustice, disregard of human rights, and a dogmatic adherence to the Shari'a law--caused the demise of their Empire.

The Samanid society that Babajan Ghafurov and other Tajik scholars regard as the formative stage of Tajik identity enjoyed an intriguing dual character: on the one hand, it was an Islamic version of a set of ancient Iranian traditions with specific ancient Iranian values; on the other hand, it was an Iranian version of a set of Islamic values based on Sufic and Shu'ubi thinking. Rising against the worldliness of the Caliphs, the Sufis redefined the relationship between man and God. In the process, they also redefined fragments of Iranian identity along spiritual lines. Conversely, the ambitious Shu'ubis centered their redefinition on gnosis. By undermining faith, they redefined fragments of Iranian identity along rational lines. The convergence of these world views, usually referred to as the "Renaissance of the Tajik," gave birth to a unique Perso-Islamic identity symbolized in the revival and re-establishment of the Persian language alongside Arabic, centralization of the bureaucracy, and establishment of a relatively just society. Emergence of sages like Ibn-i Sina, al-Biruni, Rudaki, and Firdowsi underscores the positive impact of this well-balanced convergence.

This, however, is not to say that investigation into the formation of Tajik identity under the Samanids is not fraught with difficulties. The most we gain from sifting through the information are a linear historical narrative, an impressive group of well-known scholars, and a worthy list of scholarly contributions. Narratives that could shed light on aspects of individual, collective, or generational accounts of identity are absent. Books like Nizam al-Mulk's Siyasatname are in existence, of course; but the information they provide is anecdotal at best. They lack the vigorous philosophical, sociological, and psychological discourses that would address pressing concerns regarding survival (Brennan, 1988, 37-50); continuity, either compositional or causal (Brennan, 1988, 17-33; Hirsch, 1982, 212); and sameness. Additionally, they lack discourses outlining the everyday life experiences that had led to the development of the intriguing dual character mentioned above. Such discourses would be of great benefit to present-day scholars who study the socialist movements that place an exclusive emphasis on reason.

What Is Identity?

Identity is not a single phenomenon. Rather, it is the result of the interactions among a multiplicity of phenomena which gather around a sensitive core and give it expression. Since the interactions among the contributing phenomena are diverse, the relations that emerge from the interactions, too, are necessarily diverse, fluid and, thereby, susceptible to change. The following abbreviated model illustrates the multi-functionality of identity, Tajik identity included.

At the most elementary level, the individual is conceived of as a biological entity; a universally defined genetic code assures his or her corporeal development. The individual also carries a memory imprint which, among others, accommodates the body's mental and spiritual needs against the outside forces that comfort him or threaten his survival. In what follows, we shall refer to these outside forces, which determine the identity of the holder of the biological code and the memory imprint, with the term Other (with a capital O) (cf., Brennan, 1988, 28-29).

After birth, the physical part of the body expands according to the dictates of the genetic code and its interaction with Other. The individual's main features, for instance, remain as coded while the individual's general appearance conforms to the dictates of Other. At the end, the combination of genetic coding and Other emerges as a human being with a specific physical description. Twins and look-alikes, for instance, accidentally or otherwise, share a similar genetic coding and a similar Other.

Physical description is a facet of personal identity. The latter emerges as a result of interactions between the memory imprint and the more abstract and complex side of Other. In fact, the memory imprint acts very much like a fresh floppy. The birth process formats it according to the dictates of the genetic code as well as of instinct and intuition, mechanisms which assure continuity. After birth, the formatted floppy develops its sensitive files according to the dictates of the memory imprint and the wisdom or folly of Other. Visual experience plays a major role in relating the two "worlds" to each other (cf., Schoeberlein-Engel, 1994, 179-183).

While physiologists and psychologists concern themselves with an understanding of the body and the mind, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists concern themselves with the relationships that obtain as a result of the interactions among the templates within Other. These templates, which reflect the contributions of generations of memory imprints, not only play a pivotal role in the formation of presuppositions but also in the analysis of current information leading to authoritative decisions and choices. In other words, consciously or otherwise, the individual's world view, social mode of existence, ideological inclination, and ethnic and regional preferences are molded by authority in conjunction with the information in these templates (Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 10; Schoeberlein-Engel, 1994, 195). After all, as Holzner and Robertson state, "identity and authority stand in a relationship of mutual dependency" (Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 37).

