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Partition of Aoghanistan

#41 User is offline   Kakar Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 04:25 AM

LOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOL @ pakhtuns losing jalalabad and gardez
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#42 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 11:13 AM

View PostKakar, on 28 December 2010 - 04:25 AM, said:

LOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOL @ pakhtuns losing jalalabad and gardez


Just for your information.
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Ethnic_lg.jpg
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Languages_lg.jpg

If Afghanistan get partitioned those Tajiks centres will again be fully in our hands. What will you do against it?
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#43 User is offline   Kakar Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 06:02 PM

View PostParsistani, on 28 December 2010 - 11:13 AM, said:

Just for your information.
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Ethnic_lg.jpg
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Languages_lg.jpg

If Afghanistan get partitioned those Tajiks centres will again be fully in our hands. What will you do against it?


i dont need to do anything.

the question is, what will you guys do for it?

ill let the thousands of zadrans, zazi and mangals in loya paktia do something. LOL @ losing gardez

ill let the thousands of shinwaris, mohmands etc in nangahar do something. LOL @ losing Jalalabad

you guys need to worry about Qanduz and Herat. Dont go chasing waterfalls lol

You guys are out of your mind if you think Ghazni, Wardak or Logar is available to you
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Posted 28 December 2010 - 07:10 PM

View PostKakar, on 28 December 2010 - 06:02 PM, said:

i dont need to do anything.

the question is, what will you guys do for it?

ill let the thousands of zadrans, zazi and mangals in loya paktia do something. LOL @ losing gardez

ill let the thousands of shinwaris, mohmands etc in nangahar do something. LOL @ losing Jalalabad

you guys need to worry about Qanduz and Herat. Dont go chasing waterfalls lol

You guys are out of your mind if you think Ghazni, Wardak or Logar is available to you


Why didn´t you tell us for 25 years ago? For Tajiks it would take only some hours to cleanse the entire north and eastern Afghanistan from you filths. Jaji Mangal??? These dirty filthy immigrants were running like coward dogs when even their own tribesmen came to them. Jaji Mangal and Zadrans have no influence on our regions. Jalalabad was already under Rabbani and Qanuni. Don´t worry about us..because in Qunduz your women get sold to Central Asia, your houses get looted and you get bombed to hell. In Herat, you live like gypsies. You were ever in Herat? Have you ever seen where Pashtuns live or how they live? You clean the toilettes for Heratis and the dirt under their feets. Logar´s population is high as Tajiks population is but don´t forget the rest of the non-Pashtuns who are tiered of you dogs. Those will closely and automatically ally themself with us for a better future. Don´t worry. Your words are the words of an uneducated loser. It´s not you who make the law and rules...it´s the non-Pashtuns and their leaders along their civilised world. Once Khorasan is established...no matter if he get Jalalabad or Gardez or Kandahar or not...the state between us and Pakistan will be the new play ground for all kind of terrorists, tribes, armies, thugs, rapers, killers, foreigners and many more. Just wait and see. You talk as you would stop us...no..you say you, but you won´t do anything. You just hope, cowardly, that your Paki-and Arab serving brothers will do the job for you ''brave'', ''strong'', ''tall'' Pakhtanoo. So what do you will avails from Gardez, Jalalabad etc. when they keep part of Lurfrosh Pashtunistan? Nothing!, except dust, dirt, criminals, drugs, warlords, feudal lords who will slave and kill their own people. Not to forget how IED´s Taliban will use in every part of any road to blow some black hairy asses. Get serious.

Wardaks are immigrants there. With the help of british those rats came there and settled during Abdurrahman Khan, changed Maidan to Wardak. Don´t worry, let that be our job. We will see how to work on them, be it Wardak, Paktia, Zazai, Zadran, Jadarin, Mangal, Shaghal, Khugzai, Shadizai or Mahizai
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#45 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 09:07 PM

Now we have understood.

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Northern Alliance rearms as Afghan government negotiates with Taliban

Former commanders from Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance told the The Sunday Telegraph that non-Pashtun warlords were rearming their militias in response to U.S.-brokered negotiations between Pashtun Taliban leaders and the Karzai government in Kabul, for fear their old enemies might return to power.

Earlier this week NATO allegedly helped arrange safe passage to Kabul for key insurgent leaders from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s 68-member peace council, which had been mandated to secure a potential power-sharing deal to end the 10-year old war.

The former Northern Alliance consists primarily of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras who had partnered with the US-led coalition to help defeat the Taliban during the post-9/11 takedown. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 and were infamous for its brutal repression of ethnic and religious minority groups.

Although Mr Karzai appointed senior northern leaders to the peace council it has failed to ease fears of Taliban resurgence and a Pashtun power grab. Tajik commander Naqubullah believes the current peace process is a devious plot by Mr. Karzai - himself a Pashtun - to extend Pashtun influence.

"My own opinion is it is not a peace process, it is a private deal," he said. "The Karzai family are like a mafia.”

Mr. Karzai’s cozying to Pakistan is also disconcerting to Northerners considering the Taliban are seen as an invention and puppet of the Pakistani state and its intelligence agency. The Taliban were able to run roughshod through Afghanistan in the mid-1990s due to funds, ideology, recruits, training, arms and physical support from Islamabad.

In July Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican congressman from California, led a delegation of US congressmen who met with Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek leaders in Berlin to discuss their desires for a more federal Afghanistan. Mr. Rohrabacher told The Sunday Telegraph that northern Afghans were not going to just sit by as authority is given to the Taliban to basically control their lives. Rohrabacher had said:

"If Karzai tries to bring the Taliban back into the government and our Pakistani friends start trying to muscle their way into a position of dominance in Afghanistan, then I think there will have to be acceptance that the Northern Alliance will try to protect themselves."

Adding to the confusion is the question over exactly who Karzai will be negotiating with because the Quetta Shura has denied that its senior council members are even involved in these discussions. And supposedly Karzai has cut Mullah Omar and Pakistani leadership out of this particular round altogether.

The U.S. and NATO have attempted a two pronged strategy to demoralize the Taliban by decapitating its leadership through military means and by playing Taliban elements off one another at the negotiating table. The assumption is that the Taliban have been especially weakened by recent offensives in Helmand and Kandahar.

However, although body count-wise General Petraeus has made notable progress since he took command July 4th by executing 1,500 raids that have killed 332 Taliban leaders and 929 fighters and have captured 2,217 insurgents, the General himself knows the U.S. cannot capture and kill its way to victory. The bottom line is that, according to the New York Daily News, the Taliban held a firm grip over 90% of Afghanistan before the U.S. took Kabul, but NATO and Afghan forces now barely control any turf - even with 100,000 GIs on the ground.

Some experts believe this strategy could even backfire by providing the insurgency with stronger motivation and more recruits. In fact, according to the L.A. Times, many Taliban leaders feel they’ve made significant gains, both in territorial terms and their ability to bloody U.S.-led forces. They point with satisfaction to rising Western combat deaths, which are running at their highest levels since the start of the war, and the fact that they have been able to push into more parts of the country during the last two years, even as the Western force was doubling in size.

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#46 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 09:09 PM

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Afghan warlords prepare to rearm as Taliban arrive for peace talks in Kabul

Hopes of a peace process have risen after Taliban emissaries arrived in Kabul, but fears have grown that angry northern leaders are preparing for war again.

Afghanistan's northern warlords are preparing to rearm their old militias out of fear that their Taliban enemies are on the brink of a return to power in Kabul, former gunmen and commanders have told The Sunday Telegraph.
Anger is growing in the north of Afghanistan at the prospect of a deal with President Hamid Karzai after emissaries from the rebel group were escorted to Kabul for talks last week.

Northerners whose homes were destroyed in fighting during the 1990s fear that Afghanistan stands at the beginning of a peace process that could erode their own power and eventually return Taliban supporters to the heart of government - a prospect that fills many with dread.

Earlier this month Mr Karzai inaugurated a hand-picked "peace council" of former warlords, tribal elders and clerics amid reports the Taliban's high command and its feared Haqqani network allies had already opened embryonic negotiation channels.

Last week it emerged that Afghan and American officials have been holding secret discussions with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the second ranking figure in the Taliban, in the firmest indication yet that substantive peace talks will soon begin.

Baradar, the Taliban's overall military commander until he was arrested in Karachi last February, was recently released from Pakistani custody and travelled with three senior lieutenants to Afghanistan under Nato guard.
Gen David Petraeus, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, disclosed that Taliban figures had been granted safe passage to talks in Afghanistan.

