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Partition of Aoghanistan

#81 User is offline   Parsistani Icon

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Posted 09 March 2011 - 01:30 PM

Please, take a look on the ''Secret Room''. There I posted something for you. What do you think about it? It should be our policy, no matter what comes.
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Posted 11 March 2011 - 12:01 PM

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LAST week, while Pakistan was enveloped in its own disasters, another region of the world long wracked by war saw a development few could have predicted a decade ago. On Jan 9, 2011 voting began in Sudan over the question of whether the Muslim-majority north should secede from the oil-rich south.

While definitive results have not yet been released, early reports indicate that the two will indeed separate. According to a report published in The New York Times, nearly 95 per cent of voters in the southern Sudanese city of Juba voted to form a separate country. If the partition does occur, President Omar al-Bashir of the north has promised that “sharia will be the only law and Islam the only religion of the north.”

The agreement to hold a referendum, part of the conditional peace that was negotiated in 2005, seems to have provided a solution to what was for decades termed an intractable conflict. In the midst of the bloody genocide in Darfur, few analysts would have banked on the likelihood of the north ever acquiescing to turning over the oil-rich south. Why on earth would the central government of a struggling nation ever accede to handing over territory that would likely be its best source of export revenue? And yet this is exactly what seems to have taken place in these early days of January 2011. Sudan, the site of genocide and wracked by a seemingly endless war, has demonstrated its capacity to chart a peaceful future for itself.

The denouement of the Sudanese referendum provides important lessons to those scratching their heads for solutions to another intractable conflict whose dismal prognosis currently confounds pundits and generals alike. Afghanistan, ravaged by three decades of war, tribal and sectarian divisions, and a near-ineffectual central government, is, in loose comparative terms, South Asia’s Sudan. The country’s south is home to the Taliban, now the world’s most notorious villains, and seems to have little in common with the Hazara- and Uzbek-dominated north.

Reports from the northern cities of Hazara and Mazar-i-Sharif report markedly different realities from those of the south, including strong support among the population for development projects, indigenous initiatives to improve infrastructure and a genuine proclivity towards supporting a sustainable state. The problems afflicting the south are too well-known to restate but represent in loose terms the opposite of the north: a burgeoning and seemingly unstoppable insurgency, lack of interest in supporting a central government, and a markedly different vision for governing Afghanistan. All of these factors present a compelling if not indubitable set of parallels to Sudan, where the north and south had irreconcilable differences that could only be supported by charting separate identities.

The argument for partitioning Afghanistan has most recently been championed by Robert Blackwell, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. In his essay, ‘Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option’, Blackwell argues that given the current inability to make inroads into stabilising the Afghan south, a partition of the two swathes of the country may be the elusive panacea for a costly war.

Enumerating the other options, the unlikelihood of stemming corruption in the Karzai government, the inability of the Afghan National Army to take on the pestering Taliban insurgency with any degree of success and, most troublingly, the presence of an occupying army largely ignorant of local mores and customs, Blackwell presents a good case. Nato forces in Afghanistan currently number 150,000, or 30,000 more than the Soviets had in the region at the peak of their military presence. And yet, despite the huge number of troops, a barrage of drone attacks in neighbouring Pakistan and the deaths of hundreds of militant leaders, the conflict has failed to yield a viable state to which power can be handed over.

Creating north and south Afghanistans also makes sense from the Pakistani perspective. If, as many analysts have suggested, much of the conflict in that region is a proxy war between India and Pakistan, separating the two may provide arenas of influence to both countries without distorting the delicate balance of power in the region. A partition of Afghanistan would also deliver Pakistan from its increasingly entrenched reputation as the reason for Isaf failure in Afghanistan.

While giving the south away to a Taliban-dominated set-up could well be characterised as an Isaf defeat, it would be a bounded one, offering territorial containment of a problem that could then be addressed with more precision. Concentrating military efforts on Taliban-controlled areas would better fit into the model of conventional conflict instead of the largely failed hearts-and-minds model that supposes it can win over civilian populations while killing off insurgents enmeshed within them.