The discussion of the nature of the templates which define ideology, authority, ethnicity, regionalism, gender, and race, as well as of the categories and subcategories within each, is outside the purview of the present study (for details see, Wetherel, 1990, 227). Suffice it to add that as Other-related phenomena, these relations are devoid of a genetic code; are mostly resistant to empiricist sorting, and are highly predisposed to presupposition. Furthermore, rooted in the individual's innate tendency to classify objects, they are necessarily ephemeral in their nature (Quine, 1969, 116ff; Hirsch, 1982, 240). Therefore, unless they are documented synchronically and stored over time, they tend to disappear into history. Our inability to attest to the veracity of the formation of a tenth-century Tajik identity is a case in point.

Identity, whether personal, collective, or generational consists of a fluid set of relations (Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 20; Kuehnast, 1997; Wetherel, 1990, 227; Hardison, 1981, xi). It develops as a consequence of the interactions among the genetic code, the memory imprint, and Other. It does not assume a unique shape and never ceases development (Hall, 1990, 225). A tentative assessment of the interactions between authority and two of the categories in the ideology template of the present-day Tajik identity paradigm is presented below. The presentation is incomplete; nevertheless, it is indicative of the complexity of the issue at hand.

The Tajik Ideology Template

Present-day Tajik ideology draws on a set of presuppositions rooted in the Perso-Islamic identity fragments discussed earlier as well as on a new set of directives imposed by the Marxist-Leninists earlier in this century. The word "imposed" is used advisedly to denote a redefinition of authority, a process as sensitive and fluid as the phenomena it controls.

Redefinition of identity is usually followed by a neutral space (Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 30). This space, which allows the individual, or the collectivity, an opportunity to readjust, I believe, includes an introductory phase, a peak, and a denouement. Psychological hardships, including feelings of alienation, guilt, shame, and resentment towards authority, culminate in the peak, a relatively short period (cf., Kavolis, 1979, 46). During the denouement, more and more fragments of the old identity are assimilated into the new identity.

This, of course, reflects the normal course of events. What happens if a new element, such as abandonment, is added? If the redefinition process, for whatever reason, is abandoned in midstream? This is often the case at khaniqahs when a Sufi disciple, striving to redefine his self, becomes too frustrated to continue on the Path and leaves. He is invariably overcome with bewilderment and is filled with an intense resentment for authority. More importantly, redefinition and abandonment apply to individuals and collectivities with similar results. The redefinition of Zoroastrianism into Islam and of Islam into the Soviet system are good examples, respectively, of a successful and an aborted redefinition of collectivities.

The introductory phase of the redefinition of Zoroastrianism into Islam, i.e., until the redefinition peaked in the convergence discussed earlier, took about three centuries. Perhaps the harshest period of readjustment Iranians have undergone in their entire cultural history. During the denouement, which lasted until the fifteenth century, Ahura Mazda merged with Allah, the preeminence of goodness and truth found a new home in the universality of justice, and adherence to free will was limited to belief in the will of Providence. Narratives emerging from the transition, the Mathnavi of Rumi, the Bustan and Gulistan of Sa'di, and the sonnets of Hafiz testify to the success of the redefinition. For a cultural history of the period, see Bashiri's Iran and Islam to AD 1400 on this site.

The establishment of Communism in Central Asia, on the other hand, was an artificial redefinition that bordered on adventure. Artificial in the sense that the principles continued to be hammered out as the redefinition progress moved along. Hardly allowing for a neutral space, the communists disestablished belief in the existence of a supreme authority; undermined the primacy of justice, and violated the sanctity of the family unit. In their place, they imposed atheism, the authority of the Communist Party, and the primacy of state authority. They did not produce either a viable role for the individual or a meaningful closure for life. Their all-encompassing liability to labor went against human potential and their insistence on total conformity trampled over human dignity. In some cases, reclassification surpassed redefinition. This to the point that the individual no longer knew who he or she was (cf., Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 32).