Mr Karzai's 68-member peace council has a mandate to pursue talks with the insurgents as the Nato-led war in Afghanistan enters its 10th year.
However any deal which shared power with Taliban leaders would greatly alarm Afghanistan's smaller ethnic groups, which fought for five years against the movement in the late 1990s, their leaders have said.

"If people are not actually digging up their old guns, they are at least locating them and putting a little marker on them," one diplomat in Kabul told The Sunday Telegraph.

In the district of Jabal Saraj, 60 miles north of the capital, the largely Tajik residents remember a savage, scorched-earth war of conquest by the Taliban, who came in convoys of pick-up trucks during the late 1990s.

The area changed hands three times as the Taliban, whose fighters are ethnically Pashtun from the south of Afghanistan, fought the Northern Alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras - the same alliance that eventually joined forces with the US-led coalition to drive the Taliban from power after 9/11.

Villagers said that Taliban fighters carried notes from their leaders promising an acre of the region's fertile farmland to each family after they had driven the Tajiks out.

Commander Naqibullah, a Tajik who led 500 men in desperate fighting at the time, said many felt the current attempt at a peace process was a plot by Mr Karzai - himself a Pashtun - to extend Pashtun influence.

"My own opinion is it is not a peace process, it is a private deal," he said. "The Karzai family are like a mafia.

"The Taliban attacked Jabal Saraj three times and we had to flee into the mountains. When I came back, I saw the situation of the people.

"We saw the Taliban had beaten civilians around the head with iron bars, I saw they had killed six like that. When you have seen things like that, should we accept the peace process or not?"

Sitting cross-legged beneath an almond tree in the fields where he fought a decade ago, he said his men had given up their assault rifles and grenade launchers.

"But when we handed in our weapons to the government for money, many people bought cows," he said. "If they need to, they will sell their cows for guns again."

Lt Ahmad Jawad, a gangly 26-year-old who now wears the black beret and blotchy camouflage of the Afghan border police, was in his early teens when the Taliban arrived. His brother had an arm torn off at the elbow by a Taliban air raid and he was himself soon recruited as radio operator for a Northern Alliance commander.

"They destroyed houses, they burnt all our trees, they burnt all our crops, they burnt everything," he said. "If they are really now looking for peace for Afghanistan, we are happy, but I don't think they are."

Mr Karzai's appointment of senior northern leaders to the peace council, has failed to ease fears of concessions to the Taliban. "Many in the north think this is just a Pashtun power grab," warned another foreign diplomat in Kabul. "They have not done enough at all in my opinion to bring the north along."

The growing friendship between Pakistan and Mr Karzai underpins much of the worry. The Taliban swept northward in the mid-1990s with money and arms from Islamabad, while the Northern Alliance was left looking to Iran, Russia and India for help.

Until recently the Afghan president still railed against the Pakistani military's continuing support for the Taliban. His realisation the West wants to leave Afghanistan has now forced him to reassess his long term friends, diplomats say. Relations with Islamabad have thawed.

Visitors to Pakistan's embassy in Kabul are now presented with a slim, recently-published work by the ambassador, Mohammad Sadiq, entitled Pakistan-Afghanistan: The conjoined twins.

Saleh Registani, a former MP from the Panjshir Valley north of Jabal Saraj said Mr Karzai was playing a dangerous game and his negotiation was a threat to non-Pashtuns.

"It's not very clear what this negotiation is, how it is going on, who are the negotiators and what are the limits. No one knows except Mr Karzai."
The difficulty of reconciling the Taliban with their former enemies has led some to suggest Afghanistan cannot survive as a single, centralised country.

Robert Blackwill, a former American ambassador to Delhi and national security adviser to the White House, has argued for a de facto partition.
He says the Taliban will inevitably regain control of the Pashtun south and east, and Nato forces should withdraw to the north and west from where they could continue to launch attacks on al-Qaeda targets.

In July, a delegation of US congressmen met Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek leaders in Berlin to discuss their desires for a more federal Afghanistan. Mohammed Mohaqiq, a Hazara former warlord, who has long called for a federal Afghanistan, was among those present.

Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican congressman from California who led the delegation, told The Sunday Telegraph that northern Afghans were "not going to just sit by as authority is given to the Taliban to basically control their lives".

He said: "If Karzai tries to bring the Taliban back into the government and our Pakistani friends start trying to muscle their way into a position of dominance in Afghanistan, then I think there will have to be acceptance that the Northern Alliance will try to protect themselves."

However many in Kabul argue that federalisation or partition would be a disaster, triggering ethnic war between the two halves of Afghanistan and destabilising neighbouring countries.

Andrey Avetisyan, Russian envoy to Kabul, said: "Frankly this is the most stupid idea I have ever heard of and it is extremely dangerous for Afghanistan, for its neighbours and for the region and for the whole world," he said. "We must go absolutely the opposite way, strengthening a united Afghanistan."

- The Sunday Telegraph

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 09:13 PM

Ahmad Ghani seems to be the only human among the Pashtun package of Kharzai´s terrorist team and knows what´s about when the north again rearm itself for another Taliban up-coming

Quote

Kabul seeks talks with Taliban
By Jon Boone in Kabul

President Hamid Karzai risked angering members of his government and his US backers on Tuesday when he revealed he had asked the Saudis to help broker peace talks with the Taliban leadership.

Mr Karzai said his envoys had travelled to Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Pakistan to try to kick-start negotiations that are increasingly seen as the only solution to the violent insurgency gripping Afghanistan.

“Since two years I have been sending letters and messages to the Saudi Arabian king and requested him, as a world Muslim leader, to help us bring peace in Afghanistan,” President Karzai told a news conference.

“The preparation for negotiations is going on, on a daily basis. Our envoys travelled many times to Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan, but the discussions have not started yet. We hope that it happens soon.”

According to a person familiar with the talks, the Saudis have been involved since July, when they were first approached by Pakistan-based Taliban clerics.

The Saudis sent an envoy to Kabul and started shuttling between the two sides.

Indirect talks hosted by the Saudis took place last week in Mecca but serious discussions between the two sides have yet to begin.

The Afghan leader also appealed directly to Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader who was overthrown as ruler of Afghanistan by the US-backed invasion in 2001, to return to Afghanistan.

Mr Karzai said he would protect him and his colleagues from the US-led coalition forces if they took him up on his offer to return to “come and work for the peace and good of your people”. It was the second time Mr Karzai has made a direct, public call to the leader of the fundamentalist Taliban movement, which is dominated by the Pashtun ethnic group of which Mr Karzai is also a member.

A major stumbling block, however, is the attitude of Afghans from the largely non-Pashtun north, who fought bitterly against the Taliban takeover of the country in the mid-1990s and regard the radical mullah-back movement as their mortal foes. Any sign that the Taliban might be invited back into government could cause former commanders from the Northern Alliance – a group of non-Pashtun warlords who resisted the Taliban – to rearm themselves.

Ashraf Ghani, a former senior member of Mr Karzai’s government, warned that “reconciliation must be done from a position of strength – there is no point winning the south and losing the north”.

Foreign diplomats say opposition from powerful members of Mr Karzai’s government has blocked attempts to reach out to the Taliban.

“[The Taliban] are desperate to take part in the process,” a senior diplomat said. “They have had seven years of suffering severe loses on the battlefield and they know that it is not sustainable. The problem is the extent to which the Afghan people are willing to allow this process to go ahead.”

The US government has so far been unwilling to consider a comprehensive peace process. The UK, however, has been pushing for negotiations.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
http://www.ft.com/cm...l#axzz19RWiJNY8

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#48 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 09:14 PM

Quote

Northern Afghan warlords rearming to stave off possible Taliban resurgence

Warlords in Northern Afghanistan are reportedly rearming, fearing and dreading the prospect of a possible Taliban return to power after almost a decade.

According to the Telegraph, leaders and residents of northern Afghanistan blame the Taliban for destroying their lives in the 1990s, and view President Hamid Karzai's hand-picked "peace council" of former warlords, tribal elders and clerics with skepticism.

In the last week or so, Afghan and American officials have been holding secret discussions with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the second ranking figure in the Taliban, in the firmest indication yet that substantive peace talks will soon begin.

Karzai's 68-member peace council has a mandate to pursue talks with the insurgents as the NATO-led war in Afghanistan enters its 10th year.

However any deal that ensures shared power with Taliban leaders would greatly alarm Afghanistan's smaller ethnic groups, which fought for five years against the movement in the late 1990s, their leaders have said.

