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Gabaro_glt Icon : (26 March 2013 - 10:17 AM) Tajikistan was inhabited by the races of Cyrus the great (Sultan skindar Zulqarnain). The achmaniend dynasty ruled the entire region for several thousnd years.Cyrus the great's son cymbasis(Combchia)with forces migrated to Balkh ancient Bactaria or Bakhtar. Sultan Sumus the desecndant of Cyrus the great faught war against Alaxander of Macdonia in Bakhtar current tajikistan.
this ruling class was inhabited in the areas, like Balkh,fargana,alai,Tajikistan,badakhshan,Kabul,Takhar,Tashkorogan,Khutan,kashkar,Swat,Kashmir,Peshawar, hashtnager,Dir, Bajour,Gilgit,for serveral thaousand years.
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Gabaro_glt Icon : (26 March 2013 - 10:00 AM) Tajikistan was inhabited by the races of Cyrus the great (Sultan skindar Zulqarnain). The achmaniend dynasty ruled the entire region for several thousnd years.Cyrus the great's son cymbasis(Combchia)with forces migrated to Balkh ancient Bactaria or Bakhtar. Sultan Sumus the desecndant of Cyrus the great faught war against Alaxander of Macdonia in Bakhtar current tajikistan.
this ruling class was inhabited in the areas, like Balkh,fargana,alai,Tajikistan,badakhshan,Kabul,Takhar,Tashkorogan,Khutan,kashkar,Swat,Kashmir,Peshawar, hashtnager,Dir, Bajour,Gilgit,for serveral thaousand years.
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Gabaro_glt Icon : (25 March 2013 - 10:48 AM) Asssssssssalam o Alaikum
Gabaro_glt Icon : (22 March 2013 - 05:22 AM) I would like to here something from a tajik brother/sister living in Tajikstan
Gabaro_glt Icon : (22 March 2013 - 05:20 AM) I have traced my ancestors migrated from Panj and Balkh ancient
Gabaro_glt Icon : (22 March 2013 - 05:19 AM) I am desendant of Sultan behram Gabari Tajik living in GilGit pakistan
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  1. Abdul Ghafur Breshna

    Posted 28 Jul 2008

    Who was this guy Abdul Ghafur Breshna?
  2. Kandahar Province and the New Wave of Violence

    Posted 24 Jul 2008

    By Waliullah Rahmani

    The heavy fighting that took place in the Sangsar area of Kandahar province on April 14 and 15 is indicative of the critical security situation in this most strategic region of southern Afghanistan. It is widely reported that 41 militants and six policemen were killed after Afghan security forces, backed by U.S.-led coalition helicopters, attacked a suspected Taliban hideout in and around the village of Sartak (about 40 km south of Kandahar city).

    Even before this major engagement, security in Kandahar province was sharply deteriorating, with a significant increase in suicide bombings and small-arms attacks. On April 3, a suspected Taliban militant tried to assassinate the chief of police of Arghandab District. The attack was foiled by the police chief's bodyguards. Moreover, on April 1 a suicide bomber targeted a joint Canadian-Afghan military convoy in the Maiwand District. According to Afghan National Army (ANA) Lt. Gen. Rehmatullah Raufi, only the suspected suicide bomber was killed in the attack (Pajhwok Afghan News, April 1). Later during the day, purported Taliban spokesman Mohammad Hanif claimed responsibility for the attack (Ariana TV, April 1).

    Furthermore, according to Afghan state TV, a suspected suicide bomber attacked the ANA in Arghandab District on March 31, killing only himself. In yet another suicide attack, this time in Kandahar city, the suspected bomber injured five local residents (Afghan State TV, March 30). These suicide bombings were followed by a bold attack on a police checkpoint that killed four policemen and injured three others (Azadi Radio, April 3). Following these increasingly bold attacks, Kandahar's provincial governor, Asadullah Khalid, claimed that four "terrorists" had been detained and that they had already confessed involvement in three bomb blasts and one suicide attack (Pajhwok Afghan News, April 12).