Viewing Tajik society today, we can easily trace the causes of its chronic identity crisis as well as the sources of the feeling of guilt, shame, and resentment that the population harbors to this early stage of Communist takeover. The fall of Communism only acerbated the latent sentiments by pushing them to the foreground. Before Gorbachev, when the socialist society was making its ascent towards the peak of redefinition, the ideology template contained two prominent categories: Communist and Muslim. When the socialist redefinition was aborted, a crisis of authority, a vacuum, occurred, bewildering everyone, Mulims and Communists alike. Unfortunately, of all Soviets, the Russians were identified with authority and, consequently, as the cause of the malaise.

According to the narratives on the Islamic template, Soviet Muslims have been systematically distanced from the sources of their spiritual inspiration for four generations. As a result, they have fallen victim to sectarian and regional disputes and, distrustful of people, they are in constant ethnic conflict with their neighbors. Furthermore, the divisions are pronounced. Different segments of the population attend different mosques, perform different rituals, listen to different preachers, and form different alliances. A Vahhabi Sunni, for instance, is likely to shun an orthodox Sunni, a twelver Shi'ite, or an Isma'ili Shi'ite. He will not participate in their tuys, attend their wakes, or choose a husband or a wife from among them. If their paths cross, depending on circumstances, he will not hesitate in imposing his ideological will on them, even if it entails bloodshed. As mentioned above, to a degree, these sentiments are mutual.

This state of affairs, the Muslim Tajiks believe, would not have happened if the Soviets had not disrupted their peaceful Muslim community. Furthermore, it would not have been acerbated, they believe, if the Soviets had not aborted the redefinition that they should not have undertaken in the first place. Neither are the Soviets or the Russians the only ones to blame. The Tajiks blame themselves even more. They feel guilty of abandoning their family; of not taking care of their own children; and of allowing themselves to be coerced by inferior Russian bureaucrats. They feel guilty for not standing up for their rights and for allowing their resources to be shipped out of the republic without their knowledge and permission.

For some, this feeling of intense guilt is accentuated by the shame of inability to rise above their dependence and poverty; of seeing their people, especially their women and aksakals, treated roughly and inappropriately. More than any thing, however, Tajik intellectuals resent that the Russians, rather than their aksakals, who are entitled to it by the right of ijma', should control the internal, external, and spiritual affairs of the republic.

The narratives for the democratic-minded Communists describe a group that is cut from a totally different cloth. They are mostly educated young to middle-aged men and women who seek to forge a new identity for the republic. Unlike their counterparts in the other category, they frequent the same socialist gatherings, listen to the same set of speeches, and promote the same set of ideas. More importantly, as long as the march to the ultimate Utopia is not halted, they follow Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin as much as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. The new identity they intend to forge employs the democratic institutions of the West as a bonding agent bringing about co-existence among the disparate groups. Having formed a centralist regime, at present, they act on behalf of the collectivity (cf., Holzner and Robertson, 1979, 35).


The Tajiks are undergoing a traumatic time in their history not because of who they are, but because of the circumstances in which they find themselves, circumstances that are beyond their control. Insecurity, feelings of alienation, distrust, and guilt are normal feelings for individuals or collectivities that undergo redefinition. Unfortunately, intense as these feelings are as part of the normal course of redefinition, they are compounded by a sudden crisis of authority, abandonment, and economic dislocation, a situation that would not have obtained if the redefinition had been allowed to continue at its own steady pace. Depending on the outcome of the interaction between authority and the other templates, and granted that there would be no more set backs, in time, we might witness a new Tajik identity paradigm. Contributors to this new identity would include Soviet rational thinking, Islamic spirituality, and the democratic institutions of the West.

Selected Bibliography

Bashiri, Iraj. "Iran and Islam to AD 1400, Kamal Khujandi: Epoch and its Importance in the History of Central Asian Civilization, Bashiri (ed.), Dushanbe, 1996.