"If people are not actually digging up their old guns, they are at least locating them and putting a little marker on them," one diplomat in Kabul told The Sunday Telegraph.

Commander Naqibullah, a Tajik who led 500 men in desperate fighting in the 1990s, said many felt the current attempt at a peace process was a plot by Karzai - himself a Pashtun - to extend Pashtun influence.

He asked: "We saw the Taliban had beaten civilians around the head with iron bars, I saw they had killed six like that. When you have seen things like that, should we accept the peace process or not?"

Sitting cross-legged beneath an almond tree in the fields where he fought a decade ago, he said his men had given up their assault rifles and grenade launchers.

"But when we handed in our weapons to the government for money, many people bought cows," he said. "If they need to, they will sell their cows for guns again," he warned.

Lt Ahmad Jawad, a gangly 26-year-old who now wears the black beret and blotchy camouflage of the Afghan border police, said the Taliban destroyed houses, burnt trees and crops to establish their authority.

"If they are really now looking for peace for Afghanistan, we are happy, but I don't think they are," he said.

Saleh Registani, a former MP from the Panjshir Valley north of Jabal Saraj said Karzai was playing a dangerous game and his negotiation was a threat to non-Pashtuns.

"It's not very clear what this negotiation is, how it is going on, who are the negotiators and what are the limits. No one knows except Mr. Karzai." (ANI)

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Posted 28 December 2010 - 09:16 PM

Quote

The Way Out of Afghanistan
January 13, 2011
Ahmed Rashid

For the 100,000 American forces, 40,000 NATO troops, and their commander, General David Petraeus, it’s Year One of the Surge in Afghanistan. For many Afghans it’s Year Nine of the US Occupation—or, to be kind, Year Nine of the US-led war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

US officers say that the war is finally on the right footing, with enough men and equipment to hammer the Taliban in their bases in the south. For US and European diplomats there are larger imponderables. The strategic policy review released by President Obama on December 16 is extremely cautious, noting that recent gains in the south remain “reversible.” The report says the strategy “is setting the conditions” to withdraw a small number of US troops in July 2011, but it does not specify how many of the 100,000 American forces might leave. A Western ambassador posed the problem to me clearly: “Are we creating a sustainable government, are we getting the politics right, will there be an Afghan army and civil service to take over when we leave?”

In Kabul the foreigners breathe a little easier after several months with no suicide attacks. Kabulis say that the protective blast walls and concrete barriers that line the streets are now twenty feet high, suffocating them and eating up their road and living space.

War is always a mixture of different, conflicting stories, depending on whether you are crouching in a ditch or sipping tea at the presidential palace. To have dinner with Petraeus and tea with President Hamid Karzai is a central part of the story, as is journeying to the edge of the city to tiny, unlit, unheated flats to talk to former senior Taliban officials who want to explain to you how the Americans and the Taliban can make peace. Everyone tells you the endgame has started in Afghanistan but nobody can tell you how it will end.

The world is obsessed with the big picture of the Afghan war, not the domestic details that make it so difficult to end. The NATO summit in Lisbon on November 19–20 was a clear example. It tried to clarify the vision of a Western withdrawal but also created confusion. The NATO leaders—speaking for the organization, not the US—said that they planned for a phased transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan forces and the end of NATO’s combat role by 2014. They were committed to stay after that in a supporting role, while the US warned that its forces would continue fighting beyond that date if the security situation deteriorated. Clearly, the US and NATO are on two different timetables.

To confuse Afghans even further, President Barack Obama also added that some US troops would start withdrawing from Afghanistan next July. That date, announced in January 2010 as the US surge began, has proved deeply embarrassing to the White House. It has been challenged by the Republicans, dismayed the Afghans, and created enormous uncertainty among regional countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

Obama’s final words in Lisbon were extraordinarily vague. Apparently speaking about the NATO decision to withdraw in 2014, he said, “It is a goal to make sure that we are not still engaged in combat operations of the sort that we’re involved with now,” but “it’s hard to anticipate exactly what is going to be necessary.” He added, “We are much more unified and clear about how we’re going to achieve our ultimate end state in Afghanistan.”
What Is the End State and How Do You Get to It?

None of the attempts at rebuilding the Afghan state over the past nine years have really worked. What assurance is there that they will work by 2014? The dates and debates in the White House tell only half the story. Afghanistan is going through a series of domestic crises, which will determine whether there will be a functioning state by 2014 or not.

The most immediate issue has been the parliamentary elections, which were held on September 18, but whose final results were delayed until the end of November. After the rigged presidential elections in 2009, which Karzai won after immense controversy and international embarrassment, the United Nations and NATO were reluctant to hold parliamentary elections so soon. However, Karzai insisted—hoping that his preferred candidates would win a majority in the 249-seat lower house of parliament, which would prepare the way for it to endorse Karzai’s peace talks with the Taliban.

Again rigging took place on a huge scale—except this time it was done by individual candidates, not by the government. Karzai’s handpicked Independent Election Commission (IEC), which oversaw the poll, stunned everyone by acting remarkably independently. It invalidated 1.33 million votes for fraud, or nearly a quarter of the 5.74 million cast, and in mid-November disqualified twenty-four candidates who had been declared unofficial winners, including a cousin of the President. The IEC asserted itself but left behind an intractable problem.

Turnout among the Pashtuns of southern and eastern Afghanistan, who make up some 40 percent of the population, was very low. The Taliban, who are largely Pashtuns, had threatened the Pashtun voters, telling them to boycott the polls. As a result the Pashtuns lost between 10 and 20 percent of their seats to ethnic minorities, especially the Tajiks and Hazaras. In the last parliament Pashtuns held 129 seats and now they are down to around ninety. All eleven seats in the important province of Ghazni, which has a mixed Pashtun-Hazara population, were won by Hazaras, a result that infuriated both the Pashtuns and Karzai. Ghazni’s results were announced after much delay and the eleven Hazaras were declared winners. Earlier the results were challenged by the attorney general, who ordered the arrest of several IEC officials, and there were demonstrations in Kabul for the failure to announce the results.

The election drama will continue. The non-Pashtuns are broadly against any peace deal with the Taliban, resent Pashtun dominance, and want to amend the constitution to introduce a parliamentary system in place of the current presidential system, which gives Karzai enormous powers. Karzai is trapped. If he accepts the election results, as he eventually must, he faces a parliament dominated by non-Pashtuns and his political opponents, which could scuttle his talks with the Taliban. Yet if he declares the elections null and void on account of the rigging and orders them redone, he could face open defiance from the ethnic minorities.

These election results have brought the unresolved ethnic problems to the forefront. Nine years after 2001, the divisions between the Pashtuns and the non-Pashtun nationalities that make up the complex weave of the Afghan national carpet are worse than ever. The notorious corruption and incompetence of the Karzai administration are still seen to have benefited the Pashtuns. The American development efforts have focused heavily on wooing the Pashtun south and east where the Taliban insurgency is based, to the neglect of the minorities in the north and west. Non-Pashtuns are furious that an estimated 70 percent of all development funds are being spent in just two provinces in the south to woo the Pashtuns away from the Taliban.

The non-Pashtuns mistrust Karzai’s talks with the Taliban. Despite several attempts by Karzai to arrange a national consensus, the non-Pashtuns are deeply suspicious that any Karzai–Taliban deal will only strengthen Pashtun hegemony in the country and further reduce minority rights. As a result non-Pashtun leaders from all the ethnic groups have launched political and grassroots movements to oppose talks with the Taliban.

Meanwhile the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Turcomen minorities have achieved advantages that cause immense resentment among the Pashtuns. For the first time the Tajiks and Hazaras dominate the upper officer class in the army and police even though US training and recruitment includes a strict parity between all ethnic groups. Traditionally the Afghan officer class has been Pashtun. Pashtun representation in the army is lower than its proportion of the population, and only 3 percent of recruits are from the volatile south.

The minorities who dominate the north and west have opened up roads and trade networks, imported electricity and gas supplies, and created other profitable links with their neighbors—Iran and the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan’s drug trade—30 per- cent of which travels into Iran and Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan—has also enriched local elites. All this has improved lives for ordinary people, provided independent sources of wealth for local warlords and elites that are not dependent on Kabul, and given them political power. Meanwhile the Pashtuns in the south are stuck with the power of their neighbor Pakistan, which supports the Taliban and has done little toward improving their lives.