    Kandahar: The Taliban's Headquarters

    The Taliban movement (in its current form, at least) was born in Kandahar province in 1994 when Mullah Omar was appointed leader. The symbolic significance of Kandahar was so strong that even when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, Mullah Omar and his hardcore supporters decided against relocating to the Afghan capital. Throughout the reign of the Taliban (1996-2001) and beyond, the local population has remained loyal to this enigmatic movement. The enduring strength and popularity of the movement is partly rooted in the Taliban's synthesis of rural Islamic values and Durrani Pashtun culture. Broadly speaking, Pashtuns have tended to see the Taliban as symbols of the revival of old Pashtun glory. It is this Pashtun nationalism that is the driving force of the current insurgency.

    In an interview with Terrorism Monitor, Afghan political analyst Razaq Mamoon said that there are historical antecedents to the current insurgency in Kandahar province. "From the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani (a Pashtun king during the 18th century), Kandahar has produced political and military leaders, just as today it is producing terrorist and insurgent leaders that are leading the fight against the foreign-backed [Hamid] Karzai government," Mamoon explained. According to Mamoon, "the former kingsAbdur Rahman Khan, Zahir Shah and the republicans such as Dawood Khanwere all KandahariThe Taliban regime was an extreme case of this norm as most of its top brass hailed from Kandahar. The Taliban were trying to tell the world that Kandahar is the center of Afghanistan."

    This intriguing historical factor notwithstanding, Kandahar governor Asadullah Khalid has stressed geographic factors in the deteriorating insurgency, claiming that the Taliban "chose Kandahar province because of its 'geopolitical' position and because it borders Pakistan" (Aina TV, March 31).

    The Insurgent Landscape

    According to the Afghan Islamic Press, Mullah Omar has claimed that a stream of young Afghans are volunteering for suicide missions in Kandahar and other provinces (Gulf Times, March 18). This was followed by reports that Taliban and other Pashtun insurgents were planning as many as 500 suicide bombings in Kandahar and neighboring provinces (Aina TV, March 31). While these figures may be bravado, it is undeniable that the rate of suicide bombings has increased dramatically in the past month. At the very least, this is a sign of the Pashtun militants' determination to make the southern regions of the country as unstable as possible.

    In a message to the Karzai government, a popular daily warned Kabul to take new Taliban threats seriously (Rahe Nejat, April 2). Previously, the daily warned that following its ouster in late 2001, the Taliban had meticulously re-organized into small groups and was a growing menace to southeastern provinces generally and Kandahar specifically (Rahe Nejat, March 2).

    The central questions revolve around the precise identity of Kandahar's insurgents and the specific factors that motivate them. It seems that ordinary people and the government are seriously split over this issue. In an interview with Terrorism Monitor, "Omar," a Kandahari resident, blamed the insurgency on the destruction of opium fields. "Government officials only destroy the opium lands of poor farmers, but they do not touch the opium fields of rich people who have connections to the government," Omar said.

    Meanwhile, in an exclusive interview with Terrorism Monitor, the defense commission chief of the Lower House (Wolisi Jirga) of the Afghan parliament and a representative of Kandahar province, Noor ul-Haq Ulumi, maintained that the insurgents are hardcore Taliban and "those who come from abroad." Moreover, Ulumi said that most of the suicide attackers and armed men are poor, hail from the lower classes of Kandahari society and are clearly dissatisfied with some government policies. "Some of the attackers have lost relatives in U.S. bombings, or they are generally dissatisfied with government officialsthe neighboring countries exploit these conditions and support marginalized people in Kandahar," Ulumi said in a thinly disguised reference to Pakistan.

