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After the revelations in Wikileaks, the taboo-breaking ideas of several experts are suddenly under the microscope as Washington looks for an exit strategy that will work.


The publication of secret Pentagon documents by Wikileaks has shaken political Washington and public confidence in the US administration's Afghanistan policy to their very foundations. Just a few weeks ago, the political elite was united behind the president and supported his policy of a limited escalation of the war to be accompanied by efforts to step up civil reconstruction. The goal was to push back the Taliban both politically and militarily and to negotiate a political settlement with moderate Islamists. But after the revelations in Wikileaks, the debate has taken a new turn.

An alliance against the Taliban

Steve Coll's views are being widely read at the moment. He was a South Asia correspondent for many years and is now the head of the New America think tank. Coll is one of those experts who is calling for a change of course on Afghanistan. He argues that Washington should be aiming at establishing alliances with regional strongmen in the North and West of the country against the Taliban in the South and East. He does not place much hope in negotiations with the Taliban regardless of how moderate they claim to be.

Steve Coll is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and writerBildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Steve Coll is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and writer

According to Coll, these alliances must ensure that neither the Taliban nor other factions can seize power in Kabul. Against this background the US would be able to withdraw step by step. If needed it could intervene at any time. Coll says the prerequisite for such a step would be an agreement amongst the political elite in Afghanistan that they will stand up to the Taliban together. Coll's critics in the Obama Administration point out that the government in Kabul would once again become a hostage of the powerful regional warlords. They point out that President Najibullah tried this strategy in the early 1990s - and failed.

Partition of Afghanistan?

As far as Robert Blackwill is concerned, Coll does not go far enough. The security expert, who served both George W. Bush and his father, is pushing a much more radical idea for the future of Afghanistan: partition. The US and her allies should maintain military control of the North and West. The South, where the Pashtuns form the ethnic majority, should be left to the Taliban.

Blackwill maintains that this solution is the most realistic option now on the table that the US could justify. He does not believe that such a development would have an impact on the territorial integrity of Pakistan. However, he admitted in the "Financial Times" that after nine years of war such an outcome would be a huge disappointment for Washington.

Richard Haass is the president of the Council on Foreign RelationsBildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Richard Haass is the president of the Council on Foreign Relations

Focus on regional players

Richard Haass, a security expert who also worked for both Bush presidencies, has developed a stance somewhere between that of Coll and Blackwill. He rejects a "Pashtunistan" solution as unrealistic. This would not be acceptable in Afghanistan. As he argued in "Newsweek", Washington should abandon its attempts to strengthen Kabul and its armed forces and police. Instead it should give more support to the regional forces that oppose Al-Qaeda.

In this context Washington would have scope for negotiations with those Taliban who were prepared to accept these terms. The US armed forces would remain in the country and support regional forces where necessary. The number of troops could, according to this scenario, be reduced significantly although one would have to assume that combat operations would continue for many years.

Democratic Senator John Kerry says it is time to consider a change of courseBildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Democratic Senator John Kerry says it is time to consider a change of course

Pressure on Obama growing

In the past week support for Obama's policy has waned considerably. Senator John Kerry, who ran for the presidency on the Democratic ticket in 2004 and is a key supporter of Barack Obama, has announced that he will hold a hearing on the issue of negotiating with the Taliban and the prospects of a successful outcome. When asked about Wikileaks, Kerry declared that they posed serious questions about the chances of present US policy delivering what it promised. The time had come to consider whether a change of course was necessary.

Doubts are now also being raised increasingly by the Republicans who have so far largely supported Obama's policy. As the influential Republican Senator Richard Lugar put it a few days ago, Washington could continue to pump billions into the war without reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

Public opinion turning against the war

Recent opinion polls in the US show that public support for the war in Afghanistan, which is devouring 100 billion dollars a year and costing more and more lives, both civilian and military, continues to fall. The view held by a clear majority is that the war is lost. A similar mood prevails in Congress where politicians from both parties blocked the Administration's request for fresh funding for the war effort for several weeks.

As the well-known blogger Andrew Sullivan put it in "The Atlantic": "The logic for withdrawal to the more minimalistic strategy favored by Obama after the election (...) seems overwhelming." Sullivan asks when the President will have the courage to admit it. Perhaps the time is soon approaching because the mid-term elections - scheduled for November - are looming on the horizon. The search for an exit strategy acceptable to US public opinion continues unabated.

Author: Grahame Lucas
Editor: Thomas Baerthlein

http://www.dw-world....5851472,00.html

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Plan B for Afghanistan
By Brian M Downing

It is becoming increasingly clear that US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts to develop a stable political system and growing economy in Afghanistan are failing. The government of President Hamid Karzai has little support in or out of the country. The Taliban have recovered from their sudden ouster in late 2001 and now control or have a strong presence in much of the Pashtun regions of the south and east.

One option would be for the US and its allies to withdraw from the Pashtun regions and concentrate on political and economic development in the northern areas, where the insurgency is weak and anti-Taliban sentiment is strong. Retrenchment in the north would confer considerable flexibility and advantages.

Immediate prospects
At present, the Taliban are deeply embedded in many if not most parts of the Pashtun regions in the south and east. Through parley or threat, they have won local support and brought levies of local men into their forces.

Western forces are unable to garner intelligence from locals or get them to serve effectively in militias; they are being attrited by roadside bombs; and they are operating in smaller and smaller enclaves in the south and east. Seeking to reverse this state of affairs will be painstakingly slow and will take many years and many hundreds of US casualties per year.

The recent firing of General McChrystal as the top US commander in Afghanistan, though apparently unrelated to the conduct of the war, has emboldened insurgent groups. They see his departure as stemming from their successes over the years, especially in countering counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Insurgents can look back on the past few years and feel justifiable confidence.

General David Petraeus has taken command and this has led to optimism that he can repeat his successes in Iraq where tribal parleys won over Sunni Arab insurgents. But too much adulation may have been heaped on the general by a public that knows little about Iraq or counter-insurgency, and perhaps too much is expected of him.

And a general does not go twice into the same insurgency. A principal reason for the Sunni Arab volte face lay in their hopeless strategic position - at once fighting qualitatively superior coalition forces and quantitatively superior Shi'ite militias. Sunni Arabs saved themselves by allying with the US and turning on al-Qaeda forces, which in any event had become arrogant nuisances.

Furthermore, foreign powers helped quell the insurgency. Saudi diplomats and intelligence personnel prevailed on the tribes of al-Anbar province (especially the Dulayim who straddle the Iraq-Saudi border) to ally with the US. Similarly, Iran used its considerable influence with the Shi'ite militias and political parties to end the fighting.

For similar help from abroad, Petraeus will have to contend with the Taliban's chief supporter - Pakistan. Earlier in 2010, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) arrested several important Taliban figures - a move thought to have been the result of US pressure on Pakistan to force the Taliban into negotiations. Though Pakistan's intentions remain unclear, the arrests of the Taliban figures, who were thought to be in talks with the Karzai government, might be an ISI effort to block Taliban negotiations with Karzai so as to ensure that Pakistani intelligence shapes any settlement. The recent leaked classified US military documents point to Pakistan's ongoing involvement in Afghanistan
(See Pakistan has its own battle to fight Asia Times Online, July 28, 2010.)

Unlikelihood of a complete withdrawal
The war is seasonal. Many insurgent fighters return to their homes in the autumn to help with crops and herds, then return in the late spring. This leads to variations in casualties, which in turn affects support in the US public and that of NATO partners.

The return of part-time fighters to their insurgent bands and the initiation of US/NATO operations in the south will lead to higher casualties - and greater debate. Support is waning in European countries, where mythic notions of war perished amid two world wars and where more recently politicians and generals have become unhappy with unfolding of events. Several countries with sizeable commitments will likely begin to leave within a year, triggering more intense debate in the countries that remain.

Distractions abound in the US public, but higher casualties and the attention brought on by the US commander's awkward comments on his civilian authorities. Opposition to the war may become statistically stronger yet remain politically weak. Casualties are not borne by the public at large, rather chiefly by working-class and rural Americans with greater respect for the military and war service than found in the rest of America - large portions of which are silently thankful that family members have nothing to do with military service.

Republican opposition to the war is muted. It was a Republican president in George W Bush after all who opted to occupy Afghanistan, and President Barack Obama has followed military counsel in the last year. Still, in the event of withdrawal or defeat, Republicans are prepared to pounce on their political opponents for "losing Afghanistan". Democrats in the public, convinced they elected a non-warlike president, are increasingly restive.

Most of the public - as noted, untouched by the war - are given to oscillation and indecision. A Vietnam-era poll might be recalled here. In May of 1969, with opposition to the war over 60%, only 9% of the public favored withdrawal if it meant that South Vietnam would fall, as it surely would (and as it surely did). They wanted neither war nor defeat, neither casualties nor withdrawal without victory.

Formidable currents against withdrawal permeate American political culture. There is a belief that withdrawal or defeat in Afghanistan will lead to renewed al-Qaeda sanctuaries and another wave of terrorism in the US. This is unlikely, as an al-Qaeda return to Afghanistan would offer nothing it doesn't have in Pakistan and it is clear that al-Qaeda can never operate openly anywhere. Any major base or center, regardless of the host country's disposition, will be destroyed. If they build one, the drones will come.

Global presence is a basic part of America's self-image and will not be relinquished easily. A military presence in some 84 countries around the world came as a surprise to Americans born before World War II; it became a fundamental part of the national identity to those born after the intoxicating victory of 1945. The American identity of prosperity and virtue became infused with global power and mission. The September 11, 2001, attacks charged the nation with defending itself through campaigns across the world. Relinquishing this mission, and the national identity behind it, will be difficult, especially now that terrorism is returning to America.

Recently, the Department of Defense released a geological study that reported a wealth of mineralogical deposits throughout Afghanistan. Among these deposits are considerable amounts of rare earths, which are critical to many hi-tech instruments with military and civilian applications. They are also critical to many "green" technologies, such energy-producing windmills. There is also promising oil and gas wealth in Kunduz province in the north.

Withdrawal to the north
The war as it is being fought shows little promise. The Kabul government has no meaningful support. Support in the US and elsewhere is on the wane, yet no consensus on withdrawal is likely. Another way to fight the war is needed or the US faces a lengthy, inconclusive war lasting a decade or more with a likely disagreeable outcome.

An alternative lies in recognizing and seizing on the geographical realities of the insurgency and withdrawing from the south and east - large portions of which have been left to insurgents already - and consolidating in the north and west. A diagonal line - based on centuries-old ethnic distributions, not drawn by an arbitrary outsider - could provide the basis for a more promising outcome.

The Taliban insurgency is based almost exclusively around the Pashtun tribes in the south and east. Outside those areas, in the north and west, there are almost no Pashtuns - and almost no insurgency - save for a pocket of Pashtun in the north-central area near the border with Tajikistan.

The north and west are inhabited chiefly by Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and a miscellany of other peoples who compose 45% to 50% of the Afghan population. Having suffered under Taliban rule and in cases endured massacres at their hands, they vehemently oppose the Taliban. It will be remembered that it was the Tajiks and Uzbeks who composed the bulk of the Northern Alliance, which held onto their redoubt throughout the Taliban period (1996-2001) and which with US help drive the Taliban into Pakistan in 2001.

The northern peoples have maintained their own military formations which pose a serious deterrent to a Pashtun incursion into lands in which they have no indigenous support. These militaries are well-disciplined and well-armed - the legacies of Ahmad Shah Massoud's and Abdul Dostum's forces that fought the Russians in the 1980s and the Taliban. This is a welcome contrast to the Afghan National Army, which has demonstrated little fighting spirit.

The people of the north and west, though divided on many matters, have a common heritage in opposing foreign invaders and overreaching rulers in Kabul as well. They have fought the Taliban and remained suspicious of the inept efforts of Karzai to form a polity, though they are granted symbolic positions as vice presidents in his government. The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara peoples could form a more viable and effective government than the one ensconced in Kabul today.

A "Northern Afghanistan" would enjoy a great deal of regional support in state-building, economic development, military training and generally in opposing the Taliban. Russia, Iran, India, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all oppose Islamist militancy and are concerned by its growth in Afghanistan and spread into the Ferghana Valley that winds from eastern Afghanistan into Kyrgyzstan.

By contrast, the Taliban have only the dubious support of Pakistan, which is nearing dangerous instability by any measure, and Pakistan's distant geopolitical partner, China. Economic development would lag behind that of the north. Politically, the contrast would be between a consensual formula based on Afghan tradition in the north and to the south, a zealous theocracy based on notions of Islam brought in from distant Deobandi and Wahabbi sects.

Further, though often called by a single name, the insurgency comprises numerous, disparate groups: the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami, the network of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, and numerous clan-based militias. They are reasonably united today in the face of foreign occupation and corrupt administration, but with a Western withdrawal from the south and east the unity would collapse, large-scale desertions would ensue, and infighting would break out, all of which took place when the Soviet Union withdrew in the late 1980s.

Militarily, the Taliban are tenacious fighters who knew well the advantages of the terrain. They were effective in defeating the scores of warlords that cropped up after the Soviet Union left and the Mohammad Najibullah government failed. They were also effective in defeating the various rival movements that came and went in the early 1990s. But these successes were greatly helped by their enemies' internal divisiveness and lack of reliable foreign aid - neither of which obtains today.

Controlling the south and east would greatly alter the Taliban's political and military situation. No longer would it be the evasive guerrilla band that attacks police stations, sets up improvised explosive devices, and rallies support against corruption and foreign occupation before vanishing into the hills. It would have to maintain a presence and govern a large, disparate and war-shattered region populated by people who expect an age of renewal and growth to come their way. The Taliban would have to build popular support after the charges of corruption and occupation begin to ring hollow, or face eroding popular support and perhaps even an insurgency of its own.

Further, the Taliban would have to be able to defend the south. Events of 2001 attest to the feebleness of the Taliban's political support and military prowess against a disciplined enemy with a modicum of airpower.

A new US position
The US would have strategic options and benefits that it does not have as long as it fights the war as it currently does. Perhaps most importantly, it would allow the US to reduce its bloody, expensive, and counter-productive presence in Central Asia.

The US could hold out the carrot of economic aid to Taliban-controlled regions. There already is a great deal of US infrastructure there in the form of hydroelectric dams, irrigation systems and road networks. This could lead to moderation within the Taliban, a complete break with al-Qaeda (to include turning over its leadership), and perhaps someday even to reconciliation and reintegration of the two parts of the country, perhaps after an agreement hammered out by a loya jirga (grand council).