Tajik and Uzbek warlords have become so rich and powerful in the north that they now barely listen to Karzai. Governors of northern provinces have created their own fiefdoms that are left alone by NATO forces based there, because removing them would create further instability. You may not know it from press reports, but the most powerful man in the country after Karzai is probably Atta Muhammad Noor, a Tajik general who once fought the Taliban and is now the governor of Balkh province bordering Uzbekistan. He and his fellow northern warlords are rearming their militias in preparation for what they fear will be a long war with the Taliban.

The fear is justified because the Taliban have already arrived in the north, setting up bases, appealing to local populations, attacking NATO and Afghan forces, and infiltrating militants into Central Asia. For the first time, say US officials, there is evidence of the Taliban winning support from not just northern Pashtuns but even Tajiks and Uzbeks.
Making the Transition

Amid these worsening political problems there is the complex question of transition. After years of neglect, the US and NATO are at last trying to invest more in the numbers, equipment, training, and mentoring of the Afghan army. This year the US alone will spend $11 billion on the Afghan security forces—the largest single item in the US defense budget. The Afghan army has reached its first target of 134,000 men and will expand further, according to US officers involved in the training program. The police now number 109,100.

Yet these figures are seriously deceptive. The attrition rate from the Afghan army is still a staggering 24 percent per year. Some 86 percent of soldiers are illiterate and drug use is still an endemic problem. The Afghan police are even worse. (As a recent report on 60 Minutes showed, they are plagued by elementary incompetence, illiteracy, and corruption that make the creation of an adequate police force one of the country’s most intransigent problems.) Although 80 percent of army units are working with NATO units, no single Afghan unit is ready to take responsibility on its own in the field. Afghan forces are only in command in Kabul, but this is largely because there is a sizable NATO presence there.

Moreover, when there is so little Afghan administrative presence in the provinces, Afghan forces, even if they are well-trained, can achieve very little. There is now a civil service academy turning out bureaucrats, but it will be years before they make a difference.

Equally grave is the failure to establish an indigenous Afghan economy that is not permanently dependent on aid handouts. For the first few years after September 11 President Bush refused to rebuild Afghan infrastructure, including adequate roads and electrical supplies, and this stymied economic growth. Kabul got full-time electricity only this year. Industry failed to develop because of the lack of infrastructure and because neighbors such as China and Iran were dumping cheap goods in the Afghan market and undermining local productivity.

Obama has initiated a program to help the local civilian economy take off, but it needs time. The US Army still buys no local produce, but the Afghan army, at least, is being equipped with locally manufactured boots and uniforms. Another acute problem is that the huge profits of the drug trade are recycled into property speculation rather than economic production.

Thus the key question for General Petraeus is not how many Taliban he kills, but whether the bare bones of an Afghan state—army, police, bureaucracy—which have been neglected so badly in the past nine years, can be set up by 2014. Moreover, can Afghan leaders, including the President, win the trust of a people who have put up with insecurity, gross corruption, and poor governance for many years?

If there is to be progress toward self-government in Afghanistan, a clear-headed Afghan president is badly needed. Yet Karzai is wrapped in contradictions and enigmas. During a two-hour animated conversation I had with him in the presidential palace, he seemed to be straining to not break ties with the US and NATO, while at the same time wanting to throw off their yoke because it makes him appear as a Western puppet.1

Karzai’s on-again, off-again fights with Petraeus about the tactics of the US military surge are essentially about his own role, his own sovereignty, his own image in Afghanistan—in all respects he feels he is losing power. He wants the war to somehow go away. Petraeus wants to conclude it, which means more violence in the months ahead.

Karzai’s view of the world has undergone a dramatic change and he is bitterly critical of the West and everything it has failed to do in the past nine years. He no longer supports the “war on terror” as defined by Washington, and he sees Petraeus’s surge as unhelpful because it relies too much on body counts of dead Taliban, often killed by US drones with civilian casualties that are resented deeply, and on nighttime raids by US special forces. The alternative, says Karzai, is to seek help from nearby countries like Pakistan and Iran, which he thinks could help him talk to the Taliban and end the war.
The Neighbors

Many Afghans would disagree with Karzai. Neighboring states like Pakistan and Iran have a long and bloody record of monumental interference in Afghanistan, propping up proxy Afghan warlords and fighting over the spoils. Afghanistan will not become peaceful unless the neighbors are brought into an agreement not to interfere there that could be monitored by the international community. Obama made a promise to do just that when he was inaugurated but little has been accomplished.

The major problem is Pakistan. All three major Taliban factions have been based in Pakistan for nine years, receiving official and unofficial support, sanctuary, funding, and recruits; yet three successive US administrations have been unable to stop the Pakistan military from continuing that support. The December 16 strategy review avoids direct criticism of Pakistan for failing to crack down on Taliban and al-Qaeda bases. However, two classified intelligence reports given to the President in late November cited Pakistan’s hosting of sanctuaries as a serious obstacle to US objectives.

President Bush never tried very hard, but Obama has offered much larger incentives and a tougher stick to Pakistan. Petraeus has been aggressive and made it clear to Pakistani army chief General Ashfaq Kiyani that its support for the Taliban must end. But the US has no comprehensive strategy that either offers the Pakistani military some of what it wants or changes its assumptions that it must dominate Afghanistan. The army fears growing Indian influence in Afghanistan—an issue that nobody has addressed. It wants to use talks with the Taliban as a card in the endgame, so that maximum concessions can be extracted from the US, India, and Afghanistan in exchange for Pakistan obtaining concessions from the Taliban.

Iran too has learned to raise the stakes. Shia Iran has no love for the Sunni fundamentalists who make up the Taliban, but Tehran has stepped up its support and sanctuary for the Taliban groups operating in western Afghanistan. Like Pakistan, Iran sees them as a useful hedge for the endgame, when the US and NATO will have to bring it in to discuss noninterference in Afghanistan. Iran has joined with India and Russia to ensure that Pakistan is unsuccessful in dominating Afghanistan.

So the region is already sharply divided. On one side stands Pakistan, virtually alone with some support from China, but none from the Arab-Muslim world that used to support the Taliban. Opposing Pakistan are Iran, Russia, India, and the Central Asian states, which are extremely suspicious of Pakistan and the Taliban but lack a strategy to deal with them. They want the US to stay longer in Afghanistan, but are also suspicious of an indefinite US presence.
The Taliban Want to Talk

What of the Taliban?

In separate interviews four former Taliban officials, now living in Kabul, told me that the Taliban leaders want to open a political office in a third country that is not Afghanistan or Pakistan, so that they can start talks with the Kabul regime, the US, and NATO. All four occupied high office in the 1990s when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and cannot be identified for security reasons.

Some were captured and held for several years by US forces before being freed, and they all now live quietly in Kabul under heavy government guard. Still, they are allowed to remain in touch with the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan and have facilitated Karzai’s attempts to talk to Taliban leaders.

They all said that negotiations would be possible only when they were free to negotiate from a neutral place—preferably an Arabian Gulf state, Turkey, Germany, or Japan. With Afghanistan under US occupation and Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence (ISI) trying to manipulate them, they needed space, freedom, and an address of their own.

The four former Taliban officials also called for a release of all Taliban prisoners held by the US in Guantánamo and Bagram, the main US base in Afghanistan, and the removal of the Taliban names from a list of terrorists that is maintained by the United Nations Security Council. Three of the four men I talked to said that Taliban–US talks were essential because the US is “the occupying power.” Karzai also admits that in his previous contacts, the Taliban have demanded talks with the Americans and he has tried to persuade Washington to agree.

The NATO summit did not mention anything about talking to the Taliban but it was the elephant in the room. Karzai sees his political survival as being linked to ending the war through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. Petraeus is less keen, wanting to continue the surge next year, killing more Taliban commanders and weakening others before inviting them to any negotiating table.

Petraeus does not accept the argument that by killing more Taliban you radicalize the movement further, bringing in younger and more militant commanders who owe nothing to the older leadership and are easier for the ISI to manipulate. He believes that the Taliban leadership can be broken, fragmented, and split off one by one. As a result, while drones target Taliban leaders and frequently kill them and people near them, less than a handful of US officials in Petraeus’s headquarters are addressing the issue of reconciliation with the Taliban.

The US administration is divided about the need for talks now or later. Skepticism is greater after the CIA and Britain’s MI6 were duped by a fake Taliban negotiator who twice held talks with Karzai, but turned out to be a Pakistani shopkeeper who was paid $65,000 each time he came to Kabul. Western officials believe the ISI was behind the scam.