From a global perspective the idea of creating new states with few resources, decrepit infrastructure and many hungry mouths to feed seems like an idea doomed from its inception. The future of states like southern Sudan and the imagined southern Afghanistan will undoubtedly hinge on the ability of other states to prop up their governments. The populations of these states are likely to get little else than the purported high of finally having achieved ‘liberation’. While such a recipe would not whet the palates of those imagining well-functioning democratic states, they may well be the only way to thwart cancerous conflicts that have been destabilising all those around them.

The reversal of roles, where those used to the relatively easy task of perpetuating insurgencies are suddenly forced to confront the onerous challenges of actual governance, could deflate zealotry and force the evaluation of utopia against a poverty-stricken reality. The burdens of liberation, delivered via partition, may in this way teach lessons that may not be learned in any other way.

The writer is a US-based attorney teaching constitutional history and political
philosophy.
http://www.dawn.com/...liberation.html

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Posted 11 March 2011 - 12:08 PM

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Plan B for Afghanistan(Partition of Afghanistan)
By Brian M Downing

A "Northern Afghanistan" would enjoy a great deal of regional support in state-building, economic development, military training and generally in opposing the Taliban. Russia, Iran, India, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all oppose Islamist militancy and are concerned by its growth in Afghanistan and spread into the Ferghana Valley that winds from eastern Afghanistan into Kyrgyzstan.

By contrast, the Taliban have only the dubious support of Pakistan, which is nearing dangerous instability by any measure, and Pakistan's distant geopolitical partner, China. Economic development would lag behind that of the north. Politically, the contrast would be between a consensual formula based on


Afghan tradition in the north and to the south, a zealous theocracy based on notions of Islam brought in from distant Deobandi and Wahabbi sects.

Further, though often called by a single name, the insurgency comprises numerous, disparate groups: the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami, the network of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, and numerous clan-based militias. They are reasonably united today in the face of foreign occupation and corrupt administration, but with a Western withdrawal from the south and east the unity would collapse, large-scale desertions would ensue, and infighting would break out, all of which took place when the Soviet Union withdrew in the late 1980s.

Militarily, the Taliban are tenacious fighters who knew well the advantages of the terrain. They were effective in defeating the scores of warlords that cropped up after the Soviet Union left and the Mohammad Najibullah government failed. They were also effective in defeating the various rival movements that came and went in the early 1990s. But these successes were greatly helped by their enemies' internal divisiveness and lack of reliable foreign aid - neither of which obtains today.

Controlling the south and east would greatly alter the Taliban's political and military situation. No longer would it be the evasive guerrilla band that attacks police stations, sets up improvised explosive devices, and rallies support against corruption and foreign occupation before vanishing into the hills. It would have to maintain a presence and govern a large, disparate and war-shattered region populated by people who expect an age of renewal and growth to come their way. The Taliban would have to build popular support after the charges of corruption and occupation begin to ring hollow, or face eroding popular support and perhaps even an insurgency of its own.

Further, the Taliban would have to be able to defend the south. Events of 2001 attest to the feebleness of the Taliban's political support and military prowess against a disciplined enemy with a modicum of airpower.

A new US position
The US would have strategic options and benefits that it does not have as long as it fights the war as it currently does. Perhaps most importantly, it would allow the US to reduce its bloody, expensive, and counter-productive presence in Central Asia.

The US could hold out the carrot of economic aid to Taliban-controlled regions. There already is a great deal of US infrastructure there in the form of hydroelectric dams, irrigation systems and road networks. This could lead to moderation within the Taliban, a complete break with al-Qaeda (to include turning over its leadership), and perhaps someday even to reconciliation and reintegration of the two parts of the country, perhaps after an agreement hammered out by a loya jirga (grand council).

Alternately, the US could pursue a stick policy. The US could support insurgencies in the south based on numerous Pashtun tribes which have longstanding hostility toward the Taliban. Further, Taliban behavior could be moderated by the threat of small-scale airstrikes from drones and fighter aircraft.

In an even less accommodating form, the US could prevent the Taliban from ever occupying an administrative center and becoming a government. The Taliban would have to remain a ghost-like guerrilla movement, unable to govern, spouting slogans that no longer resonate in the hearts and minds of Pashtuns.

It is particularly relevant to political considerations in the West that any of these policies could be pursued with a greatly reduced US/NATO troop presence.