Alternately, the US could pursue a stick policy. The US could support insurgencies in the south based on numerous Pashtun tribes which have longstanding hostility toward the Taliban. Further, Taliban behavior could be moderated by the threat of small-scale airstrikes from drones and fighter aircraft.

In an even less accommodating form, the US could prevent the Taliban from ever occupying an administrative center and becoming a government. The Taliban would have to remain a ghost-like guerrilla movement, unable to govern, spouting slogans that no longer resonate in the hearts and minds of Pashtuns.

It is particularly relevant to political considerations in the West that any of these policies could be pursued with a greatly reduced US/NATO troop presence.

The US would realize other benefits from withdrawing to the north. Domestic support for the effort would firm as Americans saw themselves no longer backing an inept and corrupt government and as working with a credible coalition of northern leaders, perhaps led by Abdullah Abdullah, who finished second to Karzai in last year's fraud-ridden elections.

Americans would see more political and economic development - signs of progress frustratingly absent today. Leaving the core insurgent areas and retrenching in other areas would greatly reduce US casualties and Afghan civilian casualties. Indeed, the US could greatly cut its troop levels, perhaps even reducing them by half in two years.

Regional cooperation in North Afghanistan would have long-term positive influences on the geopolitics and economic development of the area and large parts of Central Asia as well. There would be a closer working relationship with Russia, which for all its wily moves along its expansive periphery has been helpful with US/NATO logistics into Afghanistan as it shares an opposition to Islamist terrorism.

Other cooperative arrangements will present themselves. Iran has built up western Afghanistan as a glacis against the Taliban, which slaughtered its officials and cruelly oppressed its Shi'ite co-religionists, the Hazaras. India, too, shares a concern with terrorism in the region and has embarked on significant aid programs in the north.

The US could rethink its uneasy and dubious partnership with Pakistan. Its assistance was critical in supplying the mujahideen bands during the Soviet war. It led to a Soviet exit but also to a hypertrophied military intelligence service that has become the hub of terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan and India. Over the years, US policy has sought to detach Pakistan from such groups - to no avail. Pakistan is perhaps the strongest state sponsor of terrorism and yet enjoys generous aid packages and trade relations.

Recognition of the two states' differing interests in Afghanistan would make US supply lines through Pakistan even less reliable than they are now. Presently, the Pakistani Taliban attack convoys on the roads between Peshawar and the Khyber Pass and the large Pashtun population in Karachi is poised to endanger logistical depots there. The reduction of US troop levels allowed by withdrawal from the south would make Pakistan less important logistically and also reduce its leverage in Washington.

Russia has maneuvered about in Central Asia but has not sought to endanger Western supply lines into Afghanistan. It has used its influence along its periphery to facilitate supply lines from the Baltic to Kyrgyzstan and has recently authorized US polar flights to use Russian air space. Russia shares the US's concern with the Taliban and its support is more dependable than Pakistan's.

A reduced presence in Afghanistan would enable the US to wage the "war on terror" in a less expensive, more adroit and perhaps more successful manner. The heavy US footprint from Iraq to Afghanistan has provided a rallying cause for jihadis throughout the Islamic world. The US could establish partnerships with local intelligence services and respond not with large operations but with rapid insertions and extractions of special forces or with the use of small-scale airstrikes. This would certainly be the case with any return of al-Qaeda bases to Pashtun parts of Afghanistan or even south of the frontier.

Withdrawal from the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan would be seen by many as tantamount to defeat - "cutting and running" in American political discourse. Such claims would undoubtedly be made and would resonate strongly in the media and public, but they display little understanding of strategy or military history.

In 1942, Colonel Dwight Eisenhower and General George Marshall determined that reinforcing the Philippines would be a misallocation of men and materiel and chose instead to fall back on Australia. Nine years later, their fellow five-star general Douglas MacArthur withdrew from positions near the Yalu River in Korea and consolidated to the south. None of these generals was thought unwise, craven or unpatriotic - and neither war ended in defeat.

As noted, withdrawing from the south and east need not be a permanent state of affairs, diplomacy and unfolding events could bring the two parts of the country back together. But should the division stand, the line would better recognize the ethnic realities of the land far better than the one Mr Henry Durand drew between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1893.

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Afghanistan shows signs of cracking

Vermont’s foremost expert on Afghanistan issued a gloomy diagnosis for prospects there in a speech he gave in Bellows Falls on Thursday.

Peter Galbraith, who is running for the state Senate from Windham County, said the U.S. war effort there cannot knit together a country that is fracturing along ethnic lines and President Obama ought to bring the troops home.

Galbraith was forced out of his post with the United Nations mission in Afghanistan after he made critical statements about the election there and about the corruption of the regime of President Hamid Karzai. Previously, Galbraith had served as U.S. ambassador to Croatia and had extensive experience in Iraq, working to defend the Kurds from genocidal persecution by Saddam Hussein.

Galbraith views Afghanistan through the lens of its ethnic divisions, which are mirrored in the struggle between the Taliban and other factions. The dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan is the Pashtuns, who rule the south and east where the Taliban is strong. Not all Pashtuns of those regions favor the Taliban, but the Taliban is almost completely Pashtun and represents the most cohesive and ruthless force in its region.

In fighting to “win” in Helmand or Kandahar provinces, we are fighting against the Pashtun people. This, in Galbraith’s view, is hopeless, and he is probably right. The same goes for regions bordering Pakistan, such as Paktia and Nangahar.

The north and Kabul comprise a variety of ethnic groups, including Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. These groups formed the Northern Alliance, which toppled the Taliban, and they are friendlier toward the United States and fiercely opposed to the Taliban’s repressive rule. Galbraith suggested the United States could defend these peoples and their region against the Pashtuns of the south. He was in effect calling for partition of Afghanistan.

It sounds tidy. But partitions are often bloody catastrophes. Even if partition seems inevitable, as in the former Yugoslavia, genocidal ethnic cleansing can be the result, as groups are forced to migrate to their new homelands and demagogues excite nationalist passion. The partition of India and Pakistan in 1948 became a bloodbath as Muslims fled to Pakistan and Hindus fled to India, butchering each other by the hundreds of thousands along the way.

A report on Friday in The New York Times gave an indication of the complications of partition in Afghanistan. The story described increased Taliban activity in the northern province of Baghlan. Pashtuns are a minority there, but they have gravitated toward the Taliban as a way to protect their prerogatives. The government is not protecting them. Meanwhile, Tajiks and others in the province are opposed to the return of Pashtun rule. A formal partition would probably lead to communal massacres and mass expulsions — of Pashtuns from the north and others from the south.

Further, there are regions, such as Laghman near Kabul, that might not want to join a new Pashtunistan. And there are regions where groups are mixed. The Hazaras of Urozgan might think twice about trying to hold onto their land against claims by neighboring Pashtuns.

A long era of stability lasted from the 1930s to the 1970s under the rule of Zaher Shah, the Pashtun king, who maintained Pashtun control of the nation, but not the fiercely Islamic and ruthless sort imposed by the Taliban. He allowed modernization. He also sent Pashtun governors to the northern provinces. Other groups chafed and sometimes rebelled, but they did not suffer Taliban-style oppression.

That is probably what U.S. policy is aiming for. But after decades of war, there is little willingness among non-Pashtuns to come under Pashtun rule again, and there is resistance among Pashtuns to the rule of Tajiks or occupation by Americans.

This is the conundrum Galbraith described. Obama has sought to help the Karzai government establish some kind of stability in the provinces or at least work out some arrangement with regional chieftains so that when U.S. forces leave, chaos does not ensue. If civil war among these groups is going to happen, the question is whether the United States has an obligation to protect non-Pashtuns from Taliban oppression. Galbraith’s history with the Kurds ought to suggest an answer.

http://www.timesargu...ION01/707319969

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By Robert Blackwill

Published: July 21 2010 23:04 | Last updated: July 21 2010 23:04

In spite of the commitments made at Tuesday’s conference on the future of Afghanistan in Kabul, the current US counter-insurgency strategy (Coin) is likely to fail. The Taliban cannot be sufficiently weakened in Pashtun Afghanistan to coerce it to the negotiating table. America cannot win over sufficient numbers of the Afghan Pashtun on whom Coin depends. President Hamid Karzai’s deeply corrupt government shows no signs of improvement. The Afghanistan army cannot stand up to the Taliban for many years, if ever. Pakistan’s military continues to support its Afghan Taliban proxies. And the long-term Coin strategy and the far shorter US political timeline are incompatible.

President Barack Obama has promised to review the administration’s Afghanistan policy in December. After this review the US should stop talking about exit strategies, and accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south. Instead Washington should move to ensure that north and west Afghanistan do not fall too, using for many years to come US air power and special forces – some 40,000-50,000 troops – along with the Afghan army and the help of like-minded nations. Such a de facto partition would be a profoundly disappointing outcome to America’s 10 years in Afghanistan. But, regrettably, it is now the best that can realistically and responsibly be achieved.


This week media reports suggested another approach gaining favour: negotiation. But as CIA director Leon Panetta said recently about Taliban behaviour, why would they negotiate in good faith, if they think they are winning? Some instead think the US should withdraw all of its military forces over the next year. But that would be a major strategic defeat for the US and its partners, with negative global repercussions for many years to come.

Equally wrong-headed are those arguing the US should stay the course, no matter how long it takes. The CIA now thinks there are barely 50-100 al-Qaeda fighters left in Afghanistan, facing 100,000 US troops. The original Afghan objective was to destroy al-Qaeda, not fight the Taliban. That has largely been accomplished.

Even if the Afghan Taliban invited al-Qaeda to join them in greater numbers, the estimated 300 or so al-Qaeda fighters in Pakistan moving across the border would not substantially increase the threat. Is it worth an indefinite ground war, and thousands more US and allied casualties, to try to prevent that happening? The US can attack al-Qaeda on both sides of the border in any case.

Others worry the Taliban would not adhere to the rough boundaries of such a de facto partition, and would seek to reconquer the entire country. But US and allied military might and growing Afghan army capabilities could stop that from happening. Indeed, without such a long-term US military presence, a renewed civil war is probable. With such a commitment, it is unlikely. Small islands of non-Pashtuns in the south and east would be an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence, as would the comprehensive violation of women’s rights in Taliban territory. But the US could still assist those Pashtun tribal forces that wish to resist the Taliban.

Wider threats to the region should be taken seriously. An irredentist “Pashtunistan”, and perhaps the fracturing of Pakistan, could happen. Ironically, the Pakistan military is making such a development more likely through its support for the Afghan Taliban. But why should the US be more concerned about the territorial integrity of Pakistan than the country’s General Ashfaq Kayani and his colleagues? Indeed, the spectre of de facto partition in Afghanistan might even produce the change of heart in the Pakistani military’s attitude to the Afghan Taliban that successive US administration have failed to achieve.

Henry Kissinger has observed that: “For other nations, utopia is a blessed past never to be recovered; for Americans it is just beyond the horizon.” With its many flaws, de facto partition is hardly a utopian outcome in Afghanistan. The overriding virtue of this concept is only that it is better than all available alternatives.

The writer was US ambassador to India, and a deputy national security adviser under George W. Bush
.Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.


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Tribes, Corruption Ail Afghanistan

By ROBERT L. MOORE


Published: Friday, July 16, 2010 at 12:01 a.m.
Last Modified: Thursday, July 15, 2010 at 3:26 p.m.
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Afghanistan is a mess. It is populated by a multitude of ethnic groups, the dominant ones being Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Turkic. Many of these groups are further subdivided into traditional tribes whose members regard loyalty to their tribe or clan as more vital than loyalty to any nation or government. Alongside these tribal and ethnic divisions are religious differences that separate Shi'a from Sunni Muslims.


The upshot of all this is that Afghanistan is not governable in the way that most nations are. Tribal and other local loyalties ensure that office holders will work on behalf of their kinsmen and fellow tribesmen rather than on behalf of "Afghanistan" as a whole. This means that corruption is not an occasional aberration of Afghan governance, rather, it is the norm.

Further complicating the situation is the fact that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is widely disregarded by the ethnic Pashtuns since many of their tribes and families straddle it and routinely cross it unhindered by government authority.

In Kabul and other Afghan cities, tribalism is somewhat weaker and here local loyalties do not pose the problems typical of the rural areas. Of course most of Afghanistan is rural, not urban, so the constant, sometimes violent, jockeying for position among different groups predominates in this rugged country.

In the future, I expect that the more cosmopolitan ways of the Afghan cities will gradually become the norm as educational and commercial forces undermine traditional loyalties. But this won't happen for many decades and in the meantime local rivalries, violent clashes and governmental corruption will prevail. So let me say it again: Afghanistan is a mess.

Our efforts to "stabilize" Afghanistan cannot bring about rapid dramatic change in this harsh landscape.

At best, our efforts may speed up - to a small degree - the modernizing trends that are bound to occur naturally over the next several decades.

So, is it worth the blood we are spilling and the money we are spending to gain no more than a slight acceleration of a process that is certain to take decades to complete in any case? Is it so important to us that Afghanistan becomes a normal, stable country in 2035 instead of, say, 2055? Does this goal justify the thousands of lives and billions of American dollars it will require?

Some indications of the obstacles faced by our forces in Afghanistan can be seen in recent reports from Kandahar revealing that the Pashtuns who dominate this key city are opposed to our presence. In other words, they prefer the rule of the Taliban to the presence of an alien army in their midst. This was precisely the problem that caused our failure in Vietnam: lack of local popular support for our mission.

There are areas of Afghanistan, mainly non-Pashtun regions, where the Taliban are deeply distrusted and in these areas our troops might be welcomed.

But would our fighting on behalf of, say, Tajiks (who, by the way, are ethnic cousins of Iran's Persians) help solve Afghanistan's long-standing problem of ethnic conflict?

(NOTE: WE WERE FIGHTING AND RESISTING THESE MFS LONG BEFORE THE WEST WERE ON THE SCENE AND WEE WILL BE THERE FIGHTING THEM LONG AFTER THEY'RE GONE.....)

It is more likely to simply add another dimension to the dysfunctional ethnic and tribal brawl that has been the norm in Afghanistan for centuries.

A much more limited goal- that of preventing al-Qaida from setting up bases in Afghanistan that could be used to launch attacks against American and Western targets- is certainly worthwhile.