Moreover, at the moment neither Karzai nor the Taliban have a clear agenda for talks. They do not even have a clear notion of how to get to actual negotiations—but both sides realize that such a venture would have to include confidence-building measures to create trust on all sides.

The Taliban leaders said that their first political aim would not be to lay down terms for power-sharing with Karzai, but to reach an agreement on a definition of what the future Afghan state would look like—would it be a democratic state or a shariah state? The most sensible among the Taliban also realize that since they could not run the country in the 1990s they will not be able to do so in the future. Rather than trying to grab power and then face isolation by the international community and the denial of funds and aid, they see the logic of a power-sharing formula with Karzai that would retain Western aid and international legitimacy. Their main concern right now seems to be how to break free from Pakistan, something the US can help them do only when it is ready to support peace talks.
An Approach to Peace

To answer these questions and not give away too much to the Taliban at the outset, Karzai, neighboring states, the US, and NATO need to work together on a common agenda that reduces regional tensions and builds trust between the Taliban and Kabul. Any new approach to peace must include reciprocal confidence-building measures by Pakistan, Iran, and India as well as by the Taliban and the West. Karzai has set up the High Peace Council, a sixty-eight-person multiethnic body to negotiate with the Taliban, but he needs to do much more to build a consensus across the country. The main question, of course, will be how soon the White House and the Pentagon decide that it is time to talk to the Taliban. Victory on the battlefield is not possible but peace cannot be achieved without US participation in negotiations.

Here is a possible step-by-step approach, involving all the players, that is intended to build trust and confidence in the region so that ultimately negotiations with the Taliban can take place.

1. NATO, the Afghan government, and Pakistan free most Afghan Taliban prisoners under their jurisdiction and seek to accommodate them safely in Afghanistan or allow them to seek refuge in third countries. NATO guarantees freedom of movement for Taliban mediators opening an office in a friendly third country.

2. Iran enters into negotiations with the United Nations and European countries to end its safe haven for Afghan Taliban and allow them to return home or seek refuge in third countries. None of these actions includes amnesty or safe passage for al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.

3. The Taliban respond with confidence-building measures of their own such as publicly dissociating themselves from al-Qaeda, ordering an end to targeted killings of Afghan administrators and aid workers, and an end to suicide bombings and burning schools and government buildings.

4. The US, NATO, and the UN declare their willingness to negotiate directly with the Taliban when the Taliban publicly request it, although they insist that the dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban remain the main avenue for negotiating a peace deal.

5. A new UN Security Council resolution calls for negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban to bring the war to an end. The UN resolution mandates its special representative in Kabul to help those negotiations and to start a dialogue between Afghanistan’s neighboring states to reduce their mutual antagonisms and interference; the resolution also calls for Afghan Taliban leaders who do not have ties to al-Qaeda to be struck off the list of terrorism suspects.

6. India and Pakistan enter into secret talks between their intelligence agencies in order to make their presence in Afghanistan more transparent to the other and end their rivalries. Later the two governments come to agreements that would allow each one to tolerate the other’s embassies, consulates, rebuilding activities, and trade interests in Afghanistan. Both pledge not to seek a military presence in Afghanistan or to use Afghan soil to undermine the other.

7. Central to any plan would be a deal with the separatist insurgents in the Pakistani province of Balochistan who make use of territory in Afghanistan to carry out their attacks on Pakistan. To address the problem, Pakistan issues a general amnesty for all insurgent Baloch separatist groups and dissidents and announces its intentions to discuss a new peace formula with all Baloch separatist groups to end the current insurgency. The army and ISI free all Baloch prisoners they are holding including the hundreds of “disappeared” prisoners.

8. The Afghan government makes a commitment to return all Baloch separatist leaders on its soil once agreement is reached on a political deal in Balochistan and safe passage for Baloch leaders to return home is guaranteed by the Pakistan army and an international agency such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

9. Pakistan issues a timetable and deadline of between six to twelve months for all Afghan Taliban leaders and their families who want to do so to leave Pakistan and return to Afghanistan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the UN would jointly help those Taliban not wishing to return home and not on any terrorism list to seek political asylum in third countries. Simultaneously Pakistan would undertake military action in North Waziristan in an effort to destroy remnants of al-Qaeda and Afghan and Pakistani Taliban who may remain and try to sabotage any peace process. Even if such action were not fully successful, the aim would be to limit their capacity to sponsor insurgency.

10. The Afghan government works to build a national consensus inside the country among all ethnic groups, civil society, and the tribes before entering into formal negotiations with the Taliban. Negotiations also start between the US and the Taliban. The US agrees to sharply restrict killing of Taliban leaders by drones and other means.

Many questions hover over such a plan. It is a tragic loss that Richard Holbrooke, who would have been a strong leader in advancing such steps, died before they could be pursued. The former Taliban officials I talked to seemed open to a sequence of this kind. Whether their comrades in Pakistan can be persuaded to make a series of compromises and to estrange themselves from al-Qaeda is far from clear. But if after ten years the war is to be ended and the “end state” is to be actually achieved, then some such series of steps will be needed.

—Kabul, December 16, 2010

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Posted 29 December 2010 - 09:47 PM

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Sohrab Balkhi

Partition

No matter how people feel about the condition of Afghanistan, hardly any effort has gone into fixing the problems. Taken by face value, it might seem like a lot has been done in favor of the country and that the country has improved drastically, but it is only a façade. Once you delve deeper in, you can see just how weak the entire infrastructure truly is. And this is where the problem lies. Only certain, small parts of the country are doing relatively fine but overall the country is virtually falling apart because there is no strong foundation. This “show” is put on for the sake of the rest of the world, to please those that control it. So therefore, when solutions are brought forth and if the “government” doesn’t approve of them, they can use that façade of the country on its way to betterment to reject the suggestions. One solution that has been mentioned time and again is partition of the country. It has been the one of the most discussed topics and also one of the most rejected ones. Recent events as well as past historical tribulations have illustrated that the only solution for Afghanistan is separation.

Dividing Afghanistan has always been a much-heated and much-debated topic. Whether it be to divide it by North and South, or separate independent states for several provinces, the underlining solution is to separate the lands and, most importantly, the people. However, no step has been taken to go forward with such a solution. One of the main supported resolutions is separation by North and South—to divide the Non-Pashtuns and the Pashtuns. Such ethnic aversion is expected considering the shaky history and relationship between the ethnicities of Afghanistan—mainly of Pashtuns with everyone else. For 250 years, the Pashtuns had power over most of the regions of Afghanistan whether it was in the form of a monarchy, communism, or terrorism via religious fanaticism. Most recently, they have tried gaining power through fraudulent elections and official appointments in the legislatures. With 250 years in power, there is hardly any achievement to show for it. The greatest achievement of the Pashtuns is that the nation is literally at the bottom. Afghanistan’s status is the 177th country among 180 countries of the world, signaling just how poor and devastated the country is. It receives its budget from international donations and half of that money is spent on security of the south because 90% of the country’s violence comes from the south. The Pashtun’s ignorance and arrogance have arisen time and again during the Loya Jirga and the creation of such a bogus constitution. When the non-Pashtuns asked for a parliamentary system, the Pashtuns rejected it. Pashtuns are not and never will think of creating a government that is necessary or even fair for our diverse nation by acknowledging past historical events and are instead trying to restore Pashtun hegemony.

There are those non-Pashtuns who don’t wish to go over or remember past events/bad memories—they want to take the easy way out and just start fresh. However, there are those that do NOT want to forget and believe that a fresh start can only occur when there has been some sort of change. And by keeping the Pashtuns in power—the same ethnicity that has literally and truthfully brought ruin to the country—there will be no improvement or change for the country, certainly not for the non-Pashtuns and perhaps even some poor Pashtuns. Pashtuns are originally from the South so perhaps and they can rightly go back there and govern rightly over their own people. And leave the North to themselves. Now, some people have stated that once the Pashtuns are gone, the non-Pashtuns might just start fighting with each other and that’s why they prefer to have separate independent states—the Tajiks with Tajikistan, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, the Hazaras as their own nation. This may very well work out, too, but they must first try to understand just where their problems began and if they work them out. After all, they share a lot in history, culture, literature, etc.