The US would realize other benefits from withdrawing to the north. Domestic support for the effort would firm as Americans saw themselves no longer backing an inept and corrupt government and as working with a credible coalition of northern leaders, perhaps led by Abdullah Abdullah, who finished second to Karzai in last year's fraud-ridden elections.

Americans would see more political and economic development - signs of progress frustratingly absent today. Leaving the core insurgent areas and retrenching in other areas would greatly reduce US casualties and Afghan civilian casualties. Indeed, the US could greatly cut its troop levels, perhaps even reducing them by half in two years.

Regional cooperation in North Afghanistan would have long-term positive influences on the geopolitics and economic development of the area and large parts of Central Asia as well. There would be a closer working relationship with Russia, which for all its wily moves along its expansive periphery has been helpful with US/NATO logistics into Afghanistan as it shares an opposition to Islamist terrorism.

Other cooperative arrangements will present themselves. Iran has built up western Afghanistan as a glacis against the Taliban, which slaughtered its officials and cruelly oppressed its Shi'ite co-religionists, the Hazaras. India, too, shares a concern with terrorism in the region and has embarked on significant aid programs in the north.

The US could rethink its uneasy and dubious partnership with Pakistan. Its assistance was critical in supplying the mujahideen bands during the Soviet war. It led to a Soviet exit but also to a hypertrophied military intelligence service that has become the hub of terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan and India. Over the years, US policy has sought to detach Pakistan from such groups - to no avail. Pakistan is perhaps the strongest state sponsor of terrorism and yet enjoys generous aid packages and trade relations.

Recognition of the two states' differing interests in Afghanistan would make US supply lines through Pakistan even less reliable than they are now. Presently, the Pakistani Taliban attack convoys on the roads between Peshawar and the Khyber Pass and the large Pashtun population in Karachi is poised to endanger logistical depots there. The reduction of US troop levels allowed by withdrawal from the south would make Pakistan less important logistically and also reduce its leverage in Washington.

Russia has maneuvered about in Central Asia but has not sought to endanger Western supply lines into Afghanistan. It has used its influence along its periphery to facilitate supply lines from the Baltic to Kyrgyzstan and has recently authorized US polar flights to use Russian air space. Russia shares the US's concern with the Taliban and its support is more dependable than Pakistan's.

A reduced presence in Afghanistan would enable the US to wage the "war on terror" in a less expensive, more adroit and perhaps more successful manner. The heavy US footprint from Iraq to Afghanistan has provided a rallying cause for jihadis throughout the Islamic world. The US could establish partnerships with local intelligence services and respond not with large operations but with rapid insertions and extractions of special forces or with the use of small-scale airstrikes. This would certainly be the case with any return of al-Qaeda bases to Pashtun parts of Afghanistan or even south of the frontier.

Withdrawal from the Pashtun parts of Afghanistan would be seen by many as tantamount to defeat - "cutting and running" in American political discourse. Such claims would undoubtedly be made and would resonate strongly in the media and public, but they display little understanding of strategy or military history.

In 1942, Colonel Dwight Eisenhower and General George Marshall determined that reinforcing the Philippines would be a misallocation of men and materiel and chose instead to fall back on Australia. Nine years later, their fellow five-star general Douglas MacArthur withdrew from positions near the Yalu River in Korea and consolidated to the south. None of these generals was thought unwise, craven or unpatriotic - and neither war ended in defeat.

As noted, withdrawing from the south and east need not be a permanent state of affairs, diplomacy and unfolding events could bring the two parts of the country back together. But should the division stand, the line would better recognize the ethnic realities of the land far better than the one Mr Henry Durand drew between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1893.
http://www.atimes.co...a/LG29Df02.html
http://www.facebook....153204138039829

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Posted 11 March 2011 - 12:24 PM

What do you guys think about Plan A-Minus for Afghanistan?

Partition from economical view

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The Hajigak iron ore deposits near Bamiyan in Afghanistan are one of the largest in the world with an estimated 1.8 to 2 billion tonnes of high-grade ore, enough to feed a steel plant 10 million tonnes per annum for a century. The Afghan government has been looking for someone to mine them and had sought international bids last year.