But this can be accomplished with a very limited American presence and without our attempting to speed up Afghanistan's history by pushing this contentious country into the 21st century.

President Barack Obama made a mistake when he decided to augment our military forces in Afghanistan and he will make a bigger mistake if he does not use his self-imposed July 2011 deadline to begin a rapid-and-drastic downscaling of our military presence there.

Otherwise, the war in Afghanistan will be for him and his domestic agenda what the Vietnam War was for President Lyndon Johnson. And for those families whose members make the ultimate sacrifice, the all too predictable tragedy of this war will be unbearably acute.

[ Robert L. Moore, a native of Lakeland, is a professor of anthropology at Rollins College in Winter Park and director of international affairs for the college's Hamilton Holt School. E-mail: rlmoore2647@yahoo.com. ]


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[Parsistani]

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جنــگ شـــانه به شـــانۀ غــربی هــا و امپــریالیــزم داخــلی برعیــله تاجیـــک هــا در افغــانســتان
مقـــــــالات - ســـــیاسی
نوشته شده توسط ابو مسلم خراسانی
چهارشنبه ، 23 تیر 1389 ، 22:12

موقعیت جغرافیایی فعلی که ما در آن زنده گی میکنیم قسمت از خراسان بزرگ بوده که از آسیآ میانه آغاز و تا قسمت های هندوستان را در بر میگرفت و بعد از پارچه شدن خراسان بود که در سال 1889 نام افغانستان از طرف روس و انگلیس در دوران جنگ سرد با موافقت کشور ایران در زمان زمام داری عبدالرحمن خان بالای این خطه گذاشته شد.

افغانستان کشوریست متشکل از اقلیت های قومی مختلف با هویت فرهنگی خراسانی و زبان بین القومی فارسی دری، و کمیت نفوس 28 میلیونی خیالی، که از طرف سازمان ملل متحد گزارش شده است. چون افغانستان از زمان تآسیس اش تا حال توانایی و قابلیت آنرا نداشته که نفوس شهروندان کشور را به صورت دقیق، عادلانه و مسؤولانه ارزیابی نماید و هیچ گونه نفوس شماری هم صورت نگرفته و بنا بر این تمامی ارقام و آماری که در بارۀ نفوس افغانستان در کل و اقوام بخصوص داده شده است "ارقام خیالی و سیاسی" بوده که از طرف حاکمان وقت در اذهان مردم تزریق شده است.


مقدمۀ کوتاه در بالا معلومات فشردۀ است که برای بحث این مقاله خیلی اهمیت دارد چون مدتی است که یک جنگ رسانۀ تمام اعیار توسط نویسنده ها و خبرنگاران غربی و برتری طلبان داخلی بر علیه تاجیک های افغانستان آغاز شده که محتوا این بحث ها را مظلومیت افغانها" پشتونها" و نقش عمده تاجیک ها در دولت تشکیل میدهد و یاغی گری و وحشی گری طالبان را نیز به این مسلۀ ربط میدهند که گویا موجودیت تاجیک ها در دولت باعث نارضایت افغانها"پشتونها" شده است.

افغانستان بر خلاف اکثریت کشور های جهان از نگاه پیچیده گی های قومی و زبانی جایگاهی ویژۀ دارد آنهم با نوع روش و ساختار زنده گی اقوام و موجودیت مفکورۀ برتری طلبی و معیوب افغان ملیتی از یکطرف و مفکورۀ عدالت خواهانۀ انسانی بر اساس حقوق شهروندی و برابری و برادری از طرف دیگر نتوانسته است یک ملت واحد را بوجود بیاورد. اگر ما این دو تفکر را با هم مقایسه نمایم اینطور خواهد بود.


1-خیمه سالاری، شتر، گاو، گوسفند، تفنگ، ترور، تریاک، معامله گری، وطنفروشی، قانون گریزی و تمدن ستیزی که خاص قوم افغان "پشتون" است.



2-انساندوستی، عطوفت، برابری، خردورزی، شهرنشینی، قانونپذیری، متمدن بودن، آزاد زیستن که خاص اقوام غیر افغان"پشتون" یعنی اکثریت قاطع مردم کشور است.


حال به عوض اینکه روشنگران و آموزش دیده های افغان "پشتون" برای مردم خویش راه درست و مؤثر را رهنمایی نمایند و آنها را از احصار و گرو مفکوره های بدوی و قبیلوی و عرف عادات معیوب و ناپسندیده وحشی گری رها سازند، بلکه آنها برای تآیید و تقویه مسایل ذکر شده تلاش جدی بخرج میدهند تا بتوانند به ضم خود شان ازین طریق بالای قوم تاجیک تفوق حاصل نمایند.

یکی از عوامل ناکامی دولت افغانستان در طول نه سال گذشته موجودیت افراد و احزاب برتری طلب در دولت بوده است. دولتی که باید برنامۀ وحدت ملی را بر اساس عدالت اجتماعی روی دست میگرفت زیر ساخت های اقتصادی را تقویت مینمود و سیستم سیاسی و اقتصادی را ایجاد مینمود که در دراز مدت برای کشور و جامعه مفید و مؤثر واقع میشد و مردم را از نعمت آزادی، آرامش و رفاه اجتماعی بهره مند میساخت ولی متآسفانه از زمان قرار گرفتن آقای کرزی توطه های سیاسی آغاز و تفکر تقویت "امپریالیزم داخلی" اوج گرفت که کشور را به سوی بحران اجتماعی سوق داد و تمامی فرصت های طلای از دست رفت و برتری طلبان با استفاده از قدرت دولتی تمام انرژی خویش را صرف ضعیف ساختن تاجیک ها در دولت کردند که در نهایت کدام نتیجۀ تعین کننده بدست نداد.

با وجود تمامی توطه های قبلی مدتی است که یکتعداد افغانهای "پشتونها" آموزش دیده به طور دقیق و برنامه ریزی شده بحث مظلومیت طالبان وحشی را مطرح میکنند و برای غربی ها پیام های متعدد میفرستند که گویا طالبان با شما هیچ مشکلی ندارند مشکل افغانستان مشکل قومی است که گویا تاجیک ها در بدنۀ دولت مخصوصآ در اردو به طور چشمگیری حضور دارند و این عامل باعث شده که طالبان به یاغی گری روی بیاورند و علیه دولت و نیرو های شما سلاح بردارند. جای تعجب است در داخل کشور در پرده های تلویزیون و در مصاحبه ها داد از وحدت ملی زده میشود ولی در خفا در مراجع مهم تصمیم گیری که سرنوشت رهبری و سیاست افغانستان تعین میشود به ترفند های شرم آور و طرح مسلۀ قومی مطرح میشود این چیزیست که صد ها سال ادامه داشته است این ما هستیم که تازه از سیاست های غیر انسانی ، غیر اسلامی و غیر ملی آنها آگاهی حاصل نموده ایم.

موجودیت افراد ضعیف و بی ارادۀ ما نیز مقصر اند آنها باعث تطبیق برنامه های غیر انسانی آنها شده است. درین هیچ شکی نیست که افغانستان خانۀ مشترک همۀ ملیت ها اهم از تاجیک،افغان"پشتون"،هزاره ، ازبک و غیره اقوام است ما باید به انسانیت، برابری و حقوق شهروندی احترام بگذاریم و منافع کشور خویش را مقدم تر از هر چیزی بدانیم و به واقعیت های کشور خویش تسلیم شویم. از ماجرا جوی، برتری طلبی و تحمیل مسایل بگذریم و معتقد به مردم سالاری و بشر دوستی شویم میتوانیم آینده بهتر داشته باشیم در غیر آن نسل های آیندۀ مان هم نیز درین آتش بد بختی و برتری طلبی خواهد سوخت.

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[Parsistani]

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اکثریت دروغین و تارخام وحدت ملی .

سه شنبه ، 22 تیر 1389 ، 08:22 عصر دولتشاهی / تارنمای خاوران .Currently 4.00/5

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اکثـــریت دروغیــن و تـار خــام وحــدت مــلی گروهی از کلاهبرداران سیاسی فاشیست اندیشه سالهاست که در کشور ما دهل اکثریت و اقلیت قومی می نوازند و با دیده درایی و آزرم ناشناسی ادعای پوچ اکثریت قومی را عین حقیقت پنداشته اند؛ نه تنها چنین می پندارند بلکه آنرا ثابت شده تلقی کرده و برمبنای همین ادعای پوچ به غصب قدرت سیاسی و غصب حقوق و هویت دیگران پرداخته اند.




سلاح برندهء آنها درین کارزار غاصبانه و فاشیستی تار خام وحدت ملی است و از مردم می خواهند که یا بای ادعای پوچ آنها را بپذیرند و یا با اتهام برهم زدن وحدت ملی روبرو شوند.


در جغرافیای سیاسی یی که جهانیان افغانستانش خوانده اند، تا کنون هیچگونه تعریف مشخص علمی از قومیت های ساکن دران صورت نگرفته و به همین گونه آمار دقیقی که نشان دهندهء فیصدی حضور اقوام در کل نفوس کشور باشد تهیه نگردیده است. شمار نفوس و فیصدی اقوام درین کشور، همانند نامی که روی آن گذاشته اند و معاملات سیاسی یی که دران صورت می گیرد، برپایهء مصلحت قدرت های دور و نزدیک و در همنوایی با شماری خاین و وطنفروش بازشناسانده می شود.


همین مصلحت های خارجی و خیانت پیشگی های داخلی است که این کشور در قرن بیست و یک هم یک ملت نباشد و بدون دایگی جامعهء جهانی توانایی ایستادن روی پای خود را نداشته باشد. به سخن دیگر عناصر و انگیزه های تشکیل دهندهء این کشور منافع و مصلحت های بیرونیان است که در برش های گونه گون زمانی با منافع شماری مزدور، خاین و مصلحت جوی ضد ملی همنوا شده و برایش هویت و موجودیت موقت می دهد. بار ها شاهد بوده ایم، هرزمانی که این عوامل بیرونی از میان می روند، کشور دچار بحران شده و دست آورد های مشترک مردم به باد فنا می رود. چرا که این کشور در اثرفشار بیرونی شکل و هویت می گیرد نه در اثر روابط اجتماعی و سیاسی برخاسته از منافع همگانی باشندگان آن.


افسانهء اقلیت و اکثریت نیز درین کشور بهانه و دلیل عمده ییست در دست دشمنان داخلی و خارجی برای تداوم همین وضع؛ یعنی جلوگیری از ایجاد کشور ملتی که دران گروه های قومی در پیوند مفید متقابل باهم گرد آمده دولتی را که استحکام درونی داشته باشد بسازند. این افسانهء دروغین سبب می شود که نفاق و دو دستگی میان مردمان با هویت های مختلف فرهنگی، زبانی، نژادی، مذهبی و قومی ادامه یابد و این کشورهرگز ساخته نشود. این در حالیست که ملت های متمدن امروزی تلاش دارند تا نه تنها موجودیت گروه های قومی در کشور خود را بپذیرند بلکه بقا و رشد فرهنگی آنها را نیز تامین کنند و وحدت ملی را نه برمبنای اختلافات فرهنگی و قومی بلکه برپایهء منافع مشترک و تکیه بر مشترکات ملی تامین بدارند. این درحالیست که در کشور ما مرکب را از دم قیضه کرده و تلاش دارند با کوبیدن بر دهل اختلافات فرهنگی اکثریت و اقلیت ادعا بدارند، برحقوق مردم تجاوز کنند، و نامش را بگذارند تامین وحدت ملی که از راه تحمیل هویت یک قوم برهمگان تامین می شود.


پرسش اینجاست که برمبنای چه تعریفی و کدام آماری این "اکثریت و اقلیت" را عنوان می کنند؟

چنانچه برهمگان روش است، سال هاست درین کشور نفوس شماری نشده است. آخرین نفوس شماری در سال 1358 در زمان حکومت حزب دموکراتیک خلق صورت گرفت. برمبنای آن نفوس شماری بلند ترین فیصدی قومی 43 فیصد نشان داده شده بود و این فیصدی کمتر از پنجاه فیصد بوده نمیتوان آنرا اکثریت به شمار آورد. نفوس شماری های دیگری که پیش از 1358 صورت گرفته بود نیز فیصدی نفوس را به همین گونه نشان داده و تفاوت چندانی با هم نداشته اند. نفوس شماری دیگری که یک موسسهء شخصی در سال های حاکمیت طالبان ادعای به سررساندنش را کرد یک عمل استخباراتی بود از سوی آی اس آی پاکستان برای اکثریت نشان دادن یک قوم که بتوانند طالبان را نمایندهء آن قوم قلمداد کنند و مداخله و پشتیبانی شان از آن گروه را موجه جلوه بدهند. ورنه هیچ عاقلی نمی تواند بپذیرد که کار نفوس شماری یک کشور را، آنهم در دروان جنگ و بحران و بیجاشدن نفوس، موسسه یی به سر برساند که شمار کارمندانش از ده نفر تجاور نمی کرد و در دو اطاق در عمارت "گل حاجی پلازه" در ارباب رود پشاور کار می کرده است. وانگهی در مقدمهء "د افغانستان قومی جورلشت" که نتایج این نفوس شماری دران درج شده است، گفته می شود که نفوس شماری های گذشته در افغانستان به خاطر موجودیت مامورین غیر پشتون در هیات نفوس شماری همیشه نادرست بوده و شمار پشتون ها در کشور را کمتر نشان داده اند... اگر استدلال این موسسه را در مورد نفوس شماری های گذشته در افغانستان بپذیریم، همین خود همین استدلال اعتبار نتایج کار سرشماری آنرا نیز از میان می برد. اگر احصاییه های نفوس در گذشته، با وجود حاکمیت حکام پشتون در کشور که همه امور زیر نظر آنها صورت می گرفت، صرف به خاطر حضور چند کاتب غیر پشتون، نادرست بوده اند و شمار پشتون به درستی نشان داده نمی شد، چگونه می شود پذیرفت که احصاییهء گل حاجی پلازه که در برون کشور و در جریان بحران های داغ سیاسی آن هم از سوی قومپرست ترین عناصر تهیه شده و همه مامورین آن از یک قوم بوده اند، مورد پذیرش سایر اقوام کشور قرار بگیرد و دران غل و غشی نباشد؛ حتی اگر وابستگی این موسسه به استخبارات پاکستان را در نظر هم نگیریم.