    The Role of Shuras

    The local shuras (councils) exercise general control over the villages not only in Kandahar, but in most other Afghan provinces as well. The leaders of shuras are mostly tribal elders from the district who enjoy the support of local people. These district shuras have the most effective role in altering the peoples' ideas about the government and other movements in Kandahar province since the majority of the population is rural-based.

    In a recent report on Kandahar's security situation, the Senlis Council, a drug policy advisory forum, claims that due to a lack of government control in many districts of Kandahar, especially the ones bordering Pakistan, the shuras continue to provide support to the Taliban because they offer protection against the eradication of opium fields (Senlis Council Report, March 16).

    The Senlis Council also held a two day symposium in Kabul, during which it was claimed that out of the 13 districts in Kandahar, the central government only has control over Kandahar city, its surrounding highways, transit borders, Kandahar airport and isolated areas of some districts. It was also claimed that "in the Arghandab, Sha Wali Kot, maywand and Panjwayi districts, the government has minimal control" (Senlis Council Report, March 16).


    In response to increasing attacks in Kandahar province, Afghan Defense Minister Abdur Rahim Wardak announced a new defense and security strategy. This strategy ostensibly "includes new tactics to combat the terrorist groups and Taliban insurgents" (Taraqi, April 4).

    Moreover, the replacement of U.S. forces with Canadians and the expansion of NATO involvement in Kandahar bodes well for counter-insurgency operations. While many Kandahari residents believe that Canadians forces will not be able to stop the insurgency, they are optimistic that Canadians will be able to deal "justly" with the opium problem (Fajre Omid, April 4).

    In the final analysis, a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan will require the Afghan government and local Kandahari officials to devise a single and clear strategy and stick to it over a prolonged period. The central aspect of this plan must focus on the role and political sympathies of the shuras and how this can be altered to isolate the Taliban and Pashtun nationalists.
  3. Taliban kidnappes 2000 Usbek women- Taliban forcing thousands into army

    Posted 1 Jan 2008

    Sons, brothers and fathers seized as every family is ordered to give up one male to bolster 45,000 troops

    Luke Harding in Nowshera
    Thursday October 4, 2001
    The Guardian

    The Taliban have forcibly conscripted tens of thousands of men over the past two weeks in a desperate attempt to bolster their 45,000-strong regular army against an imminent American attack.

    The Guardian has obtained chilling testimony which reveals that the extremist militia has demanded that every household in Afghanistan provide at least one fighter for the jihad against the United States.

    Gangs of Taliban soldiers have implemented the edict by dragging men at gunpoint out of their homes. They have also seized them in the streets or pulled them out of cars as they attempt to flee the country. These recruits are now being sent to vulnerable positions in the frontline - and are likely to be the first, innocent casualties of any large-scale American military onslaught.

    Article continues
    One mother from Kabul, Faheema, yesterday described how her son, a second-year medical student, was seized by a Taliban press gang.

    The news that every family had to give one man was announced early last week from Afghanistan's mosques, she said. Her son Farhad and his friends from the student hostel of Kabul University immediately went into hiding. For several days Farhad hid in his mother's house in east Kabul. But last Wednesday his luck ran out.

    "A Datsun pick-up full of Taliban arrived outside our house. Two Taliban with guns stood at the door and one of them came in. They dragged Farhad off. I cried and pleaded with them not to take him away. They said 'You will see him later'," Faheema recalled.

    Across Afghanistan, Farhad's story is being repeated. The Taliban have warned that they will shoot any new recruit who tries to escape. To minimise desertion they are also transporting recruits to provinces far away from where they were originally seized.

    The heads of local mosques have been instructed to draw up lists of all men of fighting age, which means anyone over 18. There is no upper age limit.

    "My husband disappeared two or three days ago," Gul Pari, who reached Pakistan after a six-hour trek through the mountains, said last night. "He had gone shopping in the bazaar with my children when the Taliban caught him. The Taliban have taken most of the males in my village. A few of them escaped when they became aware of what was happening. I have got no idea where my husband is now. The Taliban may have killed him or he may be in jail."