Most of the problems that are present among non-Pashtuns are due to Pashtuns. In the past, pre-Afghanistan, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmans, etc. lived side by side in Khorasan. There was no threat of communism or terrorism. Terror started with the first footsteps of Abdali. By separating the North and the South that is the first step towards change. Right now, there is no stability in the country and its people. Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns do not have anything in common—historically, culturally, etc. Only recently do the ethnicities have some things in common like the literature and language and that is only because Pashtuns became persianized as they came to the north. Most Pashtuns adopted Dari as their language, Persian poets as their choice of literature, etc. Which is why it seems so hypocritical when those same Pashtuns want to push Pashto and Pashto “literature” and “culture” unto the rest of the country—they didn’t and/or can’t speak the language themselves and they want to force others to accept it. Now, if they badly want Pashto and Pashto culture to be a big part of Afghanistan, then they should all travel back to the South and contently enforce Pashto unto their own people. The people of the North have their own history and culture and they appreciate it and have appreciated it for hundreds of years.

Pashtuns did not bring any progress in the past—which is fairly obvious considering the condition of the country today—so logically, they won’t bring any progress in the future. And if the country is partitioned finally, there is no way it could get any worse. But even so, just how worse could it possibly get? Separation of the country shouldn’t be seen as a failure of the country but rather as an improvement and a solid and proper change. When we factor in all the information—dangerous and ineffective Pashtun rule, misrepresentative country name, forced Pashto assimilation—the only solution can be to separate. Living with Pashtuns did not work in the past and so it won’t work for the future. After all, one can not and should not try living a normal life with cancer—you have to get rid of the cancer or it will destroy you from the inside out. Whether it’s slowly and secretly or fast and outwardly there are only two ways out and they are by cutting it off or letting it kill you.


Also an article written by Sohab Balkhi

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National Identity

There are many ways to oppress people. One way is by taking away their identity. Afghanistan as a country of different ethnicities has always seemed to be troubled with its identities, yet another taboo topic amongst the people. The threat of being called a “traitor” and a “foreigner” hangs over those who dare tread upon the topic of national identity. For the longest time, the term “Afghan” has been pushed upon every ethnic group of Afghanistan and for years, that is what Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmans, and other non-Pashtuns were known by the rest of the world. Today, however, it needs to be made clear that “Afghan” is not the rightful national identity for the country.

The history behind the word “Afghan” is disputable due to various sources of where it originated from. However, one thing is clear: “Afghan” has always been synonymous with Pashtun. Writers and travelers to and from the country have stated that the word “Afghan” was always used to distinguish between the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns such as the Tajiks, Hazaras, etc. The name of country is believed to have been given by the British when they first invaded the country in the 19th Century. The areas that they encountered were predominantly Pashtun and since they knew “Afghan” as synonymous with “Pashtun” they therefore erroneously declared the entire country as “Land of the Afghan” or “Afghanistan.” And even though the majority of Afghanistan isn’t even Afghans, the name has stuck since then.

Before the invention of the “Afghanistan,” the land used to be known as other names: Ariana and Khorasan, with the most recent being Khorasan. The region was called Khorasan for 1500 years and the name was fairer and represented the state as well as the people better. It clearly doesn’t favor one ethnicity over another. As Khorasan, the region was once an advancing civilization and embodied many ethnicities. However, as the Pashtun nomads entered and invaded the regions, they scattered and spread over, imposing their existence as well as a need for a country.

Now, it doesn’t take a Ph.D.—self-taught or not—to figure out that those events were not just. And no matter what changes the country and the people have gone through, the term “Afghan” is not a legitimate one. Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbeks and other non-Pashtuns were never and will never be Afghan. When the literal term of a word obviously means something you are not why would you be crazy enough to fight for the right to be called one? By non-Pashtuns adamantly choosing to call themselves Afghan just because they want peace and quiet, they are inadvertently throwing their rights and their heritage away. Losing your identity as a Hazara or a Tajik, Uzbek, or Turkman, you are being oppressed and your heritage and history is being rewritten to those who crawled out of the Suleiman Mountains. When you don’t even speak the language of an Afghan (supposedly Pashto) then why call yourself one?

There are a lot of people that will threaten you if you refuse to call yourself an Afghan when you aren’t one. They will call you a “traitor” or “foreigner” and try to get the mass against you. There is a full culture and history behind the names of “Tajik” and “Hazara,” etc. When the world thinks of “Afghans” hardly anything good will come to mind. It is often associated with the horrors of Ahmad Shah Abdali, pedophilia, the Taliban, and now drug dealers. Though there are some bad within non-Pashtuns, they, however, have contributed greatly to the world and to civilization. When you begin to associate yourself with what you rightfully are, you will see just how rich your past is. Rumi, Avicenna, Sa’adi, they were not Afghans and would never have called themselves one.

When the slaves were brought from Africa to America, the first thing the enslavers did was change the names of the slaves because they knew that was the only way to completely rid them of their identity and utterly deter them. They knew it would give them total control over them and help their oppression because they weren’t even allowed their own natural, rightful names. During the Holocaust, the Nazis took away the names and identity of the Jews and just replaced them with numbers because they knew it was a way to dehumanize them. Taking away someone’s name and identity is the surest way to destroy them as a people. Every evildoer has known this.

The national identity is constantly surrounded by lies and deceit. Pashto is trying to be pushed upon those who have no need for it, the word Afghan is insisted upon even though the majority of Afghanistan isn’t even Pashtun. Afghans have always and will always be known as Pashtuns only. A Tajik and an Uzbek and other non-Pashtuns are separate and they should be known as separate. When this comes to light, only then will the people be able to gain the rest of their rights. Only then will the name of the country be forced to change because it isn’t a fair representation of the majority of the people. The people who don’t wish to call themselves Afghan are not trying to start trouble. Instead, they have opened their eyes and trying to open the eyes of others to the mistake and the lie that has covered the entire people. Issues like these need to be discussed because even though they might seem minor, they are in fact major. If the name non-Pashtuns choose to call themselves isn’t such a “big deal” then why are people trying so hard to fight those that decline the name Afghan?


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Baba-ocracy

The world is constantly evolving and changing and so are people. People change to fit the time and the time changes to fit the people. These are things that can not be denied or altered. There are countries like the US that scrutinize each change before either rejecting it or accepting it—they do, however, give it a chance. And then there are countries like Afghanistan that are not as advanced like the US but wish to work towards progress. However, Afghanistan is a country that has been divided and will continue to be so. The South chooses to remain ignorant to such essential changes and would rather continue to live by their own tribal system which is obviously backwards and primitive. And by doing so, they are keeping the rest of the nation down.

Though no country is perfect and they all have their own share of bad history, they do need to realize that they share this world with others. The US itself had to work very hard to become such a progressive country. They are labeled as a "melting pot" and regardless of the validity of that label, the country at least recognizes that they are made up different ethnicities and nationalities. And the systems of the countries are meant to work for every one of those peoples. There is the word of equality if not the spirit and the laws of the country are the same all over—it will at least defend the rights of the individual. In Afghanistan, the South has only and will only recognize the tribal system. There, the tribes are a significant illustration of just how uncivilized the South is. The Pashtun tribes are the epitome of all that is against civilization. They are all broken up into several tribes or clans and they have their own laws that they abide by. And these so-called laws are the outlines of their savagery. While the rest of the world works towards betterment of their country and the development of such systems like democracy, the Afghanistan South sticks rigorously to their "baba-ocracy."

The tribes all have a "leader" that they call their baba. This baba is the judge, jury, and executioner. He is the person who enforces the customary tribal rules and decisions for the tribe—no matter how unjust or unfair it might be. And once this baba makes a decision everyone in the tribe must follow it and abide by it—no matter what. For example, the Taliban knew all they had to do was gain support from the baba of the tribes and once that baba joined the Taliban, the whole tribe joined as well. In America there is the saying "One person, One vote." This does not apply to the tribes. There, it is more like "One person, All the votes." The baba's vote is the vote of everyone else. Once the baba has ruled on something it is impossible for him or anyone else to go back on it. For example, music was outlawed by the Taliban and the baba brought that outlawing rule into their tribes and now no one is allowed to listen to any type of music. In order for the baba himself to undo the ruling he must admit that he was either wrong in the first place or that he has changed his mind. This is usually unheard of because of their stubbornness.

The baba and the tribes consider themselves above any law that isn't a part of their customary ways. This means that they will and have refused to follow the laws and constitution of Afghanistan. Just like the US, it is mandatory for both boys and girls to go to school up to a certain age in Afghanistan. However, the Afghanistan South will not allow any of their females to attend school or go anywhere outside of their home. They insist that the only education anyone needs is the way of the tribes and they will burn down any school that the government tries to build for them. They also believe that a female has only a certain number of uses and therefore they marry them off at the age of 12, disregarding her mental and emotional state as well as disregarding the age of the man she marries and his marital status. Polygamy and marriage deals are a common part of their tribal society.