قوم به کدام پدیدهء اجتماعی گفته میشود؟

قوم یک گروه اجتماعی است که برمبنای مشترکات فرهنگی، دینی و نژادی شناخته می شوند. پس منافع وهویت مشترک است که گروه اجتماعی را شکل می دهد و قوم تنها یکی از مقولات اجتماعی می باشد. گروه های دیگر اجتماعی نیز وجود دارند که همه برمبنای همان اصل عام ِ منافع مشترک، به میان می آیند و از میان می روند. پس درینجا پایایی یک گروه اجتماعی وابسته به پایایی منافع مشترک شان است.

در میان گویندگان یک زبان، اهل یک نژاد و پیروان یک دین می توان گروه های کوچک دیگری را تشخیص داد که گروپ اجتماعی فرعی پنداشته شده و دارای هویت دیگری در میان هویت جمعی می باشند. تعلق به یک جغرافیای خاص نیز در تشکیل هویت یک گروه قومی دخالت دارد. همچنان اگر سلسلهء گروهبندی ها را ادامه بدهیم، به جزء غیر قابل تجزیهء جامعه می رسیم که فرد است.


اقوام در کشور ما:

در کشور ما، افغانستان، گروه های قومی به درستی تعریف نشده اند. به سخن دیگر معیار هایی که گروه های قومی را از هم متمایز می سازند، علمی نیست. به گونهء نمونه:

ما در افغانستان چند نژاد شناخته شده داریم. نژاد آریایی، نژاد مغولی و نژاد ترکی. جای این پرسش همچنان خالیست که آیا ما نژاد خالصی در افغانستان داریم؟ آنهایی که بیولوژی میدانند و آگاه اند که مایهء ارثی تشکیل دهندهء یک فرد انسانی 46 کروموزم است که 23 کروموزم را پدر و 23 کروموزم دیگر آن از مادر می آید. پس از دید بیولوژیکی هویت جنتیکی یک شخصی تنها وابسته به پدر نیست بلکه مادر نیز درین هویت سهم مساوی دارد. زمانی که چنین است، دیگر ادعای "خون خالص" کردن جز این که دلالت به بیدانشی شخص بکند، چیز دیگری نمی تواند باشد.


به همین ترتیب پرسش های زیادی در مورد هریک ازین نژاد ها وجود دارد که بحث در مورد ریشه و اصالت آنها شامل این مقال نیست. با آن هم بیایید دریابیم که در افغانستان برمبنای همین طبقه بندی نژادی اکثریت نژادی با کدام نژاد است. آریایی، ترک یا مغول؟ بسیاری از آنهایی که تاجک نامیده می شوند دارای خصوصیات نژادی ترکی یا مغولی اند. به همین ترتیب بسیاری از آنهایی که پشتون خوانده می شوند پیشینهء نژادی ترکی و مغولی آریایی دارند. خصوصیات چهرهء آنها بیانگر این حقیقت است. این که ادعای سامی بودن برخی از قبایل پشتون هنوز هم وجود دارد، مساله ییست که تا هنوز درست بودن و نادرست بودن آن ثابت نشده است. پس اکثریت نژادی در افغانستان با کدام نژاد است؟ کسی هست که پاسخ قانع کنندهء علمی بدهد؟


اگر ترکیب زبان و نژاد را در نظر بگیریم. پشتو زبان ها دارای ریشه های نژادی آریایی، ترک و احتمالاً سامی اند. پس نمی شود ادعا کرد که همه پشتو زبان ها یک قوم اند. به همین ترتیب فارسی زبان ها نیز به گروه های نژادی آریایی، مغولی و ترکی تقسیم می شوند.


فارسی زبان ها را به تاجک، ایماق، هزاره و پشتون تقسیم می کنند و حتی یک دره را به پایینی و بالایی تقسیم می کنند. اما در مورد پشتو زبان ها چنین نیست و نه تنها هر پشتو زبانی پشتون به حساب می آید بلکه حتی غیر پشتو زبان ها را زیر نام "په خته" پشتون از فارسی زبانان جدا می سازند. برمبنای همین اصولی که فارسی زبانان را به اقوام مختلف تقسیم می کنیم، پشتو زبان نیز به شاخه های مختلف تقسیم می شوند.


عناصری از گونهء مذهب، نژاد (خصوصیات بیولوژیک و ساختمان چهره و بدن)، لهجه های مختلف پشتو، وابستگی جغرافیایی و غیره می تواند پشتون ها را نیز به درانی، غلجایی، کرلانی، پشاوری، وزیری، بنگش، توری، ورکزی، کوچی و غیره تقسیم کند. گروه های پشتونی را که نام بردیم هریک به خاطر خصوصیات مذهبی، زبانی (لهجه)، نژادی و وابستگی های جغرافیایی خود از هم متمایز اند. به گونهء نمونه، درانی ها و غلجایی ها از یک نژاد واحد نمی توانند باشند. بینی های دراز، چهره های بیضوی و رنگ گندمی در میان درانی ها معمول است. در حالی که در میان غلجایی ها چهره های گرد و بینی های پهن زیاد تر دیده می شود. از همین روست که افسانه های زیادی در مورد هر قوم از اقوام پشتون دیده می شود. پیوند پشتون ها به یهودیت، شاید شامل حال تنها یکی دو طایفهء پشتون شود. غلجایی ها بر مبنای افسانه یی که در مرحوم حبیبی در پته خزانه آورده است، باید از نسل تاجک یا ترک باشند. چرا که شهزادگان غوری تاجک اند و غلجایی ها از پیوند میان دختر بیت نیکه و شهزادهء غوری به میان آمده اند. حقیقت این افسانه هرچه باشد، برین نکته تاکید دارد که غلجایی ها از نژاد و خون دیگری استند. به همین گونه گفته می شود که وردک ها از نسل شخصیت روحانی یی به نام سید احمد گیسو دراز اند. البته ادعایی که شماری از پشتون های پاکستان دارند و خود را از نسل ساول پادشاه یهودی می دانند، مساله ییست که کمتر کسی می تواند به درستی اش باور کند.


بدین ترتیب دیده می شود که همهء پشتون زبان ها از یک نژاد نیستند و ادعای اکثریت نژادی در گام نخست ثابت نمی شود و اگر ثابت هم شود، پشتون کدام نژاد به خصوص نبوده یا به ترک ها تعلق می گیرند یا به آریایی ها که در هردوصورت پشتو زبان ها نمی توانند به تنهایی نمایندگی قومی آریایی یا ترک را بکند بلکه گویندگان زبان های دیگر نیز با آنها همنژاد اند.


واما ازنگاه زبان: یگانه اکثریتی که در کشور قابل اثبات است، بر مبنای زبان است. کلیه آمار تا کنون بدست آمده و موجود در مراجع ملل متحد و سازمان های جهانی نشان می دهد که زبان اکثریت مردم افغانستان فارسی دری است. اکثریت هزاره های مغولی نژاد و تاجک ها فارسی زبان اند. جمعیت هایی با سابقهء ترکی، درانی و غلجایی نیز در میان فارسی زبانان یافت می شوند. بیشتر پشتو زبانان به اقوام درانی و غلجایی و کرلانی تقسیم می شوند. اما درمیان شان شمار زیادی از تاجک ها، برکی ها، نورستانی ها، پشته یی ها، شیخ محمدی ها، قوال ها وغیره وجود دارند که زبان شان پشتو شده. کلیه نفوس شماری های معتبری که درین کشور تاکنون صورت گرفته است، بیشتر از پنچاه فیصد نفوس کشور را فارسی زبان نشان داده اند. چرا که فارسی زبان مادری اکثریت تاجک ها (تاجک های غیر فارسی زبان هم وجود دارد)، هزاره ها و شماری از اقوام دیگر به شمول پشتون ها فارسی است. پس زبان اکثریت مردم فارسی است.


یگانه اکثریت غیر قابل انکار پذیرفته شده توسط مراجع بین المللی اکثریت زبانی فارسی زبانان درین کشور است. البته این اکثریت متعلق به یک تیرهء قومی نیست. بلکه دران گروه های قومی یی که تاجک، پشتون، هزاره، ایماق و غیره خوانده می شوند گویندگان آنرا تشکیل می دهد.

به حساب دین و مذهب هم که دیده شود، شمار زیادی از پشتون ها، تاجک ها، ازبک ها و بخشی از ترکمن ها و بلوچ ها مسلمان سنی اند. قزلباش ها که در اصل ترکمن اند، پیروان مذهب شیعه اند. پیروان شیعهء دوازه امامی نیز هم درمیان پشتون ها و هم در میان هزاره ها و تاجک ها وجود دارد. البته پیروان مذهب اسماعلیه را هزاره ها و تاجک ها می سازند.


وقتی به این موزاییک رنگارنگ و تنوع نژادی، زبانی، فرهنگی و دینی توجه کنیم، این کثرت یک وحدت زیبا را نیز در خود دارد. یعنی اقوام ساکن کشور دارای چنان هویت هایی نیستند که آنها را به کلی از یکدیگر شان جدا بسازد و میان شان دیوار چین بنا کند. به گونهء نمونه یک پشتو زبان شاید سنی باشد شاید شیعه. یک پشتو زبان شاید یک آریایی نژاد باشد یا ترکی نژاد. به همین ترتیب در مورد هزاره، ازبک و تاجک نیز می توان چنین دریافت. پس اگر از خودخواهی و تحمیل های غیر طبیعی جلوگیری شده و بگذارند اقوام همانگونه که میل شان است با هم به تفاهم برسند، امید های بس نیرومندی در خاصیت فرهنگی هویتی این مردم هست که باهم جور بیایند و به یک وحدت واقعی ملی برسند.


ادعای دروغین اکثریت برای یک قوم، آن هم بدون ثبوت و دستاویز پذیرفتنی، سبب می شود که دیگران این اکثریت را زیر سوال ببرند و خواه ناخواه دعوای حقانیت و غیر حقانیت به میان می آید که نتیجه اش دوری اقوام از یکدیگر، تولید نفرت در میان آنها و تنش های قومی است.

دکترین افغان ملت که در رسالهء رییس آن حزب زیر عنوان "زوال پشتون ها" آمده است ریشهء تمامی بدبختی ها و بحران ها در کشور بوده "دیواره ییست فراراه تمدن و تدین". چرا که بنیاد آنرا تفکر قبیلوی ساخته و از پذیرش نظامی که برمبنای ارزش های دینی و تمدنی شکل بگیرد، سر باز می زند.

خطراتی که ازین دکترین به جامعه و کشور ما متصور است همه حقیقی بوده و همین حالا جامعه را تهدید می کند. کار هایی که برمبنای دکترین افغان ملت درین ده سال در کشور پیاده شده است، کلیه شیرازه هایی را که وحدت ملی روی آن می تواند استوار گردد، تکان داده است.

مظاهرات هزاره ها در اعتراض به موضعگیری های قومی در پارلمان کشور نشانه های نخستین بحرانیست که کشور را حزب افغان ملت با آن روبرو ساخته است.


حزب افغان ملت، مایه بحران قومی:

حزب افغان ملت که برای ساختن "لوی افغانستان" تلاش دارد و پشتون های پاکستان را نیز بخشی از "افغانستان" می داند، سایر اقوام را نیز تشویق کرده است تا به جای یافتن ریشه ها و پیوند های مشترک با یکدیگر به تامین و تقویهء روابط فرهنگی خود با هم زبانان و هم نژادان خود در خارج کشور بپردازند. اگر خان عبدالغفان خان می تواند حقی درین کشور داشته باشد، امام علی رحمان، اسلام کریموف و احمدی نژاد هم باید حقی داشته باشند. اگر سرحد دیورند پذیرفتنی نیست، چرا سرحدات غربی و شمالی کشور پذیرفتنی باشد؟ اگر اقوام واحد در دو سوی دیورند زندگی می کنند، در دو سوی سرحدات غربی و شمالی نیز وضع به همین گونه است. مگر آیا کشوری هست که دران همچو پدیده یی دیده نشود؟ اما کشور های متمدن منافع خود را درهمگرایی با همان هایی که میثاق هموطنی سیاسی بسته اند جستجو میدارند و از هرگونه معامله در پشت دیوار ها پرهیز می کنند؛ نه این که با عمال بیگانه که در تربیتگاه های استخبارات منطقه ساخته می شوند، به خاطر همقوم بودن، دست بدست هم بدهند و خانهء همسایه و همطوطن خود را غارت کنند و به قتل عام همکوچه و همدیار خود بپردازند.


بسیاری بدین باور اند که کوبیدن در دهل اکثریت و اقلیت چیزی نیست جز ریختن آب به آسیاب آنهایی که طالبان را نمایندهء یک قوم جا می زنند و جنگ طالبان را جنگ قوم اکثریت برای بدست آوردن اکثریت حقوق و منافع قلمداد می کنند. در حالی که هرکوری می داند که خواست طالبان حق و حقوقی برای پشتون ها نیست و نبوده است. پشتون حق دارد که فرزندانش، چه پسر و چه دختر، به مکتب برود. آیا طالب همین را می خواهد؟ پشتون حق دارد که شفاخانه، مکتب، کار و امنیت داشته باشد. آیا طالب همین را می خواهد؟ روشن است که طالب را پاکستان برای گرفتن حقوق پشتون ها نساخته است. هدف از ساختن طالب هرچه باشد، بدست آوردن حقوق پشتون ها نیست. آیا اسامه بن لادن و طاهر یولداش و هزاران ترورییست دیگری که از سراسر دنیا در نوار مرزی ما با پاکستان یکجا شده اند، تامین حقوق پشتون ها را می خواهند؟

طالبان و بهانهء تامین حقوق پشتون ها اهداف دیگری را دنبال می کند. حزب افغان ملت از همین آب گل آلود ماهی می گیرد و با دامن زدن به اختلافات قومی و ادعای اکثریت و اقلیت برای اعضای خود وزارتخانه و برای پاکستان دست دراز در تقویت تروریزم فراهم می کند.