Brennen, Andrew. Conditions of Identity: A Study in Identity and Survival, Clarendon Press, 1988.

Ghafurov, Babajan. The Tajiks, Moscow, 1972.

Hall, S. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," Identity: Community, Culture and Difference (J. Rutherford, ed.), London, 1990.

Hardison, O. B. Entering the Maze: Identity and Change in Modern Culture, Oxford University Press, 1981.

Hirsch, Eli. The Concept of Identity, Oxford University Press, 1982.

Holzber, Burkart and Ronald Robertson. "Identity and Authority: A Problem Analysis of Processes of Identification and Authorization," Identity and Authority: Explorations in the Theory of Society, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Kavolis, Vyatautus. "Logic of Selfhood and Modes of Order: Civilizational Structures for Individual Identities," Identity and Authority: Explorations in the Theory of Society, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Kuehnast, Kathleen. Let the Stone Lie Where it Has Fallen: Dilemma of Gender and Generation in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1997. Quine, W. V. "Natural Kinds," Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, 1969.

Schoeberlein-Engel, John Samuel, 1994. Identity in Central Asia: Construction and Contention in the Conceptions of "Ozbek," "Tajik," "Muslim," "Samarqandi" and Other Groups,

Harvard University Dissertation, 1994.

Wetherel, Margaret (ed.). Identities, Groups and Social Issues, Sage Publications, 1996.               
9  General / Geopolitical Studies and News / Howard Zinn - Corruption of Democracy and the War on Afghanistan (audiobook) on: November 29, 2008, 03:18:45 PM

Howard Zinn, author of A Peoples History of the United States examines the manipulation of the popular myths of democracy in the US by political and economic elites to achieve ends having little to do with democracy or security.

Code: [Select]
10  General / Geopolitical Studies and News / From Great Game to Grand Bargain on: November 25, 2008, 04:29:40 PM
Summary: The crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beyond the point where more troops will help. U.S. strategy must be to seek compromise with insurgents while addressing regional rivalries and insecurities

BARNETT R. RUBIN is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Blood on the Doorstep. AHMED RASHID is a Pakistani journalist and writer, a Fellow at the Paci?c Council on International Policy, and the author of Jihad, Taliban, and, most recently, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.

Persian version:
11  General / General Discussion / Top 20 Political Sites of Afghanistan on: November 22, 2008, 04:15:35 AM

1. Khawaran
2. Ariaye
3. Mashal
4. Jawedan
5. Ariananet
7. Tajikam
12  General / Geopolitical Studies and News / نقشه رويايي آمريكايي براي خاورميانه فردا on: November 09, 2008, 05:02:31 AM
13  General / Geopolitical Studies and News / Reports Link Karzai’s Brother to Heroin Trade on: October 05, 2008, 02:40:18 AM