A turning point in India’s stake in Afghanistan was reached when a consortium of Indian companies, backed and aided by the government, put in a bid for the mines and possibly steel plants in that dangerous, war-torn country.

This was at a time when the continuance of America and its allies is uncertain beyond 2014, and the region is likely to witness a new phase of the ‘great game’ in which India is expected to play a larger part. With a reduced role for the US and its allies, Afghanistan is going to seethe once again as a battleground not only for tribal rivalries, but between neighbors like Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia and India.

The Afghan government has been looking for partners to exploit the country’s rich mineral resources for several years but has only found one taker so far. The Beijing-based Metallurical Corp. of China won the license to mine Afghanistan’s biggest copper deposits at Aynak in 2007. This will give it a much greater role, and together with Pakistan, could allow Beijing to dominate the region.
Pakistan’s role has been to aid and abet the Taliban. The US, being unable to tame the Taliban despite having 110,000 troops and spending $115 billion every year in Afghanistan, is in a spot. Domestic support for the war is also declining.An opinion poll, published recently by the Washington Post reveals that a record 60% of Americans now believe the war is not worth fighting.

The changing view of the American establishment comes out starkly in an article in Foreign Affairs by Robert Blackwill, a senior foreign policy analyst and former US ambassador to India. Titled ‘Plan B in Afghanistan’, Blackwill argues that a de facto partition of Afghanistan is the least bad option. The article, which has also been carried in condensed form by some Indian newspapers, says, “Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east… a de facto partition offers the best available alternative to strategic defeat…

Washington would concentrate its efforts on defending the areas in the north and west of Afghanistan not dominated by the Pashtuns.”

The Indian foreign policy establishment is aware that the new perspective changes the equations in the neighbourhood. Though Indian aid of $1.3 billion to build roads, power lines, a dam, provide buses and build the new Afghan parliament, etc have won it much support among the Afghan people, all this goodwill could be lost if a Pakistan-backed Talibanmoves in to control the Pashtun heartland.

Backed by the strong economic interest of China in the Aynak copper mine, the China-Pakistan axis would undermine our influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan, by its proxy control of the south and the east, and China by the economic clout it would wield.

Clearly India has to be prepared for such an eventuality. While any kind of armed intervention should be ruled out, we cannot afford to desert a long time friend either. Luckily, the Hajigak, mining bid provides just such a chance.

Merely to take out the iron ore in a typical colonial way would not do. What is needed is an integrated approach that would involve building a railway, one or more steel plants, generating employment within the country by having ancillary steel units and workshops, and creating vast employment potential by building and maintaining roads and truck transportation.

It would go a long way in moving the Afghan economy from drugs and guns. Sensibly handled, China need not only be a rival but could share a partnership in the development of Afghanistan since both Asian powers have an interest in a stable region.

Even Pakistan could have something to gain. At present it has only one integrated steel plant near Karachi and the total annual steel production in that country is under 5 million tonnes versus a consumption of over 8 million tonnes. It is the closest market for steel from Afghanistan.

Given the difficulties in Afghanistan, such a scenario might seem utopian. But it offers a good chance, if ever there is one, of restoring peace to a troubled land.
http://www.dnaindia....anistan_1501990

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Posted 11 March 2011 - 12:32 PM

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NEW DELHI: Should Afghanistan be divided into two? Former US envoy to India, Robert Blackwill, has suggested that the US should effect a de facto partition of Afghanistan.

The current counter-insurgency is not working, he says, because the Taliban don't see why they should negotiate peace when they haven't been defeated on the ground. The US, he suggests, will have to reconcile to the fact that the Taliban will control southern Afghanistan. They should be allowed to do so.

"After years of faulty US policy toward Afghanistan, there are no quick, easy and cost-free ways to escape the current deadly quagmire. But, with all its problems, de facto partition offers the best available US alternative to strategic defeat," Blackwill argues in an article in `Politico'.

Having let the Taliban control southern Afghanistan, the US, he says, should "then focus on defending the north and west regions -- roughly 60% of the population. These areas, including Kabul, are not Pashtun-dominated and locals are largely sympathetic to US efforts".