    Rocket launchers

    Mrs Pari, whose four children fled with her, is from the village of Darrea Noor in eastern Kunar province, where a handful of opposition fighters still hide out in the mountains.

    "We left Afghanistan because we didn't have anything to eat," she added. According to other newly arrived refugees reaching Nowshera, a dusty cantonment close to the frontier town of Peshawar, the Taliban are massively reinforcing their positions against an American invasion.

    "I saw several tanks. The Taliban are pulling rocket launchers up the mountains. Some are being transported on donkeys," Naweed Ahmad, 18, said. His family arrived from the eastern city of Jalalabad three days ago. Jalalabad is now 95% deserted, he added.

    "I saw some Arabs strapping bombs to their bodies. They were also trying to buy Datsun pick-ups to use for fighting. We know them. There is a workshop for cars next to our house and they would come there quite often."

    Naweed estimated that there were 3,000 Arab fighters who swear allegiance to Osama bin Laden living in Jalalabad. He said the fighters were rich, and were often seen in the city shopping for vegetables. They used to be based in two of Bin Laden's camps: on a farm on a ridge in Hadda, on the outskirts of the city, and at Deronta Dam. The camps were now abandoned, he said. The Arabs were easy to spot because they drove vehicles with police registration plates. Many of them worked for the Taliban's intelligence service, he added.

    Naweed's father, Ghulam, a former policeman, decided it was time to flee when he discovered his name had been added to the list of recruits for the jihad at his neighbourhood mosque.

    "We could not live under the control of the Taliban. If you didn't turn up to the mosque to pray five times a day they would beat you," Ghulam said. "The Taliban forced me to grow a beard. If the Taliban start losing the war, I'll shave it off. Otherwise I'll keep it," he added.

    The evidence emerging from the refugees penetrating Pakistan's sealed border is that the Taliban's press-gang campaign extends across the country.


    Malika, who fled from the remote drought-ruined northern province of Faryab, lost one of her brothers to the Taliban two weeks ago.

    "My brother was searching for wood for turning into fire. He didn't come back. A neighbour told us the Taliban had taken him," she said. "They take girls too. If the Taliban get to know a beautiful girl is living somewhere they will take her."

    Malika, who belongs to Afghanistan's minority Uzbek community, said the Pashtun-dominated Taliban had taken away 2,000 Uzbek women from her area for use as concubines. The women were often sold to other Taliban fighters from southern provinces for around
  4. Persian names on Pashtun tribes

    Posted 21 Dec 2007

    How comes that some Pashtun tribes have a persian name like Durani, Niazi, Momandzai?
  5. Tajik Literature: Seventy Years is Longer Than the Millennium

    Posted 5 Dec 2007

    Journal article by John R. Perry; World Literature Today, Vol. 70, 1996

    Journal Article Excerpt


    Tajik Literature: Seventy Years Is Longer Than the Millennium

    By JOHN R. PERRY The Tajik language and its
    literature are a tangle of
    paradoxes. Tajikistan cov*
    ers much of the region where the earliest Iranian
    civilizations of the Silk Road flourished, even before
    that of the Medes and Persians on the plateau to the
    southwest; relics of much earlier Iranian languages
    are still spoken in the mountains. The written lan*
    guage and spoken lingua franca, however, has long
    been a variety of Persian, which spread to these
    parts from the Iranian plateau with the expansion of
    Islam in the eighth century. At the Samanid court of
    Bukhara this evolved into the vehicle of a great liter*
    ature, replacing Arabic in the East as the voice of
    humanistic scholarship, mysticism, and poetry, of
    Avicenna and al-Ghazali, Omar Khayyam and
    Hafiz. Rudaki, the father of Persian verse, was born
    in Tajikistan late in the ninth century. Nobody else
    of truly international note has surfaced since.