WASHINGTON — When Afghan security forces found an enormous cache of heroin hidden beneath concrete blocks in a tractor-trailer outside Kandahar in 2004, the local Afghan commander quickly impounded the truck and notified his boss.
Before long, the commander, Habibullah Jan, received a telephone call from Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of President Hamid Karzai, asking him to release the vehicle and the drugs, Mr. Jan later told American investigators, according to notes from the debriefing obtained by The New York Times. He said he complied after getting a phone call from an aide to President Karzai directing him to release the truck.
Two years later, American and Afghan counternarcotics forces stopped another truck, this time near Kabul, finding more than 110 pounds of heroin. Soon after the seizure, United States investigators told other American officials that they had discovered links between the drug shipment and a bodyguard believed to be an intermediary for Ahmed Wali Karzai, according to a participant in the briefing.
 The assertions about the involvement of the president’s brother in the incidents were never investigated, according to American and Afghan officials, even though allegations that he has benefited from narcotics trafficking have circulated widely in Afghanistan.
 Both President Karzai and Ahmed Wali Karzai, now the chief of the Kandahar Provincial Council, the governing body for the region that includes Afghanistan’s second largest city, dismiss the allegations as politically motivated attacks by longtime foes.
“I am not a drug dealer, I never was and I never will be,” the president’s brother said in a recent phone interview. “I am a victim of vicious politics.”
But the assertions about him have deeply worried top American officials in Kabul and in Washington. The United States officials fear that perceptions that the Afghan president might be protecting his brother are damaging his credibility and undermining efforts by the United States to buttress his government, which has been under siege from rivals and a Taliban insurgency fueled by drug money, several senior Bush administration officials said. Their concerns have intensified as American troops have been deployed to the country in growing numbers.
“What appears to be a fairly common Afghan public perception of corruption inside their government is a tremendously corrosive element working against establishing long-term confidence in that government — a very serious matter,” said Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, who was commander of coalition military forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and is now retired. “That could be problematic strategically for the United States.”
The White House says it believes that Ahmed Wali Karzai is involved in drug trafficking, and American officials have repeatedly warned President Karzai that his brother is a political liability, two senior Bush administration officials said in interviews last week.
 Numerous reports link Ahmed Wali Karzai to the drug trade, according to current and former officials from the White House, the State Department and the United States Embassy in Afghanistan, who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. In meetings with President Karzai, including a 2006 session with the United States ambassador, the Central Intelligence Agency’s station chief and their British counterparts, American officials have talked about the allegations in hopes that the president might move his brother out of the country, said several people who took part in or were briefed on the talks.
 “We thought the concern expressed to Karzai might be enough to get him out of there,” one official said. But President Karzai has resisted, demanding clear-cut evidence of wrongdoing, several officials said. “We don’t have the kind of hard, direct evidence that you could take to get a criminal indictment,” a White House official said. “That allows Karzai to say, ‘where’s your proof?’ ”
Neither the Drug Enforcement Administration, which conducts counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, nor the fledgling Afghan anti-drug agency has pursued investigations into the accusations against the president’s brother.
Several American investigators said senior officials at the D.E.A. and the office of the Director of National Intelligence complained to them that the White House favored a hands-off approach toward Ahmed Wali Karzai because of the political delicacy of the matter. But White House officials dispute that, instead citing limited D.E.A. resources in Kandahar and southern Afghanistan and the absence of political will in the Afghan government to go after major drug suspects as the reasons for the lack of an inquiry.
“We invested considerable resources into building Afghan capability to conduct such investigations and consistently encouraged Karzai to take on the big fish and address widespread Afghan suspicions about the link between his brother and narcotics,” said Meghan O’Sullivan, who was the coordinator for Afghanistan and Iraq at the National Security Council until last year.
It was not clear whether President Bush had been briefed on the matter.Humayun Hamidzada, press secretary for President Karzai, denied that the president’s brother was involved in drug trafficking or that the president had intervened to help him. “People have made allegations without proof,” Mr. Hamidzada said.
Spokesmen for the Drug Enforcement Administration, the State Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
An Informant’s Tip
The concerns about Ahmed Wali Karzai have surfaced recently because of the imprisonment of an informant who tipped off American and Afghan investigators to the drug-filled truck outside Kabul in 2006.