But it would not mean that the US would completely exit. Instead, "we would then make it clear that we would rely heavily on US air power and special forces to target any al-Qaida base in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan Taliban leaders who aided them. We would also target Afghan Taliban encroachments across the de facto partition lines and terrorist sanctuaries along the Pakistan border."

The US would work to secure the north and west and Kabul, which has considerably less Taliban presence or influence. "This might mean a long-time residual US military force in Afghanistan of about 40,000 to 50,000 troops. We would enlist Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and supportive Pashtuns in this endeavour, as well as our NATO allies, Russia, India, Iran, perhaps China, Central Asian nations and, hopefully, the UN Security Council."

The US, he says, would retain the freedom to strike at even civilian Taliban leaders in southern Afghanistan.

The arrangement, he says, would make Pakistan unhappy, but a "Pakistan would likely oppose de facto partition. Managing Islamabad's reaction would be no easy task -- not least because the Pakistan military expects a strategic gain once the US military withdraws from Afghanistan."

http://articles.time...istan-partition


Zindabaad Hindustan, Zendabaad. Down with dirty Pakiland and Khaybar Pakhtunwha, death to fabricated Awghanistan, death to every loyal Awghan son.
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Posted 11 March 2011 - 01:05 PM

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#6 Partition Afghanistan ($10 billion - 10 dead)

Afghanistan has no real history as a nation, its just a creation of the old British empire. It has become a radical terrorist hotbed because it is a dysfunctional country torn by decades of civil war with no logical ethnic or geographic boundaries. The ruling Taliban sect has irritated neighboring countries by slaughtering minorities and spreading violent ideology. The USA could work with the United Nations and partition Afghanistan among neighboring countries based upon ethnic and geographic lines. These larger nations with powerful militaries could invade and occupy their expanded boundaries. Wealthier UN nations could offer economic and development assistance while the USA provides military intelligence and airpower to support this campaign.

These neighboring countries would assume a role of permanent peacekeepers in the "former" Afghanistan with an incentive to develop and control their regions in order to resettle the millions of Afghan refugees they now care for. This is the only permanent solution to the Taliban problem as they would face the impossible task of fighting all their Muslim neighbors. Most importantly, this would provide greater peace and prosperity for the millions of innocent Afghan civilians.

Hopefully, the Pentagon will reject ideas from paratrooper nuts for an airborne assault in Afghanistan to seize an airfield and form an "airhead" so that helicopters and other equipment can be flown in for regional operations. This would work nicely for a few weeks, until artillery fire begins to hit the base and a million Muslims mass in a replay of the 1954 French military disaster at remote Dien Bien Phu. Attempting to supply a large force by air on the other side of the world and 1000 miles from the nearest major American military base is foolish. Even with access to bases in neighboring countries, those Muslim nations may suddenly change their minds and deny use. A major Afghan leader was killed by a suicide bomber last month; that's the type of operation the USA must consider for Osama bin Laden. As for the problem of Afghanistan, just partition it and the problem is solved with little loss of life.
http://www.g2mil.com...taryoptions.htm

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Posted 11 March 2011 - 01:08 PM

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Defeatism or realism in Afghanistan?

Patrick Bury is a former Captain in the Royal Irish Regiment who has served in Sangin, Afghanistan; a memoir of his experiences, ‘Callsign Hades’, described as “a scintillating masterpiece, the first great book of the Afghan war”, is out now

Wars, like all violence, tend to pull us towards absolutes. We either win, as in the Second World War, or lose, as in Vietnam or with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The former soldier in me is easily ‘pulled’ into seeing the conflict in Afghanistan as a matter of absolutes, of simple ‘Cause, Effect and Solution’. But the analyst in me sees things differently.

That the West cannot win militarily in Afghanistan is now widely accepted. That it cannot lose is less so. Con Coughlin is right to say there is too much at stake in Afghanistan for the West just to cut and run. Such a defeat for NATO would not be good for the future geopolitical position of the West, Pakistan’s control of its nuclear weapons or the Afghan people. But he is wrong to suggest that the only other option is therefore ‘to wait until the reconstruction effort is completed’ in the forlorn hope the Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy actually succeeds.