    From the eleventh to the sixteenth century, suc*
    cessive waves of invaders (the Mongols, Tamerlane,
    the Uzbeks) from Inner Asia massacred, ruled, set*
    tled, and intermarried in this zone of passage. Much
    of the Iranian population was driven into the moun*
    tains or marooned in the ancient oasis cities of the
    Oxus basin, Bukhara and Samarkand. The rank and
    file of the invaders eventually settled down to farm
    and trade among the Iranians. By the middle of the
    nineteenth century, when the Russian empire rolled
    into Central Asia, this ethnolinguistic cauldron had
    simmered down into a peasantry of turcophone
    Uzbeks and persophone Tajiks, a small urban com*
    mercial and intellectual class (chiefly Tajiks), and a
    ruling Uzbek elite that struck even the czar's gener*
    als as one of the more bloodthirsty and reactionary
    regimes of the age.

    Illiteracy and bilingualism were widespread;
    Uzbek Turkish was gaining ground as the vernacu*
    lar. Persian was still the principal written language
    of government, and classical Persian poetry was cul*
    tivated among the less devout and more iranized of
    the Uzbek khans. The spoken Persian of the north,
    including the dialect of the Jews of Bukhara, was
    heavily influenced by Turkic vocabulary and struc*
    tures. Some literate Bukharans, with the ambivalent
    support of the Russians against fierce opposition
    from the Muslim clerics, introduced a modern cur*
    riculum and methods of education for both Uzbek
    and Tajik children, modeled on the so-called Jadid
    schools devised by Tatar intellectuals of Kazan. By
    the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, the khanate of
    Bukhara was already undermined by indigenous
    teachers and poets such as Sadriddin Aini ( 1878-1954 ), who were writing a more vernacular
    style of Persian with a reformist content.

    After the Bolshevik dust settled, Uzbeks and
    Tajiks were packaged in 1929 into separate re*
    publics. There were several problems with this neat
    arrangement, apart from the sizable minorities of
    each ethnos that were left in the other's SSR.
    "Tajikistan" was allotted the Pamir Mountains and
    their western foothills, with its capital at Dushanbe,
    a Russian colonial city; Bukhara and Samarkand,
    the traditional centers of the Tajiks' literature and
    culture, were now located in "Uzbekistan." Never*
    theless, Aini and other reformers-turned-revolution*
    aries (including the Uzbek, Fitrat) turned with en*
    thusiasm and considerable debate to devising a new
    Persian literary language, "Tajik," in a new Latin al*
    phabet. A concerted educational campaign dramati*
    cally increased literacy throughout Central Asia.
    Then, a mere decade later, in 1939, Moscow de*
    creed a change from the Latin to the Cyrillic alpha*
    bet, in order to facilitate education in Russian and
    consolidate the revised version of the Soviet Union.
    This time there was no debate. Persian materials in
    Arabic script were no longer allowed into Tajikistan.

    The new literary models were to be Gorky and
    socialist realism. Aini led the obligatory parade of
    rags-to-revolution autobiographies. Some of his
    contemporaries and fellow reformers, such as Sadri
    Ziyo, did not change step adroitly enough and per*
    ished in the purges of the 1930s. Pairav Sulaimoni ( 1899-1933 ), whose poetry at first followed both
    the form and the content of classical lyrical and
    mystical verse, was fiercely criticized and in 1930
    abruptly switched to a martial brand of socialist
    realism. His daughter Gulchehra became an estab*
    lished writer who translated Russian verse and

    JOHN R. PERRY is Professor of Persian Language and Civilization
    at the University of Chicago. He has previously translated from
    Arabic (the prose and poetry of Mikhail Naimy, 1974 ) as well as
    from Persian and Tajik. His other publications include books and
    articles on Iranian history and Persian language and folk litera*
    ture. He is currently working on a history of the modern Tajik lit*
    erary language.

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January 2, 1980

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