نتیجه:

نتیجه این که ما چیزی به نام اقلیت و اکثریت در کشور نداریم که ثابت شده و قابل پذیرش همگان باشد. اقوام در کشور برمبنای عناصر متشکلهء هویت قومی تعریف نشده اند. نام اقوام، بیش ازان که تعریف علمی داشته باشد، آفاقی و تصادفی است. در حالی که همین اصل آفاقیت هم در تمام موارد یکسان پذیرفته نمی شود. چنانچه همهء پشتو زبان ها پشتون و یک قوم پنداشته می شوند اما همهء فارسی زبان ها یک قوم پنداشته نمی شوند. یا همهء فارسی زبان ها هم یک قوم پنداشته شده و برای شان فیصدی نفوس در نظر گرفته شود، یا پشتون ها هم مانند هزاره ها و تاجک ها به گروه های متشکلهء قومی شان جدا شناخته شده و فیصدی مشخص خود را در کل نفوس داشته باشند. همانگونه که فارسی زبانان به هزاره و ایماق و پشتون فارسی زبان و غیره تقسیم می شوند پشتو زبان ها هم باید به غلجایی و درانی و کرلانی و تاجک پشتو زبان شده وغیره تقسیم شده برای شان فیصدی در نظر گرفته شود.


نکتهء بسیار مهم این است که هرگز و هرگز نباید ادعا کرده که همهء پشتون ها در افغانستان در دو صد پنجاه سال گذشته حاکم بوده اند. ده های قوم مشخص پشتون در طول سال های حکومت محمدزایی و سدوزایی همانند سایر اقوام کشور محکوم بوده اند. اشتراک جوانان اقوام غیر درانی در جنبش های چپ و راست دههء دموکراسی و بدست آوردن عضویت حزب خلق، پرچم و نهضت اسلامی توسط همین جوانان گویای این حقیقت است که اقوام دیگر پشتون نیز زیر ستم بوده برای رهایی از ستم یک یا دو خانوادهء درا نی که بر سرنوشت مردم حاکم شده بودند، تلاش کرده اند. نورمحمد تره کی از قوم تره کی غیر درانی، حفیظ الله امین از قوم خروتی غیر درانی، داکتر نجیب الله از قوم احمدزی غیر درانی، گلب الدین حکمتیار خروتی، عبدالرب رسول سیاف خروتی، مولوی محمد یونس خالص غلجایی.... نام هایی اند که ثابت کنندهء این ادعا است. نباید فراموش کرد که حتی در میان درانی ها نیز اقوام اسحاقزی، علیزی و نورزی محروم بوده و با حاکمیت در جنگ بوده اند. برمبنای یک سروی که از سوی یک کانادایی شده است، بیشترین اعضای جنبش طالبان در جنوبغرب کشور را افرادی متعلق به اقوام نورزی، اسحاقزی، علیزی و هوتک می سازد. پس اندیشهء ستم همهء اقوام پشتون بر اقوام دیگر نمی تواند بنیاد محکمی داشته باشد. البته حکام برای فریب پشتون ها این خزعبلات را به خورد مردم می دهند که حقایق تاریخ اجتماعی کشور چیز دیگری می گوید.

مطالعهء عمیق تاریخ کشور حقایق دیگری را نشان می که مبین وجود منافع مشترک مردم اعم از پشتون، ازبک، هزاره، تاجک و سایر اقوام است. تلاش برای جدا ساختن پشتون ها از تن واحد ملت و اکثریت خواندن آنها کاریست در جهت جلوگیری از اتحاد مردم و تامین وحدت ملی. درین خیانت حزب افغان ملت سردمدار کلیه خیاینین است و صد فیصد حاصل تلاش های این حزب آبی می شود که در آسیاب پاکستان می ریزد و ازان طالب می روید.

در حالی که در هم تنیده گی قومی در میان اقوام کشور امید برای ساختن یک کشور متحد را تقویه می کند، هرگونه ادعای اکثریت و اقلیت در غیاب یک احصائیهء معتبر و قابل پذیرش اسباب افتراق و نفاق در کشور را فراهم و از تشکیل یک کشور ملت جلوگیری می کند.

فاشیزم مزدور که ستون پنجم پاکستان است، در یک دستش شمشیر غارت، تحمیل و زور گویی به بهانهء "اکثریت" آنچنانی دارد و در دست دیگرش بهانهء "وحدت ملی". بسیاری درین تار خام گیر کرده اند که اگر ادعا های دروغین اکثریت و اقلیت را به مخالفت برخیزند، به شکستن وحدت ملی متهم می شوند. از همین روست که فاشیست ها چار نعل می تازند و دیگران دست زیر الاشه تماشا می کنند.


چه باید کرد؟

تا زمانی که دیو فاشیزم افشا و مهار نشود، کشور هرگز روی خوبی نخواهد دید و همچنان لغشت خامی باقی خواهد ماند که بدون دایگی جامعهء جهانی بقایی نخواهد داشت. ده سال را فاشیزم از ما گرفت و به هدر داد، ازین پس باید متوجه بود ورنه با خروج نیرو های خارجی، کشور دوباره صوبهء پنجم پاکستان خواهد شد و در شایان یاد آوریست که در آن صورت از پنجاب اداره خواهد شد، نه از خیبرپختونخوا و از جلال آباد و قندهار، هرگز!



یادداشت تاجیک میدیا : از دوست گرانمایه که این نوشتار را برای ما فرستاد سپاسگزاریم . امید که خواننده گان عزیز پس از خواندن این نبشته ، دیدگاه های خویش را اینجا بنویسند . با سپاس از شما .

[Parsistani]

Quote

http://sitrep.global...escent-into-rea li.htm

"... One seasoned diplomat, Robert Blackwill, has argued for a "de facto partition" which would basically provide a middle course, retaining an active combat role in Afghanistan for years to come but rejecting permanent Taliban control of the south. The United States would focus on defending the northern and western regions and assist tribal leaders on the Pashtun periphery who may decide to resist the Taliban. This could also be combined with some agreement with Taliban elements. Similarly, Jack Devine, who ran the CIA's support to anti-Soviet Afghans, also sees a fragmented country, a tribal society, not a nation state. He recommends the establishment of "productive relationships" with tribal leaders and even Taliban factions; concerned about a potential collapse of the Karzai government, he advises cultivating relationships with leaders inside and outside the current regime. US forces have recognized the importance of local efforts with a new initiative to develop local defense forces. The effort raises many questions and is only reluctantly supported by President Karzai, but it emphasizes the need for local leaders to take charge of their own security. [...] So, as Blackwill argues, we need to focus development efforts on the northern and western regions, where, unlike the Pashtun areas, people are not conflicted about accepting US help and not systematically coerced by the Taliban. Unfortunately, these are the very areas we are neglecting, providing the Taliban opportunity to destabilize areas that we should be actively developing. The military effort needs to transition to being a support element, checkmating major Taliban initiatives while protecting grass roots economic activities in the quieter areas. Such development can not only serve as a major motivation to local Afghans, but can provide young people an opportunity to work enthusiastically at development rather than becoming dejected misfits open to jihad propaganda. Development will also serve as a showcase, vividly contrasting austere areas under Taliban domination with vibrant areas moving into the modern world. This is what will defeat the Taliban. ..."

Quote

Opinion: Federal system only option for Taliban, U.S.; by a proud Afghanistani Tajik and CNN Blogger


Abbas Diyar

Editor’s Note: Abbas Daiyar began his blog, Kabul Perspective, last year to look at issues in Kabul and around the world. He has worked with newspapers in Pakistan and reported for news agencies in the past and is now a member of the editorial board of the independent Daily Outlook Afghanistan newspaper in Kabul. The opinions expressed in this guest blog are solely those of Abbas Daiyar.

Why is it that every policy change is doomed to failure in Afghanistan? From the community-security and reach-out policy to the fight against drugs, all have shown little success so far.

Gen. Petraeus has come to Afghanistan with the latest commitment of success. After fierce opposition from the Afghan government, his proposed Public Protection Force has been approved by the Afghan cabinet. This approach is based on the successful model of Iraq, where Sunni militia groups were armed to fight against al-Qaeda. In the Afghan government, there was intense opposition to the program of arming locals as a Public Protection Force to avoid Taliban insurgency spreading. President Karzai’s ambitions are more of setting a ground for the post-American Afghanistan, regardless of whatever results. There are no signs of success so far that his proposed reintegration of Taliban will work out.

Coming to Arg (the Afghan Presidential Palace) for a second term in a controversial election, Karzai has been moving close to Iran and Pakistan. In June, when the interior minister and intelligence chief were asked by the president to resign, the most common commentary in Kabul newspapers were that the move is to placate Pakistan regarding the Taliban reconciliation, as NDS (National Directorate of Security) Chief, Amrullah Saleh was the fiercest Pakistan-critic voice in the Karzai Administration. Some politicians in Kabul even fear Karzai will attempt to grab power for long after NATO withdrawal, by calling a National Jirga and bringing some amendments in the constitution. And it’s quite possible!

Again the fundamental question is: why after billions of dollars spent and thousands of lives sacrificed, is Afghanistan becoming a quagmire for the U.S. and NATO? Why is it that Iraq is gradually getting stability while Afghanistan is deteriorating with a new story each day of failure? Recently there have been talks about a de facto division of Afghanistan. The U.S. policy thinkers are now discovering the options suggested nine years ago by many in Afghanistan. And it comes at a time when the situation is at its worst. If there was such serious thinking in Washington in 2001, things would have not been at its worst.

Renowned Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid in an article on the Financial Times website has mocked former U.S. Ambassador Robert Blackwill’s suggestion of de facto partition of Afghanistan in volatile Taliban-influenced South and peaceful North and Hazarajat. Ahmad writes “Not a single Afghan will ever support such a demand.” Really? Ahmad Rashid analyses from his world of knowledge about post-Taliban Afghanistan, which he has not visited for the last couple of years. He should know that the slogan of Latif Pedram, a presidential candidate rival of Karzai in last year’s election, was for a federal system in Afghanistan demanding division of regions in the country. And there are ethnocentric “nationalist” groups even advocating for a full partition.

Today Gen. Petraeus is applying the Iraq model of Sunni Awakening under the label of Public Protect Force in Afghanistan after years of growing insurgency. Pentagon and Washington know now that the insurgency is of the same nature in Iraq and Afghanistan, ideologically and operationally. But the strategy will only work when other parallels are successful, too.

The political system and civilian government is a measuring parallel for the success of military operations in Afghanistan. The administration in Kabul is a fragile and corrupt one, and fundamentally very different from the system successfully working in Iraq. The key of success in Iraq in fighting insurgency was Sunni Awakening in addition to a stable federal parliamentary political system. Amidst the discussions of alternatives in Afghanistan, federal parliamentary system would be the best way to avoid a bloody partition. As Mr. Blackmill says, “there is no quick, easy and cost-free ways to escape the current deadly quagmire.” Leaders from Afghanistan had suggested it long ago in 2002 during the Bonn Conference and later. And recently, it has not only been Latif Pedram calling for a federal system, but the strongest rival of Karzai in the election - former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah was calling for a parliamentary system. And allies of Karzai in election, who left Karzai’s side recently, Muhaqiq and Dostum, have been calling for a fundamental change in the system. Recently in a TV talk in Kabul, Muhaqiq was saying “we demand decentralization of power, you name it federal system, parliamentary or whatever…”

A central system is against the nature of Afghanistan for centuries. A strong central government has never had control over all parts of the country in history. Even today, under a strong presidency and central government, Karzai due to his political weaknesses cannot remove a rival Governor of Balkh, Mr. Ata, who often talks against Karzai in public.

Such a system would be the only solution for the so-called reconciliation and reintegration program with insurgents. Taliban want a share in power, and they fight under the slogan of Sharia and religion. Some ministries and offices in Kabul would not bring them for a settlement. If local people of an area want to be ruled by Taliban, billions of U.S. dollars and the least-corrupt official appointed from Kabul would never win the hearts and minds of people. It’s impossible for Taliban to burn down girls’ schools, if the majority of local people are against it. Simply, let people be ruled by Taliban in the areas the people want them. And the little population who don’t want to live under Taliban can move to other provinces. Some of the southern provinces could go under Taliban if they take part in elections in a federal system with provincial autonomy. And this can be the only possible deal for workable negotiations.

Taliban insurgency is now spreading to the peaceful parts of country. Most peaceful provinces like Bamyan, Badakhshan and Daikundi were in headlines the past week for casualties. The Iraq model of Gen. Petraeus is incomplete unless the political system in Afghanistan is like that of Iraq. For saving Afghanistan and the efforts made in the last nine years, it’s extremely important to bring fundamental changes in the whole strategy and system in Afghanistan.

Already there is a rise of ethnic sentiments in Afghanistan after the calls of reconciliation by Karzai. Political leaders in North and Hazarajat are saying to launch a mass campaign. The best way to avoid a bloody partition like that of Ahmad Rashid’s country (partition of Bangladesh from Pakistan) in 1971 is to change the system in Afghanistan. The attempts of negotiations with Taliban will not work unless they receive an attractive offer of rule in some provinces of South under a federal parliamentary democratic system. It’s an honorable roadmap for the U.S. withdrawal from a stable Afghanistan.

[Parsistani]

Quote

http://jawedan.com/i...8-00&Itemid=576

چرا تجزیه؟

چهارشنبه ، 27 اسد/مرداد 1389 ، 12:55 عصر دولتشاهی

در یکی از برنامه های دلچسپ تلویزیون طلوع زیر نام "سیاه و سپید"، داکتر اشرف غنی احمد زی آنهایی را که طرح تجزیهء افغانستان را پیشکش کرده اند، احمق خواند. اما بنده بدین باورم که اگر آنها احمق باشند، احمقتر از آنها هم در عرصهء سیاست کشور یافت می شوند و از بخت بد تار بسیاری از اجراات و برنامه ریزی های سیاسی درین کشور بدست همین احمقتر هاست. چرا که برنامه ها و پالیسی های نه سالهء همین ها است که زمینه را برای ایجاد اندیشهء تجزیه به مثابهء یکی از راه های حل و حتی یگانه راه حل معضل خانمان برانداز بی امنیتی و دهشت افگنی در کشور در برخی اذهان به میان آورده است.

طرح تجزیه که سوی یک دپلومات امریکایی در هند اعلام شد، به خاطر تامین امنیت یا هم رهایی امریکاست از لجنی که دران گرفتار آمده است؛ هم هدفش و هم راهکار هایی که برای رسیدن به آن به کار گرفته می شود، منشا و بازده بیرونی دارد. اما این طرح از سوی برخی حلقات در داخل کشور نیز خریداران و مخالفین جدی یی یافته است.