Although the West’s view of Afghanistan is understandably influenced by historical discourse, we need to break away from the absolutes of victory or defeat when thinking of Afghanistan’s future. The West will never create a stable Afghan democracy that enjoys a legitimate monopoly of violence due to the well documented nature of Afghan society. The near collapse of the Kabul Bank this week highlights the sheer fallacy of this task.

As does the fact that war is now costing NATO $140 billion a year to keep 140,000 troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a Talib force of about 35,000 still maintains a large degree of tactical and operational manoeuvrability in many areas of the country, at an estimated cost of only $60 million a year. Such figures belie the truth that COIN in Afghanistan is going to take too long and prove too costly. In reality it is simply unsustainable.

This has also been acknowledged in a new study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, which has called for a review of the West’s strategy in Afghanistan.

So what is sustainable in Afghanistan? What do we need to achieve there? Given the fact that the UN mandated operation that began in November 2001 had defeated Al Qaeda in Afghanistan by early 2002, airpower, drones and special forces can continue to be used to keep pressure on them into the future in areas NATO ground forces cannot penetrate.

What are really needed in Afghanistan are realistic policy goals and a military strategy to complement them; this should be a strategy that contains and deters the Al Qaeda threat. Instead of massive numbers of ground forces out of proportion to the threat the Taliban pose, NATO should adopt a long and light military, economic and diplomatic commitment. This would set the West’s interests in Afghanistan in the context of other domestic and foreign policy imperatives and acknowledge fiscal constraints.

Such a policy would ensure we are not pulled into a black or white scenario; that there would be no doomsday for the West. Rather, it would involve propping the Kabul government in areas where its writ actually runs and where it enjoys the popular support of the people.

It would also involve negotiating with the Taliban, a prospect that will ultimately abandon women to their fate in the areas that would be ceded to their control, often the very areas NATO troops have fought the hardest for.

As the former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, will outline next week, de facto partition of Afghanistan is now the best course open to the West. And this will have to go hand in hand with con-federal power arrangements in the provinces.

And a lighter, less visible NATO presence that concentrates in areas where they have popular support and on developing a federalised Afghan Security Force capability is a more realistic option.

The sooner we accept this and adjust our strategy in Afghanistan to target our real enemy – extremist jihadism – the West can set a course that may prevent civil war in Afghanistan and its own geo-political decline.

In supporting a Kabul government so that it won’t fall to the Taliban, and in encouraging practical provincial sovereignty, we are not winning or losing. We are doing what is sustainable, given the context of the threat we face, and Afghan society.

Indeed, this is not a very palatable outcome, especially given the ‘mission creep’ aspirations the West has used to dress its involvement in Afghanistan.

But it is the most realistic.
http://www.leftfootf...in-afghanistan/

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Posted 11 March 2011 - 01:17 PM

ANOTHER GREAT ARTICLE
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Posted 12 March 2011 - 09:41 AM

Ma kwar o madar e Pashtain Yahood Kafar ra konam http://www.bbc.co.uk..._problems.shtml
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Posted 29 March 2011 - 07:20 PM

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Amrullah Saleh versus Mordor

In his speeches Saleh recounts Taliban brutalities: busloads of laborers lined up and executed, young men chopped in half with axes, women and children slain before their families. His rhetoric is harshly critical of Pakistan.

"The Taliban have reached the gates of Kabul," he said.

The following Washington Post report contains a few deceptive passages. Together, they convey the impression that it was Hamid Karzai's idea to negotiate with the Taliban, and that the U.S. and other NATO regimes were merely innocent bystanders to this idea.

That's not what happened. Karzai was quietly pressured by NATO to negotiate with Taliban since at least as early as 2007. And as I've pointed out more than once on this blog, when he didn't move fast enough the British regime went behind his back and made plans to set up secret camps to train Taliban fighters. The British regime overlooked Afghanistan's very effective secret service, headed by Amrullah Saleh, which caught them red-handed.

Innocent bystanders, my foot. The NATO regimes involved in Afghanistan just got scared, that's all, when rumors started flying that Karzai was negotiating with an al Qaeda-affiliated Taliban terrorist group. That was one story that couldn't be kept quiet. So now the regimes are hastening to assure voters that they would never support such negotiations.