These tribes base their power and supremacy on just how big their tribes are. The Popalzai tribe is considered more powerful than that of a smaller tribe like the Oryakhills. The tribes have always fought amongst themselves and were only brought together by a common belief which was terrorism. The idea of violence is a force strong enough to unite them all with the belief that for them "Weaponry is accessory for the man." For a tribal person of the South, the way to complete his life is having a gun in one hand and a young boy in the other. They are against technology and advancement because it threatens their way of life. The only advancement they accepted was the AK-47 when they realized that throwing rocks would only take them so far.

This is a major roadblock for Afghanistan as a nation. The South thinks of the "baba" as a unifying figure and term. However, that term is just as alien to Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras—the people of the North—as it is to the Americans. That term is also now included in the Constitution of the country with Zahir Shah declared as the "baba" of the nation. This is a symbol of bab-ocracy. Not only is the South adamant about refusing to move forward towards civil society, they also want to impose their tribal culture unto the whole nation by including such an irrelevant person in something as crucial as the Constitution. In the North, everyone was and still is working towards the progression and advancement of the country and the South is practically working hard to keep Afghanistan in the Stone Age. "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link." For Afghanistan, that weakest link is the South and its tribal system. The South does not think as a nation but as individual tribes and they selfishly want that which would ultimately be better for them. The tribes do not want to give up their power and do not want to follow anyone's rules but their own. In order for Afghanistan to function as a nation and to have any hope they must find a way to break up the tribal system and force the South to comply with the rest of the country or else they must break away from them altogether. Right now, Afghanistan is like a drowning person trying to reach the surface and the tribes of the South is an anchor dragging the country further down into the abyss.

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#51 User is offline   Nader Shah Icon

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Posted 31 December 2010 - 05:13 AM

Sohrab Balkhi's articles are excellent !! What an intellilgent and thoughtful person !
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#52 User is offline   Nader Shah Icon

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Posted 31 December 2010 - 05:17 AM

LOOOOOOL at backward Indic pashtuns hoping to fight both Iran, Pakistan, and India ... who do you think will win in the end, a few barbaric Jew-Paki-Saudi bearded turbaned low-IQ retarded tribes ? LOOOOOOOOOL :lol: Keep dreaming, u are nothing but backward tribes opposed by US, Iran, India, Russia and even Pakis who hate Pakhi independence movements .... with your stupid arrogance soon you will be toast and we shall celebrate a dance and wonderful feast over your stinking corpses being devoured by pigs !!! :D :cool:

View PostKakar, on 28 December 2010 - 04:25 AM, said:

LOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOL @ pakhtuns losing jalalabad and gardez

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#53 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 31 December 2010 - 09:49 AM

View PostNader Shah, on 31 December 2010 - 05:17 AM, said:

LOOOOOOL at backward Indic pashtuns hoping to fight both Iran, Pakistan, and India ... who do you think will win in the end, a few barbaric Jew-Paki-Saudi bearded turbaned low-IQ retarded tribes ? LOOOOOOOOOL :lol: Keep dreaming, u are nothing but backward tribes opposed by US, Iran, India, Russia and even Pakis who hate Pakhi independence movements .... with your stupid arrogance soon you will be toast and we shall celebrate a dance and wonderful feast over your stinking corpses being devoured by pigs !!! :D :cool:


Dear Nader,

the irony is that exactly these people are today licking the shoes of Iranians who become just one more of a long listed masters to them who use them so ''beautifully'' that they are not able to realise it.
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#54 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 01 January 2011 - 07:15 PM

The following book is very interesting for everyone who is interested for an own independant Khorasan, apart from dirty evil Afghanistan. Take time, use a bit money and buy it. According to Ahhangar, too, it is a very good academic book that predicts Afghanistan spliting up and Khurasan forming

Quote

Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History
Thomas Barfield

Posted Image

Afghanistan traces the historic struggles and the changing nature of political authority in this volatile region of the world, from the Mughal Empire in the sixteenth century to the Taliban resurgence today.

Thomas Barfield introduces readers to the bewildering diversity of tribal and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, explaining what unites them as Afghans despite the regional, cultural, and political differences that divide them. He shows how governing these peoples was relatively easy when power was concentrated in a small dynastic elite, but how this delicate political order broke down in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Afghanistan's rulers mobilized rural militias to expel first the British and later the Soviets. Armed insurgency proved remarkably successful against the foreign occupiers, but it also undermined the Afghan government's authority and rendered the country ever more difficult to govern as time passed. Barfield vividly describes how Afghanistan's armed factions plunged the country into a civil war, giving rise to clerical rule by the Taliban and Afghanistan's isolation from the world. He examines why the American invasion in the wake of September 11 toppled the Taliban so quickly, and how this easy victory lulled the United States into falsely believing that a viable state could be built just as easily.

Afghanistan is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how a land conquered and ruled by foreign dynasties for more than a thousand years became the "graveyard of empires" for the British and Soviets, and what the United States must do to avoid a similar fate.

Thomas Barfield is professor of anthropology at Boston University. His books include The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757; The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan; and Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture.

Reviews:

"[I]mpressive."--Christopher de Bellaigue, New York Review of Books

"This book is an authoritative and well-written summary of what we might call the majority view. There is a streak in this book, however, of more radical thinking. . . . It leads him near the end of the book to some startling predictions for Afghanistan's possible futures."--Gerard Russell, Foreign Policy

"A brilliant book to educate all of us about a country we should know and appreciate. . . . Thomas Barfield's book on Afghanistan is likely to become the first source that serious students turn to as a guide to this complicated country. His comprehensive portrait of Afghanistan is a stunning achievement."--Joseph Richard Preville, Saudi Gazette

"Barfield, an anthropologist and old Afghanistan hand, has written a history of Afghanistan that weaves in geography, economics, and culture (think tribes, rural-urban dichotomies, value systems) while maintaining a focus throughout on Afghan rulers' relations with their own people and the outside world. [The book] is lightened by many breaks in the narrative to address broad themes or make intriguing comparisons, such as likening patrimonial Afghanistan to medieval Europe."--Foreign Affairs

"In this riveting study, Barfield does a splendid job of informing us why Afghanistan is the way it has always been."--Daily Star

"Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History by Thomas Barfield is a primer for anyone seeking to understand the region, its cultural and political underpinnings."--Raghu Mohan, BusinessWorld

"Thomas Barfield's new book offers a remedy for Americans' pervasive ignorance of Afghanistan. . . . Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History is an invaluable book. Mr. Barfield does not give the United States a way out of Afghanistan, but he does provide the context necessary for good policymaking."--Doug Bandow, Washington Times

More reviews

Table of Contents:

List of Illustrations vii
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Chapter One: People and Places 17
Chapter Two: Conquering and Ruling Premodern Afghanistan 66
Chapter Three: Anglo-Afghan Wars and State Building in Afghanistan 110
Chapter Four: Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century: State and Society in Conflict 164
Chapter Five: Afghanistan Enters the Twenty- first Century 272
Chapter Six: Some Conclusions 337
Notes 351
References 359
Index 367

A short introduction of the book (Summery of the book): http://press.princet...pters/i9144.pdf

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#55 User is offline   Nader Shah Icon

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Posted 02 January 2011 - 02:05 AM

Too much time on this forum is taking its toll, and although I had turned away from nationalism and aggressive tendencies, I am going back to old habits.

Maybe Parsistani, you are rubbing it on me ;) You are free to be as you like, and I understand the horrible aggressions of Pashtuns against tajiks.

It may sound naive, but is it not better to be more kind, less aggressive, and more inclusive of all people, at least on a personal level ?

Enemies may take advantage of that, but on a personal level I feel corrupted when I bring myself down to the level of people that I feel have gone astray. I get taken advantage of sometimes too. But one needs to find a balance, be kind and good, not be naive of course, but also balance it with firmness and intolerance of abusive behaviour. I tend to kick out of my life people who are abusive, the moment I see that clearly, rather than try to debate them, argue, or get dragged into their game.