در داخل کشور، طرح یاد شده از سوی آنهایی که خواهان تامین حاکمیت یک جانبه بر سرنوشت و تقدیر افغانستان اند، به مثابهء زنگ خطری تلقی شد که می تواند خیال های دور و دراز آنها را برای به اشغال در آوردن کشور به نام یک قوم برهم بزند. در سوی دیگر آنهایی که امید خود را برای ساختن یک افغانستان مبتنی به عدالت اجتماعی و تامین حقوق مردم بر مبنای یک تذکره و یک رای، از دست داده اند، این طرح را روزنهء امیدی می بینند برای ساختن کشوری که بتوانند بدون دغدغه از خطر تاراج زندگی، ملکیت، هویت، تاریخ و حقوق شان زندگی کنند.

این که چرا برای برخی ها در داخل کشور این طرح چندان "احمقانه" هم نبوده است، باید دلایلی را دریابیم که در شرایط کنونی آیا دست اندرکاران حکومت کاری برای تامین وحدت ملی و همدلی ملی کرده اند و آیا اقوام کشور می توانند به زندگی آبرومندانه و مامون با یکدیگر، در زیر یک چتر سیاسی، دل خوش کنند؟ آیا با گذشت هر روز عرصهء زندگی باهمی برای اقوام گونه ساکن این کشور، تنگ تر نمی شود؟

پیش ازان که نشان بدهیم، چگونه عرصه برای زندگی باهمی درین کشور تنگ تر شده می رود، است به دو سه دیدگاهی که همین پسانها در رسانه ها آمده اند، اشاره کنیم.

چند روز پیش نشست تلویزیونی یی زیر عنوان "افغانستان به کجا می رود؟" از برنامهء "پرکار" تلویزیون بی بی سی پخش شده که دران روستار تره کی استاد پیشین دانشگاه کابل و مجیب الرحمن رحیمی دانشجوی دکتورا در دانشگاه اسکس لندن شرکت کرده بودند. درین برنامه روستار تره کی به روشنی تمام از اعمال جبر و زور از سوی پشتون ها علیه سایر اقوام برای ساختن یک دولت مرکزی دفاع کرده و آنرا تیوریزه می کرد. تره کی این شیوه را رایج کشور افغانستان می خواند و استدلال می کرد که گویا در هر کشوری نیروی محرکهء طبیعی یی وجود دارد که توانایی کشاندن دیگران بدور محور خود و تشکیل حکومت را دارند. از دیدگاه تره کی این نیروی محرکه در افغانستان پشتون ها اند و نشانی اش هم این که در گذشته پشتون ها در افغانستان حکومت تشکیل کرده اند. به همین گونه تره کی، دلیل نیروی محرکه بودن پشتون ها را اکثریت بودن پشتون ها عنوان می کرد و دلیل اکثریت بودن شان را هم تشکیل دادن حکومت از سوی آنها در طول سه قرن گذشته. تره کی هر گونه راه حل متمدنانه و دموکراتیک برای افغانستان را به این بهانه که افغانستان به آنجا نرسیده و افغانستان با سایر جهان فرق دارد رد می کرد. توگویی مردم افغانستان با انسان های دیگر فرق داشته و از کرهء مریخ آمده باشند.

هرچند این استدلال ها از سوی مجیب الرحمن رحیمی با استدلال های امروزین و دیدگاه مدرن به سیاست و جامعه رد می شد اما رحیمی نگفت که: 1) حاکمیت یک نفر ویک خانواده در یک جامعه به معنی حاکمیت همهء وابستگان قومی آنها نیست. در مورد افغانستان باید گفت که نخستین حاکمیت از سدوزایی های ابدالی بود و سپس حاکمیت به بارکزایی های ابدالی رسید که در هردو صورت اقوام دیگر مانند غلجایی ها و تیره های دیگر قومی پشتو زبان همان روز و روزگاری را سپری میکردند که سایر اقوام در کشور. 2) اگر تشکیل حکومت از سوی یک فرد در یک کشور معنی اکثریت بودن آن قوم را برساند پس اکثریت باشندگان هندوستان را باید مغول و ترک بدانیم چرا که چهارصد سال ترک ها در آنجا حکومت کردند.

داکتر فاروق اعظم که یکی از شخصیت های جهادی منسوب به حزب اسلامی حکمتیار است در مضمونی به ارتباط تجزیهء افغانستان که در سایت جرمن افغان آنلاین نشر شد، استدلال های جالبی دارد. او درین مضمون یکی از دلایل تجزیه ناپذیر بودن افغانستان را همدردی ملا های تاجک و ازبک با پشتون ها دانسته و این همنوایی را در گونهء مخالفت آنها با بمباران مناطق پشتون نشین توسط امریکایی ها قلمداد می کند. او در بخشی از مقاله اش می گوید که پشتون ها و تاجک ها در مناطق مختلف کشور در همنوایی و همدلی زندگی می کنند.

البته این یک حقیقت است که تا کنون پشتون و غیر پشتون در کشور در همدلی و همنوایی زندگی کرده اند مگر این که عبدالرحمن و نادرشاهی، محمد گل مومندی را به خدمت گرفته و دمار از روزگار مردمان غیر پشتون با اجیر کردن برخی از پشتون ها برآورده باشند. اما در نوشتهء جناب فاروی اعظم، جالب این است که ایشان کابل و هرات را در اصل پشتون نشین می خواند. این شاهد ناحق شاید دست شاهد های اجیر در دروازه های محاکم را نیز از پشت بسته است. آیا خنده دار تر ازین حرفی یافت می شود که کابل و هرات شهر های در اصل پشتون نشین باشند؟ آیا هرگز زمانی در تاریخ بوده است که زبان مردم کابل و هرات چیزی جز فارسی باشد؟ پس روی کدام دلیل ایشان این دو ولایت را "در اصل پشتون نشین" می خوانند؟

فاروق اعظم یکی از صد ها چهره ییست که منسوب به حزب اسلامی حکمتیار بوده و امروز جز حاکمیت به ریاست جناب کرزی است. او که خبر تجزیهء افغانستان را شنیده است، در عین حالی که ریاکارانه به همنوایی پشتون و تاجک اشاره می کند، با دیده درایی تمام کابل و هرات را پشتون نشین قلمداد می کند تا در آینده زمینه یی ساخته باشد برای تصاحب کابل.

آیا همچو ادعایی می تواند یک ادعای سالم باشد؟ نخست این که پشتون نشین بودن و تاجک نشین بودن روی چه معیاری استوار است؟ دوم این که آیا در طول تاریخ زمانی بوده است که نفوس پشتون ها در کابل و هرات بیش از غیر پشتون ها باشد؟ سوم این که آیا ادعای پشتون نشین بودن و تاجک نشین بودن خود راه اندازی دعوی و مرافعه طلبی قومی نیست؟ چهارم این که آیا به کسی که خود را عالم دین و مجاهد می شمارد، زیبنده و مناسب است که به راه اندازی همچو دعوی هایی بپردازد؟

بهتر است بدانیم که نوشتهء فاروق اعظم به گونهء غیر مستقیم از طالبان و جنگ آنها دفاع کرده و تلویحاً می خواهد بگوید که سایر اقوام این کشور نیز با آنها همنوا اند. یعنی سایر اقوام از غارت کنندگان خویش، از قتل عام کننده های خویش، سربرندگان خویش، از سوزانندگان زمین و خانه های خویش و دشمنان قسم خوردهء خود دفاع می کنند. یعنی سایر اقوام کشور آنقدر احمق اند که ندانند طالب مزدور کیست و زنجیرش در دست کسانیست. زهی علمیت و "فاروقیت"!

سایت فردا در آخرین شمارهء خود گزارشی از بزرگداشت کارهای عبدالباری جهانی شاعر شناخته شدهء زبان پشتو و همو که سرود ملی کنونی را ساخته است، به نشر رساند. درین گزارش همهء مقالاتی که درین بزرگداشت خوانده شده بود، آمده است. ازان میان نقدی که براندیشه های جهانی از سوی داکتر صبورالله سیاسنگ به نشر رسیده است، افشاگر اندیشه های باری جهانی است. نوشتهء سیاهسنگ زیرعنوان "جهان جهانی" در بسیاری از رسانه های چاپی و انترنتی دیگر از جمله سایت و روزنامهء آرمان ملی نیز به نشر رسید.

در نوشتهء سیاهسنگ می خوانیم که اندیشه های باری جهانی در اشعارش "مانیفیست نژاد گرایی" را به نمایش می گذارد. او ازین شعر باری جهانی آغاز می کند که: "کندهار در قبالهء بابا من است" و می رسد به جایی که باری جهانی پس از افتخار به "سردار بودنش پشتون ها و به ویژه کندهاری ها را "شیر" و سایر اقوام را الاغ یا "خر" می پندارد و دوستی خر و شیر را ناممکن. خود برتربینی باری جهانی به پشتون و سردار هم محدود نمی ماند بلکه او تنها و تنها به کندهار وسرداران فکر می کند و حتی سایر پشتون زبان ها نیز در خیالش نیستند. بگذریم ازین که تاجک ها و فارسی زبانان کندهار در اندیشهء باری جهانی نفی بلد اند و جایگاه و ملکیت شان را باری جهانی در قبالهء بابای خود در آورده است.

همین باری جهانی با همین مفکوره و خیال و اندیشه سرود ملی کشور را می نویسد اما از سوی دیگر با نظامی که به رهبری کرزی باشد مخالف است و اشعارش می رساند که به چیزی جز حاکمیت بی چون و چرا و خالص پشتون ها و سرداران درین کشور راضی نیست. چرا که در اندیشهء جهانی نظام کنونی دارای دو معاون رییس جمهور از اقوام دیگر است که "شیر" نیستند.

آیا فکر تجزیهء کشور مبتنی بر حماقت است؟

ازدید بنده، این فکر اگر احمقانه است یا غیر احمقانه، معلول حماقت هاییست که درین کشور صورت می گیرد. زمانی که ملا و مجاهد یک قوم شهر ها را برای قوم خود دعوا کنند و به اصطلاح جر بیندازد و نامش را هم "فاروق اعظم" بگذارد و یک بار هم نیندیشد که فاروق اعظم لقب حضرت عمر خلیفه دوم مسلمین است که به عدل و داد بینظیرش به این لقب دست یافته است نه با جرانداختن شهر ها به نام "در اصل: فلان قوم نشین؛ وقتی شاعری که سرود ملی کشور را می سازد، قوم خودش را شیر و دیگر اقوام را خر خطاب کند و حتی دوستی میان شیر (قوم خودش) و خر (سایر اقوام) را ناممکن بخواند، و زمانی که پروفیسور منسوب به یک قوم از تلویزیون یک کشور مدرن اروپایی کشتن و بستن و اعمال زور و فشار را راه ساختن یک حکومت قومی در افغانستان نسخه بپیچد، آیا می شود باز هم پذیرای اندیشهء زیست باهمی درین کشور بود؟

این ها همه یکسو، وقتی یک حزب فعال سیاسی که پیگیرنده اینهمه افکار فاشیستی است، گردانندهء اصلی برنامه های سیاسی درین کشور باشد و از امور تعلیم و تربیه تا دفاع و مالیه و فرهنگ را با اعضا و همفکران مشخص خویش زیر نظر داشته و سمت دهی کند، آیا زمینه برای پذیرش آنچه امریکایی ها در مورد تجزیه و برای حل مشکل خود ارائه می کنند، آماده تر از هروقت دیگر نمی شود؟

هیچ فرد و هیچ سازمان سیاسی از مردم افغانستان تاکنون حرف و حدیث تجزیه را پیش نکشیده است. مردم به پیامد ها و امکانات این اندیشهء خونبار آگاه اند. تا کنون همهء تلاش ها در جهت "ازهمین خاک جهان دگری ساختن" بوده است. این جهان دیگر باید مبنی و مبتنی بر عدالت اجتماعی و اصل حقوق شهروندی باشد نه اصل حاکمیت یک قوم. آیا کسانی که نه سال این کشور را برای ساختن یک حکومت تک قومی و قوم محور ضایع ساخته اند، خود در پهلوی خیانت علیه منافع کلیه شهروندان کشور، احمقتر ازآن امریکایی نیستند که تجزیهء کشور را برای حل مشکل امنیت پیشنهاد می کند؟

احمقتر آنهایی اند که به خاطر به کارگیری واژه های "دانشجو" و "دانشگاه" که کلمات سچه و ریشه دار در زبان آنهاست، مردم را به کیفر می رسانند. احمقتر آنهایی اند که در شورای ملی خود را و قوم خود را یگانه مالک این آب و خاک می خوانند. احمقتر آنهایی اند که سکاندار امور کشور اند و وظیفه و مسوولیت ساختن کشور برای همه مردمان آن را دارند اما همه به فکر قوم خود، اکثریت تراشی و اقلیت تراشی، تغییر ترکیب قومی مناطق، چور و غصب دارای ها و ملکیت های مردم به نفع یک قوم، ستایش از جباران قومپرست و چهره های بدنام و فاشیست و پیروی از شیوه های عبدالرحمن خانی تامین حاکمیت در کشور اند.

حماقت اینها زمانی آشکارتر می شود که دریابیم در عصر انفجار آگاهی و معلومات، زمانی که دیگر هیچ فردی را نمی شود به هیچ انقیادی جز انقیاد قانون مورد پذیرشش در آورد؛ زمانی که مردم نگاه و دیدگاه آزادانه وآگانه به تاریخ و گذشته و هویت خود دارد و مادامی که دیگر خون کردن بینی یک انسان نیز اعتراض سراسر جهان را بر می انگیزد و زندگی در جهان کنونی بدون همنوایی با معیار ها و ذهنیت عامهء جهانیان نا ممکن است و برتر از همه، مادامی که کشور ما افغانستان بدون کمک جامعهء جهانی توانایی یک روز ایستادن روی پای خود را نداشته در دام هیولای بی یال و دمی به نام طالبان والقاعده می افتد... در همچو شرایطی حدیث تامین حاکمیت قومی را بیان کردن و اندیشهء ساختن حکومت تک قومی را دنبال کردن آیا چار نعل به سمت حماقت تاختن نیست؟

با اندوه و سوگ فراوان باید گفت که کشور ما درین نه سال گرفتار چنین حماقت هایی بوده است. ازینروست که کار ما به جایی نمی رسد و امروز آتش نفاق در غرب کابل دق الباب دارد. آتش نفاق قومی مانند قوغ زیرخاکستر هستی این کشور را تهدید می کند، اما شماری در آن بالا ها دل به همین آتش خوش کرده اند و روی آن دیگ مراد می پزند. هوس دادن "هویت پشتونی" به افغانستان که دکترین حزب افغان ملت است، هستی این کشور را به لبه نیستی کشانده است. چرا هویت ملی این کشور ترکیب کلیه هویت های موجود کشور نباشد تا وحدت ملی تامین و حدیث تجزیه قصهء مفت نشود. چرا و چرا و چرا؟

برخی ها با خیالات واهی تجزیهء افغانستان را "جنون و خیال و محال" می خوانند و فکر می کنند که با برزبان راندن و نوشتن چنان یک جملهء مسجع، وحدت ملی تامین است و دنیا به کام. اما به این دوستان باید گفت که یک بار به عقب نگاه کنید و بنگرید که آیا افغانستان در گذشته تجزیه شده است یا خیر؟ تجزیه کنندگان این کشور به خوبی می دانند که چگونه در ذهن و روان برخی ها خانه کنند و خودخواهی را در آنها تا جایی هوا بدهند که راهی جز تجزیه برای دیگران باقی نماند. باید به یاد آورد که اگر سلطان محمد خان طلایی پشاور را با یک خریطه طلا فروخت، خلف الصدق های بیشماری درین خاک می توانند برایش بیابند که بخش های دیگرش را نیز از ایشان بخرند... ایشان "کلچر وسوسایتی" یی را که بتوانند دران درز بیندازند و تباهش کنند، خوب می شناسند. باید آن کلچر و آن سوسایتی را دگرگون کرد.