Please, no letters asking why I'm now calling NATO governments, including my own, "regimes." What do you want me to call them? Pieces of shit? They betrayed their own troops out of fear that if they didn't kowtow to Pakistan's regime there would be large-scale terrorist attacks in their countries, and because the U.S. regime wanted to keep Pakistan's as a strategic asset.

The NATO countries should have confronted the downsides of their policies on Pakistan a long time ago -- downsides which include the Pakistani regime's support for the Taliban 'insurgency' in Afghanistan.

And now NATO wants Afghanistan to bear the brunt of their leftover problem from the Cold War. Amrullah Saleh says 'No.'

Minority leaders leaving Karzai's side over leader's overtures to insurgents
By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
July 23, 2010

PANJSHIR VALLEY, AFGHANISTAN -- The man who served as President Hamid Karzai's top intelligence official for six years has launched an urgent campaign to warn Afghans that their leader has lost conviction in the fight against the Taliban and is recklessly pursuing a political deal with insurgents.

In speeches to small groups in Kabul and across northern Afghanistan over the past month, Amarullah Saleh has repeated his belief that Karzai's push for negotiation with insurgents is a fatal mistake and a recipe for civil war. He says Karzai's chosen policy endangers the fitful progress of the past nine years in areas such as democracy and women's rights.

"If I don't raise my voice we are headed towards a crisis," he told a gathering of college students in Kabul.

That view is shared by a growing number of Afghan minority leaders who once participated fully in Karzai's government, but now feel alienated from it. Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek politicians have expressed increasing concern that they are being marginalized by Karzai and his efforts to strike a peace deal with his fellow Pashtuns in the insurgency.

Saleh's warnings come as the United States struggles to formulate its own position on reconciliation with the Taliban. While U.S. officials have supported Afghan government-led talks in theory, they have watched with apprehension as Karzai has pursued his own peace initiatives, seemingly without Western involvement.

NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, cautioned recently that "any political reconciliation process has to be genuinely national and genuinely inclusive. Otherwise we're simply storing up the next set of problems that will break out. And in this country when problems break out, they tend to lead to violence."

Still, with war costs and casualties rising, U.S. policymakers are increasingly looking for a way out, and a power-sharing deal between Karzai and the Taliban may be the best they can hope for. One senior NATO official in Kabul described Saleh as "brilliant." But the official said Saleh's hard-line stance against negotiations does not offer any path to ending the long-running U.S. war.

Saleh, 38 and a Tajik, began his intelligence career in this scenic valley north of Kabul working for the legendary guerrilla commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. He said he is not motivated by ethnic rivalries with the majority Pashtuns or by a desire to undermine Karzai, whom he describes as a decent man and a patriot.

Rather, Saleh said he wants to use nonviolent, grass-roots organizing to pressure the government into a harder line against the Taliban by showing that Afghans who do not accept the return of the Taliban are a formidable force. Saleh resigned last month as director of the National Directorate of Security after he said he realized that Karzai no longer valued his advice.

"The Taliban have reached the gates of Kabul," Saleh said. "We will not stop this movement even if it costs our blood."

Proceeding carefully

Karzai spokesman Waheed Omar declined to comment on Saleh's analysis. Karzai's government has made reconciliation a top priority, and officials say they are proceeding carefully. Karzai has invited Taliban leaders to talk, but he has said insurgents must accept the constitution, renounce violence and sever their links to foreign terrorists before they can rejoin society.

Those conditions do little to mollify Afghan minority leaders, many of whom had backed Karzai in the past but are now breaking with the president. Some are concerned that a deal between Karzai and the Taliban could spawn the sort of civil war that existed in Afghanistan prior to the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001.

"The new political path that Karzai has chosen will not only destroy him, it will destroy the country. It's a kind of suicide," said Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader and former Karzai ally.

With the defection of Saleh and the transfer of another Tajik, Bismillah Khan, from his position as chief of army staff to interior minister, Karzai critics see an erosion of strong anti-Taliban views within the government. Khan, many argue, was more important to the war effort in his army post than at the interior ministry, which oversees the police.

"Now Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks, they are not partners in Karzai's government, they are just employees," said Saleh Mohammad Registani, a Tajik parliament member from the Panjshir. "Karzai wants to use them as symbols."