Did not Zarrosht say Good Thoughts, Good Speech and Good Actions ? I am sure he did not mean we should be naive, but persist in our internal goodness despite outside pressures to stray away from it, because in the end it is we who end up being corrupted by the people we become entangled with. It is best to be firm and throw out people who are unkind and mean from our life. In the case of attack and violence, by Pashtuns, we have to become smarter and powerful and be ready to defend with full strength.
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#56 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 02 January 2011 - 10:35 AM

@Nader Shah

yes, you are right. Good thoughts and behave does not mean to accept oppression and tyrrany, lies, lootings etc.

This page have to be paste on Facebook, everyone can see it and fight for Partition
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#57 User is offline   Kakar Icon

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Posted 14 January 2011 - 10:03 PM

View PostNader Shah, on 31 December 2010 - 05:17 AM, said:

LOOOOOOL at backward Indic pashtuns hoping to fight both Iran, Pakistan, and India ... who do you think will win in the end, a few barbaric Jew-Paki-Saudi bearded turbaned low-IQ retarded tribes ? LOOOOOOOOOL :lol: Keep dreaming, u are nothing but backward tribes opposed by US, Iran, India, Russia and even Pakis who hate Pakhi independence movements .... with your stupid arrogance soon you will be toast and we shall celebrate a dance and wonderful feast over your stinking corpses being devoured by pigs !!! :D :cool:


hey faggot, youre not from afghanistan. what gives you qualifications to speak on Jalalabad and Gardez. Do you see me ranting stupidly about how Iraq will take Tehran

Stay in your corner faggot, and worry about the Azeri Akhunds who are running your country and the Israelis who are going to carpet bomb your iran zameen within 12 months

LAUGH OUT MOTHERFUKKIN LOUD@ pakhtuns losing Jalalabad and Gardez.

theres 5 of you on this forum and you all repeat the same shiit over and over again.

you think these shamali warlords who are now millionaires and fuking lil boy for the last 10 yrs have the heart to go up against 30,000 battle hardened talibs let alone all pakhtana?

sit the fuk down, open a book, and think with common sense
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#58 User is offline   Kakar Icon

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Posted 14 January 2011 - 10:06 PM

this beghairat Nadir Shah, used to private message me telling me to ignore Parsistani and expressing kind words

now he speaks like him and insults me like him

this is the epitome of a beghairat, benamoos

Nader Shah, on 14 November 2010 - 09:30 PM, said:

parsistani is making a trash can out of this forum ... best to ignore him ... work with mods and others ... everyone i know wants him banned but for some reason he is not ... he has been like this from the beginning ... even personally insulted me very harshly in the distant past ... i think he is an old frustrated man



explain your beghairati
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#59 User is offline   قزلباش Icon

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Posted 14 January 2011 - 10:17 PM

View PostKakar, on 14 January 2011 - 05:03 PM, said:

hey faggot, youre not from afghanistan. what gives you qualifications to speak on Jalalabad and Gardez. Do you see me ranting stupidly about how Iraq will take Tehran

Stay in your corner faggot, and worry about the Azeri Akhunds who are running your country and the Israelis who are going to carpet bomb your iran zameen within 12 months

LAUGH OUT MOTHERFUKKIN LOUD@ pakhtuns losing Jalalabad and Gardez.

theres 5 of you on this forum and you all repeat the same shiit over and over again.

you think these shamali warlords who are now millionaires and fuking lil boy for the last 10 yrs have the heart to go up against 30,000 battle hardened talibs let alone all pakhtana?

sit the fuk down, open a book, and think with common sense


Speak properly or you will have to be muzzled.

Nader has just as much right to comment on issues pretaining to Afghanistan as you do in commenting on issues pretaining to Pakistan.

PS: As for Nader's private messaging; I must say that i am very disappointed. We may disagree amongst ourselves but we must always present a united front in the face of outsiders
هیچ وقت به خدا نگو یه مشکل بزرگ دارم
به مشکل بگو من یه خدای بزرگ دارم


Go tell the wolves that although the father has been killed,
The father's gun is with us still
Tell them that although all the men of the tribe have been killed,
There is a young boy in the cradle still

Bakhtiari Proverb
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#60 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 14 January 2011 - 11:04 PM

View PostKakar, on 14 January 2011 - 10:03 PM, said:

hey faggot, youre not from afghanistan. what gives you qualifications to speak on Jalalabad and Gardez. Do you see me ranting stupidly about how Iraq will take Tehran

Stay in your corner faggot, and worry about the Azeri Akhunds who are running your country and the Israelis who are going to carpet bomb your iran zameen within 12 months

LAUGH OUT MOTHERFUKKIN LOUD@ pakhtuns losing Jalalabad and Gardez.

theres 5 of you on this forum and you all repeat the same shiit over and over again.

you think these shamali warlords who are now millionaires and fuking lil boy for the last 10 yrs have the heart to go up against 30,000 battle hardened talibs let alone all pakhtana?

sit the fuk down, open a book, and think with common sense


http://www.telegraph...fghanistan.html

:cool: :cool: :cool:

95% of Pashtuns are pedophiles. They even have sex with their own daughters. In cold nights, the father, daughter, grand.mother, grand-father, wifes, everyone from the family and their neighbours sleep under one ''Sandali''...naked..son side to the mother, to the sister father, grand-father etc. Do you think they are all angles? Hahahaa Stay what you are, Afkooni.

You hypocrite bastard, you are a filthy Paki. YOU have not the qualifications to talk about Afghanistan and the self-determination of it´s people, namak Haram. Go and beg your Paki masters to hide you from our hands, you filthy bitch. And what the hell are you talking about Iran and ''Azeri Akhunds''? Ohh bache sag, do-raga, your own barbarian Mullahs are 100times worser than ''Azeri Akhunds'', you low life monkey. Your Mullahs are known under the name of Talibna, Al-Qaida, Haqqani, Zai and Khil...known for looting, killing, beeing sellout, kidnapping boys and girls for sex, beeing homosexual and hostile to humanity, Afghanistan, it´s history and culture, bache K*****mdar Pashatin. Your Kharzai team earned billion from the US. The US pay PigTun tribesmen every year mio of Dollars to win their loyality to the Kharzai government but those motherfucker cockroaches use the money for more weapon and coworking with Taliban and other terrorists, bach e Benamoos i Haramzada. Kharzai gang became self millioners through drug traffic, selling Pashtun children for sex and organ tradings, geting money from Pakis, Arabs, US ...70% of all money that goes to Afghanistan is spend in Kandahar and Helmand in the name of Pashtuns but still we do not see any results, you filthy monkey, while the north isw flourishing from the rest. That tell us a lot why it´s like that. Amon non-Pashtuns maybe there are some warlords who are pedophile..but among Pashtuns it´s the nearly entire Pashtun society, bach e Khugzai, not only your warlords. Do you know that according to reliable sources, many Gulbuddini dogs had sexual ties with Babur Gul and Hamid Gul? Gay boy, shut up. Don´t point your dirty unwashed fingers on other when you are the cancer. Without Pashtuns who brought every dirty tribalist custom to the north, the north wouldn´t know today what Bacha Bazi is, you filthy rat. Go and take a wash. You look like shit and stop talking about Iranians, Tajiks, Hazaras.... because these people are native of Afghanistan and ruled it for 100 000 years..while you dogs are present in this state since 260 years and ruled it through your foreign masters...the real ruler of Afghanistan. It was yesterday so, it will be tomorrow so and it is so. Shameless monkey.

Your Pashtun package is today so rich that nearly every dog of them drive 5 BMWs and having many villas in Pakistan, Iran, Dubai and elsewhere. Bach e Sagzai.

Don´t use words like Beghairat and Ghairati, Awghool. These words do not exist in your dirty language. Once, we introduced to monkeys like you these words but because you were and still are to stupid for this world and a shame for all humanbeeings, you did not understood. You think you are ''Ghairati'' when you cut women eyes and noses, having sex with children, men and animals, selling your own asses to foreigners, beeing hyprocrite bastards who hide themself behind the PC, propagate against the west from whom you enjoy your wellfare, selling your own women, mothers, daughters, killing of innocent children, opium traffic, homosexuality, sodomy, serving always foreigners....etc. and now you are happy? You Khartoons have missunderstood the meaning of Ghairat and Ghairati, bitch. Iranians stand over you....that´s why you too will adopt my language...your sisters, your wife and her children etc. You will see. That´s Ghairat, power and pride...not your fake identity. What a shame.

Ps: Nader Shah and me had possibly some problems at the beginning, but today we are brothers. Now burn, you faggot loser. I know you burn right now and I enjoy it. :cool:
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