اگر تجزیهء این کشور خواب راحت را از ما می گیرد، پس باید در راه یکی ساختنش و بهم رساندن مردمی که هویت های قومی جداگانه یی دارند، کار و تلاش کرده و دژ استوار و رخنه پذیری ازان ساخت. این ممکن نیست مگر با ترک خود خواهی و قومپرستی.

اگر تجزیهء افغانستان اندیشهء احمقانه است، باید به حماقت هایی که تجزیه را موجه می سازد پایان داد

[Parsistani]

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[Parsistani]

Quote

U.S. lawmakers met with Karzai opponents over possible Taliban deal

By JONATHAN S. LANDAY AND WARREN P. STROBEL

McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON -- Four members of the House of Representatives held talks last month in Europe with leaders of Afghanistan's ethnic minorities opposed to President Hamid Karzai and his U.S.-backed initiative to open political negotiations with the Taliban.

The delegation of three Republicans and one Democrat was organized by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., who said he shares the minority leaders' objections to a deal with the Taliban, as well as their demand for changes to reduce Karzai's powers and allow greater provincial autonomy.

"None of the people of Afghanistan except for the crooks at the top are interested in a central government with all the power," Rohrabacher said in a telephone interview last week. "That's the model that we have been trying to force with our military ... on the people of Afghanistan."

Several experts cautioned that the July 31 meeting in Berlin could fuel the distrust with which Karzai regards the U.S. because of tensions over issues like high-level official corruption and the extensive fraud that marred his re-election last year to a second five-year term.

"Karzai is prone to seeing conspiracies everywhere and he has been concerned that the United States would desert him before he deserted the United States," said Marvin Weinbaum, a scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington. "He could conceivably take any meeting like this as a back-channel effort to replace him."

That possibility doesn't appear to bother Rohrabacher.

"We hope that there is a message in this that Karzai had better understand that we are aware that there is adamant opposition to any proposal to bring the Taliban back into this government," said Rohrabacher, who's been involved with Afghanistan since the 1979-89 Soviet occupation.

In addition to Rohrabacher, the Berlin talks were attended by Duncan Hunter, R-Calif.; Louie Gohmert, R-Texas; and C.A. "Dutch" Ruppersberger, D-Md. Several U.S. diplomats and intelligence officials also were present, Rohrabacher said.

Rohrabacher is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, while Hunter is on the Armed Services Committee, Gohmert is on the Judiciary Committee and Ruppersberger is on the Intelligence Committee.

The Afghans in Berlin, which included a former vice president, "don't feel the United States is listening to them because of our relationship with Karzai," Ruppersberger said.

The State Department declined to comment, but a senior official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly, said: "We don't have any particular concerns."

The meeting was held as Karzai pursues - with the blessings of the United States and its NATO allies and at the urging of Pakistan - an effort to open talks with the Taliban and allied groups on a political agreement to end the nearly nine-year war.

Karzai's national reconciliation initiative has ignited tensions with leaders of the Northern Alliance, the now-disbanded force of mostly minority Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras that drove the Taliban from power with the help of U.S. air power in 2001.

He's purged most former Northern Alliance leaders from top positions, leaving his inner circle dominated by Pashtuns, the country's largest ethnic group, who traditionally have governed Afghanistan. They also dominate the Taliban and live mostly in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara leaders, whose communities are mostly in central and northern Afghanistan and who battled the Taliban takeover in the 1990s, oppose a power-sharing deal. They fear that the minorities will be marginalized and that the Taliban will renege on any agreement and move to reimpose their harsh brand of Islamic rule.

"The current system has taken the shape of a dictatorship. We want more authority given to the provinces," Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq, one of the Afghans who met the House members, told McClatchy Newspapers in Kabul.

Mohaqiq was joined in Berlin by Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated by two al-Qaida operatives two days before Sept. 11, 2001. Ahmad Zia Massoud, a Tajik, served as the senior of two vice presidents during Karzai's first term.

Also with them were Mohaqiq's deputy, Hussain Ali Yasa, and Faizullah Zaki, a lawmaker and top aide to the notorious Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former communist general who played a key role in ousting the Taliban and allegedly allowed the murder of up to 2,000 Taliban prisoners.

Rohrabacher's involvement with Afghanistan began during the Soviet occupation, when he served as a speechwriter for President Ronald Reagan. He entered the country with U.S.-backed rebels in 1988 after winning election to his first term, and then again during Taliban rule.

He said the only way to stabilize Afghanistan would be for the U.S. to withdraw its nearly 100,000 troops, back the minorities' demand for more autonomy and help them rebuild their own militias and take over the fight against the Taliban.

"We can beat the radicals in Afghanistan. We can't do it by trying to force people to accept a centralized government that is totally contrary to their culture," he said.

Ruppersberger said he told the Afghan leaders that they should strengthen their regions, in part through mobilizing voters and developing natural resources, which in some areas include extensive mineral deposits.However, he cautioned them that they should work within Afghanistan's "democratic structure," rather than try to oust Karzai from office.

"I kept saying, you've got the resources, you've got the numbers, you just have to organize them," Ruppersberger said.

Rohrabacher joined liberal Democrats in July in unsuccessfully opposing House approval of $33 billion in emergency funds to support the surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops being sent to Afghanistan under President Barack Obama's counterinsurgency strategy.

"I voted against it because I don't believe in sending troops to do something that can't be done," Rohrabacher said. "Wasting American lives on ... sending them to accomplish a mission that no one can accomplish via the military is immoral. I'm not going send our troops off to have their legs turned into hamburger or their wives turned into widows if there is no chance that they are going to have a success in their mission and it's going to appreciably make our country safer."

http://www.miamihera...th-karzai-oppon ents.html

[Sultan Faghal Gabari]

Yeah people dont have a life

[Parsistani]

Sultan Faghal Gabari, on 21 August 2010 - 12:13 PM, said:

Yeah people dont have a life

what do you mean?

[Parsistani]

Filthy Paki-Filthy Pashtun political marriage

Quote

The Pakistani state has a long history of nurturing jihadis as a means of dominating Afghanistan and undermining India. It is proving a fatal alliance.

Dravidian Pashtun man

It may have been a nightmarish year for Pakistan but it has been a pretty good one for the country's inscrutable chief of army staff, the most powerful man in the Land of the Pure, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

For a start, the army's response to the floods has compared well to the usual corrupt incompetence of Pakistan's civilian politicians, guided by their chateau-hopping president, Asif Ali Zardari (while minister for investment, he was nicknamed "Mr 10 Per Cent"; he has now been upgraded to "Mr 110 Per Cent"). This has led to discussion in army circles about whether it is time to drop the civilian fig leaf and return the country to the loving embrace of its military. So serious is this threat, that one of the country's most senior and well-connected journalists, Najam Sethi, editor-in-chief of the Friday Times, went on the record this month to warn that elements in the army were plotting yet another coup. "I know this is definitely being discussed," he said.

Then there was the news that Kayani was going to be allowed to keep his job for a second term: "an extraordinary situation requires an extraordinary decision to overcome it", explained a brigadier, writing in the Nation newspaper. Kayani, a former head of Pakistan's notorious intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), can now continue to run the army, and by default Pakistan's foreign policy, until November 2013.

But Kayani's biggest triumph this year, arguably the greatest of his career, was his visit to Kabul in July as the honoured guest of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. The visit marked an important thawing in Pak-Afghan relations, which have been glacial ever since Karzai came to power in 2001. It also coincided with the sacking of Amrullah Saleh, Karzai's pro-Indian and rabidly anti-ISI former security chief. Saleh is a tough Tajik who rose to prominence as a mujahedin protégé of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Indian-backed "Lion of Panjshir". The Taliban, and their sponsors in the ISI, had regarded Saleh as their fiercest opponent, something Saleh was enormously proud of.

When I had dinner with him in Kabul in May, he spoke at length of his frustration with the ineffectiveness of Karzai's government in taking the fight to the Taliban, and the extent to which the ISI was managing to aid, arm and train its puppet insurgents in North Waziristan and Balochistan. Saleh's sacking gave notice of an important change of direction by Karzai. As Bruce Riedel, Barack Obama's Af-Pak adviser, said when the news broke, "it means that Karzai is already planning for a post-American Afghanistan".

It seems that Kayani and Karzai are discussing some sort of accommodation between the Afghan government and ISI-sponsored elements in the Taliban, maybe those of Sirajuddin Haqqani, which could give over much of the Pashtun south to pro-Pakistan Taliban, but preserve Karzai in power in Kabul after the US withdrawal. The expulsion of India, Pakistan's great regional rival, from Afghanistan, or at least the closing of its four regional consulates, would be a top priority for the ISI in return for any deal that kept Karzai in power.

With the US toppling of the Taliban after the 11 September 2001 attacks, Pakistan's influence disappeared abruptly from Afghanistan and
India quickly filled the vacuum. To the ISI's horror, in the early years of this decade, India provided reconstruction assistance and training worth roughly £835m in total. It also built roads, sanitation projects, the new Afghan parliament and free medical facilities across the country. It even offered to help train the Afghan army. Nato refused. As General Stanley McChrystal put it in a report last year, "while Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures".

McChrystal was right. The Pakistanis have always been paranoid about the small Indian presence in Afghanistan. "We have strong evidence [that India is] using Afghanistan against Pakistan's interests to destabilise Pakistan," a foreign ministry spokesman claimed in March. Pakistan's military establishment, terrified of the economic superpower emerging to the south, believes it would be suicide to accept an Indian presence in what it regards as its Afghan backyard - a potential point of retreat for the army in the event of an Indian invasion, something Pakistani analysts refer to as vital "strategic depth".

According to Indian diplomatic sources, there are still fewer than 3,600 Indians in Afghan­istan; there are only ten Indian diplomatic officers, as opposed to nearly 150 in the UK embassy. Yet the horror of being encircled has led the ISI to risk Pakistan's relationship with its main strategic ally, the US, in order to keep the Taliban in play and its leadership under ISI patronage in Quetta - a policy Kayani developed while head of the ISI. Karzai's new deal with the Pakistanis, and his clear intention to try to reach some accommodation with their proxies among the Taliban, therefore represents a major strategic victory for Kayani and Pakistan's military, as well as a grave diplomatic defeat for India.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban today is only the most recent chapter of an old story of complicity between jihadi movements and the Pakistani state. Since the days of the anti-Soviet mujahedin, Pakistan's army saw violent Islamic groups as an ingenious and cost-effective means of both dominating Afghanistan (which they finally achieved with the retreat of the Soviets in 1987) and bogging down the Hindu-dominated Indian army in Kashmir (which they managed with great effect from 1990 onwards).

The former ISI director and Dick Dastardly lookalike Hamid Gul, who was largely responsible for developing the strategy, once said to me: "If the jihadis go out and contain India, tying down one million men of their army on their own soil, for a legitimate cause, why should we not support them?" Next to Gul in his Islamabad living room lay a piece of the Berlin Wall presented to him by the city's people for "delivering the first blow" to the Soviet empire through his use of jihadis in the 1980s. The WikiLeaks documents suggest he is still busy liaising with jihadis in his "retirement".

The Pakistani military top brass were long convinced that they could control the militants they have nurtured. In a taped conversation between President Pervez Musharraf and Muhammad Aziz Khan, his chief of general staff, that India released in 1999, Aziz said the army had the jihadis by their "tooti" (balls) [These filthy Pushtuns are not only homosexuals, but also good sex-slaves ] . Yet the Islamists have increasingly followed their own agendas, sending suicide bombers out against not just Pakistan's religious minorities and political leaders, but even the ISI headquarters. Nonetheless, many in the army still believe the jihadis are a more practical defence against Indian hegemony than nuclear weapons. For them, supporting Islamist groups is not an ideological or religious whim, so much as a practical and patriotic imperative - a vital survival strategy for a Pakistani state.

The army and ISI continued this duplicitous and risky policy after 11 September 2001 despite Musharraf's public promises to the contrary. The speed with which the US lost interest in Afghanistan after its invasion and embarked on plans to invade Iraq convinced the Pakistani army that the Washington had no long-term commitment to Karzai's regime. This led to the generals keeping the Taliban in reserve, to be used to reinstal a pro-Pakistani regime in Kabul once the American gaze had turned elsewhere.

So it was that the ISI gave refuge to the leadership of the Taliban after it fled from Afghan­istan in 2001. Mullah Mohammed Omar was kept in an ISI safehouse in Quetta; his militia was lodged in the sprawling suburb of Pashtunabad. There, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar presided over the Taliban military committee and war chest. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-e-Islami, was lured back from exile in Iran and allowed to operate freely outside Peshawar, while Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of the most violent Taliban commanders, was given sanctuary in North Waziri­stan. Other groups were despatched to safehouses in Balochistan.