The informant, Hajji Aman Kheri, was arrested a year later on charges of plotting to kill an Afghan vice president in 2002. The Afghan Supreme Court recently ordered him freed for lack of evidence, but he has not been released. Nearly 100 political leaders in his home region protested his continued incarceration last month.
Mr. Kheri, in a phone interview from jail in Kabul, said he had been an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration and United States intelligence agencies, an assertion confirmed by American counternarcotics and intelligence officials. Several of those officials, frustrated that the Bush administration was not pressing for Mr. Kheri’s release, came forward to disclose his role in the drug seizure.
Ever since the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, critics have charged that the Bush administration has failed to take aggressive action against the Afghan narcotics trade, because of both opposition from the Karzai government and reluctance by the United States military to get bogged down by eradication and interdiction efforts that would antagonize local warlords and Afghan poppy farmers. Now, Afghanistan provides about 95 percent of the world’s supply of heroin.
Just as the Taliban have benefited from money produced by the drug trade, so have many officials in the Karzai government, according to American and Afghan officials. Thomas Schweich, a former senior State Department counternarcotics official, wrote in The New York Times Magazine in July that drug traffickers were buying off hundreds of police chiefs, judges and other officials. “Narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government,” he said.
Suspicions of Corruption
 Of the suspicions about Ahmed Wali Karzai, Representative Mark Steven Kirk, an Illinois Republican who has focused on the Afghan drug problem in Congress, said, “I would ask people in the Bush administration and the D.E.A. about him, and they would say, ‘We think he’s dirty.’ ”
In the two drug seizures in 2004 and 2006, millions of dollars’ worth of heroin was found. In April 2006, Mr. Jan, by then a member of the Afghan Parliament, met with American investigators at a D.E.A. safe house in Kabul and was asked to describe the events surrounding the 2004 drug discovery, according to notes from the debriefing session. He told the Americans that after impounding the truck, he received calls from Ahmed Wali Karzai and Shaida Mohammad, an aide to President Karzai, according to the notes.
 Mr. Jan later became a political opponent of President Karzai, and in a 2007 speech in Parliament he accused Ahmed Wali Karzai of involvement in the drug trade. Mr. Jan was shot to death in July as he drove from a guesthouse to his main residence in Kandahar Province. The Taliban were suspected in the assassination.
 Mr. Mohammad, in a recent interview in Washington, dismissed Mr. Jan’s account, saying that Mr. Jan had fabricated the story about being pressured to release the drug shipment in order to damage President Karzai.
But Khan Mohammad, the former Afghan commander in Kandahar who was Mr. Jan’s superior in 2004, said in a recent interview that Mr. Jan reported at the time that he had received a call from the Karzai aide ordering him to release the drug cache. Khan Mohammad recalled that Mr. Jan believed that the call had been instigated by Ahmed Wali Karzai, not the president.
 “This was a very heavy issue,” Mr. Mohammad said.
He provided the same account in an October 2004 interview with The Christian Science Monitor. Mr. Mohammad said that after a subordinate captured a large shipment of heroin about two months earlier, the official received repeated telephone calls from Ahmed Wali Karzai. “He was saying, ‘This heroin belongs to me, you should release it,’ ” the newspaper quoted Mr. Mohammad as saying.
Languishing in Detention
 In 2006, Mr. Kheri, the Afghan informant, tipped off American counternarcotics agents to another drug shipment. Mr. Kheri, who had proved so valuable to the United States that his family had been resettled in Virginia in 2004, briefly returned to Afghanistan in 2006.
The heroin in the truck that was seized was to be delivered to Ahmed Wali Karzai’s bodyguard in the village of Maidan Shahr, and then transported to Kandahar, one of the Afghans involved in the deal later told American investigators, according to notes of his debriefing. Several Afghans — the drivers and the truck’s owner — were arrested by Afghan authorities, but no action was taken against Mr. Karzai or his bodyguard, who investigators believe serves as a middleman, the American officials said.
In 2007, Mr. Kheri visited Afghanistan again, once again serving as an American informant, the officials said. This time, however, he was arrested by the Karzai government and charged in the 2002 assassination of Hajji Abdul Qadir, an Afghan vice president, who had been a political rival of Mr. Kheri’s brother, Hajji Zaman, a former militia commander and a powerful figure in eastern Afghanistan.
Mr. Kheri, in the phone interview from Kabul, denied any involvement in the killing and said his arrest was politically motivated. He maintained that the president’s brother was involved in the heroin trade.
“It’s no secret about Wali Karzai and drugs,” said Mr. Kheri, who speaks English. “A lot of people in the Afghan government are involved in drug trafficking.”
 Mr. Kheri’s continued detention, despite the Afghan court’s order to release him, has frustrated some of the American investigators who worked with him.
In recent months, they have met with officials at the State Department and the office of the Director of National Intelligence seeking to persuade the Bush administration to intervene with the Karzai government to release Mr. Kheri.
“We have just left a really valuable informant sitting in jail to rot,” one investigator said.
By JAMES RISEN-  New York Times
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