By 2004, the US had filmed Pakistani army trucks delivering Taliban fighters at the Afghan border and recovering them a few days later; wireless monitoring at the US base at Bagram picked up Taliban commanders arranging with Pakistani army officers at the border for safe passage as they came in and out of Afghanistan. Western intelligence agencies concluded that the ISI was running a full training programme for the Afghan Taliban, turning a blind eye as they raised funds in the Gulf and allowing them to import materiel, mainly via Dubai. By 2005 the Taliban, with covert Pakistani support, were launching a full-scale assault on Nato troops in Afghanistan and being given covering fire as they returned to their bases in Pakistan.

At the same time, Taliban attacks on Indian interests in Afghanistan intensified, beginning the process of turning the Afghan conflict, like that in Kashmir, into what it is today: an Indo-Pak proxy war. The Indian embassy in Kabul was twice bombed - in July 2008 and October 2009 - as were two city-centre hotels thought to have been used by the Research and Analysis Wing (Raw), the Indian intelligence agency. Seven Indian civilians and two Indian military officers died in the blasts.

The degree to which the ISI has been controlling the Afghan Taliban has only just become clear, and not just in the documents published by WikiLeaks. A report by Matt Wald­man of the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard, based on interviews with ten former senior Taliban commanders, closely documents how the ISI "orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences" the Taliban and shows how the ISI is even represented on the Taliban's supreme leadership council, the Quetta Shura.

Meanwhile, in the Punjab, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba, and the man believed to have been behind the 2008 Bombay attacks, has been allowed to continue operating from Muridke, near Lahore. "The powerful western world is terrorising Muslims," he told a conference in Islamabad this year. "We are being invaded, manipulated and looted. We must fight the evil trio of America, Israel and India. Suicide missions are in accordance with Islam. In fact, a suicide attack is the best form of jihad." [Typical, filthy Pashtun Jews, the enemies of God, Islam and it´s prophetes. Kill them all. Call Jihad against Pushtuns"!]

At the same time as pursuing its policy of selectively using jihadis, Pakistan has appeased the US by giving generous assistance to the CIA in arresting foreign Arab al-Qaeda personnel. A major assault was also launched against both the militants who took over the Lal Masjid and the ultra-radical Pakistan Taliban who took over the Swat Valley and announced their intention of turning the country into an Islamic Emirate. In the course of these operations and others in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, more than 1,500 Pakistani soldiers and policemen were killed; another 250,000 people were made homeless in the Pak army assault on Bajaur. The ISI has even been prepared to arrest any members of the Afghan Taliban who didn't follow orders. Hence the seizure in Karachi, in February, of the Taliban second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, along with about a dozen other senior Taliban whom the ISI regarded as infringing on their hospitality by opening talks with the Karzai administration via the Saudis, without ISI clearance.

Yet, even though the Pakistani army has conducted major offensives in six of the tribal areas, the seventh, North Waziristan, has been left alone, as it is home to the ISI's favourite proxies: Haqqani and Hekmatyar. Similarly, Pakistan's foot-dragging response to the 2008 attacks on Bombay, and the lack of response to the attacks on minority faith groups in Pakistan over the past few months, show that the Janus-faced policy remains in place. This summer, the chief minister of the Punjab, Shahbaz Sharif, was quoted heatedly denying that there were any militant groups working in the Pakistani Punjab, or that the Punjabi Taliban even existed. There are still, in the eyes of many in the Pakistani establishment, good Taliban and bad Taliban, useful militants and expendable ones.

In their eyes, the ongoing defeat of Nato in Afghanistan, with US and British troops suffering record casualties last month, is a vindication of its long-term strategy. Islamabad has succeeded in regaining influence in Afghanistan and Delhi has been checked. But India will not take this lying down. Already the Indian press has reported attempts to resuscitate the Northern Alliance as a contingency against the Taliban's takeover of the south, and here India is working in conjuction with Russia, Iran and the central Asian "stans". The Indian national security adviser, Shivshankar Menon, was despatched to Afghanistan in March, and the foreign minister, S M Krishna, has visited Tehran. Post-American Afghanistan is looking increasingly likely to be divided between the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara north and the Pashtun south, either formally, with a partition, or more likely, to slip into inter-ethnic civil war, with India supporting and arming the north and Pakistan the south. [KILL THE FUCKTOONS; KILL THEM ALL!!!]

As diplomacy gathers pace, the Afghan Tali­ban, who already control over 70 per cent of the country, continue to increase their power. The most worrying development has been the spread of Taliban units to the previously peaceful north, where they have taken over pockets of Pathan settlement around Kunduz and Badakhshan. The death of the British aid worker Karen Woo on 5 August was a direct result.

In Pakistan, too, jihadi activity is growing. Last year there were 87 suicide attacks across the country, killing roughly 3,000 people and the ISI this week stated that, for the first time in the nation's history, it regarded home-grown Islamic militants to be a bigger threat to the integrity of the nation than India. Yet the army continues to obsess about India. In a recent speech, Kayani emphasised that although the army knows the dangers of militancy, it was against Indian attacks that he was principally focused. At a time when Pakistan's economy is in crisis, electricity supply increasingly erratic and the educational system in complete breakdown, Kayani has secured a huge increase in the country's defence budget.

It is not a pretty picture: growing violence everywhere, increasing Indo-Pak tensions and a defeat for western interests in the region. Worst of all, because the Pakistani army regards this as a major triumph, it is unlikely to change its policy any time soon.
http://www.newstates...tan-afghanistan

DEATH TO FILTHY BLACK TAILED PAKIS

[Sultan Faghal Gabari]

divison Impossible

[Parsistani]

Sultan Faghal Gabari, on 24 August 2010 - 07:38 AM, said:

divison Impossible

Don´t talk out of your back. ''Devision Impossible'' LOL Just you say it so it won´t happen? Who you are? Filthy Pushtuns will get killed and hunted like dogs and slaves. There won´t be any future for them in a tomorrow Afghanistan. First, educate yourself political than come and give some statements. At least, you could explain your ''devision Impossible''. Partition is a fact and the reality in Afghanistan, today and tomorrow. Former Balkan states and the Caucasian republic are the proof everything is possible. You should reread all the articles, from the first to the last one. Than you will understand that even the people call for a partition otherwise they will kill, rape and sell Pashtuns in all non-Pashtun lands, upward from Kandahar to Kunduz, Herat, Balkh, Mazar, Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad and Badakhshan

[Parsistani]

Quote

http://kabulpress.or...hp?article21056
Javed Ludin, the monkeyzai and Khar-Zais corrupt tribal system

The Afghan Ambassador to Canada illegally verifies his younger brother’s educational documents to get him appointed in high position in the government. By acknowledging his brother’s educational certificates from Peshawar schools in Pakistan and by illegally verifying his documents, Jawid Ludin, the Afghan Ambassador to Canada commits an obvious act of corruption.

Qaseem Ludin, the younger brother of the ambassador, had studied at the Abasyn Institute of Management Sciences—a private educational center in Peshawar —between June 14, 2000 and September 17, 2000, and received a completion certificate for this short-term course. Ignoring the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education’s Academic Solidarity Affairs Department in Afghanistan, the ambassador officially, but illegally recognized and certified his brother’s short term course certificate in place of a proper BA or BSc diploma, in the Afghan Embassy in Canada on April 2010 one decade later.

According to Mohammad Hassan Rashiq, head of the Academic Solidarity Affairs Department in the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education, “The Afghan embassy can only certify the stamp and certification of the Office of Foreign Affairs of a country where the embassy is located.” Strongly expressing concerns over the issue of certifying educational documents, Mr. Rashiq said that the Afghan Embassy’s act in this matter is against the rules and regulations of the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education. According to Mr. Rashiq, “The embassy is a political entity, not an academic institution.”

Mr. Osman Osmani proposes someone with no basic knowledge of or training in planning or policy as his Planning and Policy Deputy in the High Office of Oversight and Anti Corruption (HOO). Mr. Osmani the head of HOO requested Mr. Qaseem Ludin as his planning and policy deputy ignoring the fact that Mr. Ludin has no study or work background in this field.

Mr. Qaseem Ludin’s only documents are a certificate from his three-month long course at the Abasyn Institute of Management Sciences in Peshawar, Pakistan; and his master’s degree in Environmental Studies Geography from Wilfrid Laurier University in Ontario, Canada. None of these two degrees are remotely related to his previous post as senior advisor to the HOO and his current post as the Deputy of Planning and Policy for the HOO.

Turning a blank eye to Mr. Ludin’s professional field and his incapacity to serve as professional deputy of planning and policy in HOO, Mr. Osmani nominated Mr. Qaseem Ludin for this post just to keep Ambassador Ludin and President Karzai happy. Mr. Osmani’s favor to ambassador Ludin’s efforts and President Karzai’s biased decision paid off handsomely to younger Ludin’s employment attempts.

A young gentleman with a background in geography drafts plans and policies in HOO. No surprise! This is how most other high-ranking officials have been hired in Karzai’s administration.

The Afghan Labor law states clearly that no one should be hired in any governmental posts unless his documents are verified by the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education. But Mr. Osmani, the head of HOO says that when the need arises he can recruit staff to fill the gap without verifying their documents first—the way he hired Mr. Qaseem Ludin.

Mr. Osmani told me in a phone interview that he hired Mr. Qaseem Ludin on direct order of the Afghan President. Now, about six months after Mr. Ludin has served as the planning and policy deputy, Mr. Osmani—coming under pressure from various media organizations—had no choice but to send Mr. Ludin’s illegally verified documents to the Ministry of Higher Education for examination. Agreeing with the reasoning of Mr. Osmani, Mr. Abdul Razaq Zulali, HOO Administration and Finance Deputy says that nothing is wrong with the way Mr. Ludin was hired and nothing is wrong with his educational documents either.

Zulali claims that for an ordinary employee, it is crucial that his documents must be verified and his work background must be checked; however, according to Mr. Zulali, “such rules don’t apply to political posts like ministers and deputy ministers.” Mr. Ludin’s current post is similar to that of a deputy minister.

Currently, Mr. Ludin is drafting plans and policies for HOO to fight corruption in such a situation that his own educational documents have not been officially verified for the past six months, meaning that Mr. Qaseem Ludin has been serving as the planning and policy deputy in the HOO for the past nearly seven months with no official document in place.

Mr. Zulali added that HOO has no time limit or deadline for Mr. Ludin to complete the verification process of his documents. According to Mr. Zulali, it may take up to one year to verify his documents.

The HOO was set up as an independent organization to oversee the corruption and make policies to fight it. The authorities of HOO are equivalent to that of a ministry.

The President’s Office of Administration Affairs(OAA) whose sole responsibility in recruiting and employing high-ranking government officials is to make sure the documents are genuine and authentic bypasses Qaseem Ludin’s three-month long certificate and its acceptance as a proper BA degree equivalent.

Not only that, the OAA also ignored the fact that Qaseem Ludin had been charged with bad debt payment in his previous job at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Needless to say, Mr. Ludin hasn’t paid his debt to date this article being written. Finally, President Karzai signs off on Mr. Osmani’s request letter and appoints Qaseem Ludin as the Planning and Policy Deputy at the HOO, because he knows Ludin’s older brother.

Despite the international community’s push to end corruption, the Afghan government, particularly President Hamid Karzai and his close allies like Mr. Jawid Ludin and Mr. Osmani have no intention to fight corruption themselves.

To respond to president Obama’s call to fight against corruption, President Karzai established the HOO to oversee the anti corruption efforts, but ironically the President appointed corrupt people like Mr. Osmani as the head and Mr. Qaseem Ludin as the Planning and Policy Deputy for this organization.

When a convoy is led by such men, no doubt it will never reach the final target destination.

How can the people of Afghanistan expect the HOO to oversee the anti corruption effort, when they commit corruption within the organization?

How can lower level Afghan government employees be stopped from bribery and corruption, when a high-ranking government diplomat like Mr. Jawid Ludin does it so obviously and without consequences?

How can the international community and the Afghan civil society stop corruption or fight against it, when the even the Afghan president commits it with such arrogance and ease.
Look also here http://tajikam.com/f...corrupt-monkey/

[Sultan Faghal Gabari]

Parsistani, on 24 August 2010 - 05:57 PM, said:

Don´t talk out of your back. ''Devision Impossible'' LOL Just you say it so it won´t happen? Who you are? Filthy Pushtuns will get killed and hunted like dogs and slaves. There won´t be any future for them in a tomorrow Afghanistan. First, educate yourself political than come and give some statements. At least, you could explain your ''devision Impossible''. Partition is a fact and the reality in Afghanistan, today and tomorrow. Former Balkan states and the Caucasian republic are the proof everything is possible. You should reread all the articles, from the first to the last one. Than you will understand that even the people call for a partition otherwise they will kill, rape and sell Pashtuns in all non-Pashtun lands, upward from Kandahar to Kunduz, Herat, Balkh, Mazar, Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad and Badakhshan

yeah but a dishwasher didnt have to do anything with that so why are you trying to take credit for it take credit for reaching germany which you think is matter of pride ............

[Parsistani]

Quote

http://www.megavideo.com/?v=LR6KQ2X2
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=RQHRUDFA
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=G7JDTDHN
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=U1Z3BM0N
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=80UUA6GH (Day Chopan; Persian soldier gives order with his American comrade)

Australians vs Taliban
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=140B4YU3

Dutch vs Taliban
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=Q4A57AW5

German sniper Taliban snipers LOL
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=QBU23VB4

Battling Taliban in Nauzaad
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=Y233STS6

The wonder weapon of Americans and NATO for colleteral damages
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=PH7NH7JM

Terrorists try to run away from the ''72 virgins''
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=A82X4P00

Pashtun and Arab support in tribal areas of Pakistan for Taliban
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=JRQE14BI

Pashtunwali Terrorists caught by ANA and American Force in Helmand
http://www.megavideo.com/?v=3U5GH3D9

[Sultan Faghal Gabari]

well what ahve these to with partition of afghanistan that you are proposing

[Parsistani]

Sultan Faghal Gabari, on 25 August 2010 - 01:00 PM, said:

well what ahve these to with partition of afghanistan that you are proposing

Pashtuns vs Non-Pashtuns. Civilisation vs Barbarians and cave-monkies

[Sultan Faghal Gabari]

Parsistani, on 25 August 2010 - 06:02 PM, said:

Pashtuns vs Non-Pashtuns. Civilisation vs Barbarians and cave-monkies

yes but germans arenot i the list so you cannt claim anything here cuz if germans were here u could have taken pride for your mothers customers.

[Parsistani]

non-Pashtuns hate Pashtuns and can t go along with them