To spread his message, Saleh has sought out young, educated students and university graduates. Through them he intends to form groups across the country to apply grass-roots political pressure. His aims are nonviolent, he said, and not intended to further ethnic divisions, but he has said they must prepare for the worst.

Saleh was born in the Panjshir Valley before the family moved to Kabul. He joined the armed opposition, or mujahideen, rather than be conscripted into the Afghan army and in 1997 started as an intelligence officer with Massoud's forces.

Saleh was appointed to run Afghanistan's fledgling intelligence service in 2004, and developed a reputation among U.S. officials as one of the most effective and honest cabinet ministers.

In Saleh's view, Karzai's shift from fighting to accommodating the Taliban began last August. The messy aftermath of the presidential election, in which Karzai prevailed but was widely accused of electoral fraud, was taken as a personal insult, Saleh said.

"It was very abrupt, it was not a process," Saleh said of Karzai's changing views. "He thought he was hurt by democracy and by the Americans. He felt he should have won with dignity."

Frayed relations

After the election, Afghan relations with the United States plunged to new lows, as Karzai railed against Western interference in his government and threatened to join the Taliban. Saleh said Karzai believes that the United States and NATO cannot prevail in Afghanistan and will soon depart. For that reason he has shifted his attention to Pakistan, which is thought to hold considerable sway over elements of the insurgency, in an attempt to broker a deal with the Taliban.

"We are heading toward settlement. Democracy is dying," Saleh said. He recalled Karzai saying, "'I've given everybody a chance to defeat the Taliban. It's been nine years. Where is the victory?'"

In his speeches, Saleh recounts Taliban brutalities: busloads of laborers lined up and executed, young men chopped in half with axes, women and children slain before their families. His rhetoric is harshly critical of Pakistan.

"All the goals you have will collapse if the Taliban comes back," he told a gathering of college students under a tent outside his house in Kabul. "I don't want your university to be closed just because of a political deal. It will be closed if we do not raise our voices."

Saleh believes the Taliban will not abide by a peaceful power-sharing deal because they want to regain total authority. Despite a significant U.S. troop buildup this year and major NATO offensives, he estimated that insurgents now control more than 30 percent of Afghanistan. He said the Taliban leadership -- about 200 people, many of them in the Pakistani city of Karachi -- are financed, armed and protected by Pakistan's intelligence agency. "The inner circle is totally under their control," Saleh said. Pakistan has long denied it supports the Taliban.

The second ring of Taliban leadership -- about 1,700 field commanders -- oversees a fighting force of 10,000 to 30,000 people, depending on the season, Saleh said. Under former NATO commander Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, 700 of these Taliban commanders were captured or killed, Saleh said, only to be replaced by a new crop.

"The factory is not shut," he said. "It keeps producing."

Special correspondent Javed Hamdard contributed to this report.

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Posted 29 March 2011 - 07:22 PM

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Abdul Hafiz Mansur: The Mujahedin's Journalist
Abdul Hafiz Mansoor is chief editor of the Tajik faction's newspaper, but he has fallen out with many in his own political camp.

One of the more controversial figures in Afghanistan's upcoming presidential election is Abdul Hafiz Mansoor, who has come in for criticism for what some see as his Tajik nationalist views and hardline attitude to religion and women.

Mansoor, 41, one of 18 people standing for election on October 9, is currently editor of the newspaper Payam-e-Mujahed, the mouthpiece of Jamiat-e-Islami, a former mujahedin faction whose stronghold is the mainly Tajik northeast.

But as well as attacking the policies of the incumbent president, Hamed Karzai, Mansoor has lashed out at fellow-candidate Mohammad Younis Qanuni, who shares his background as a Panjshiri Tajik member of Jamiat.

He has harsh words to say about the current president.

"Karzai is against religion, against the jihad, and against the mujahedin," he told IWPR in an interview. "His government is not national, but is instead based on discrimination and divisiveness. It is always trying to fan the flames when it comes to ethnicity, and it disregards the parliament."

But he was equally scathing about Qanuni and his backers in the presidential race, foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and defence minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim.

"At the Emergency Loya Jirga [2002], I wanted to run against Karzai, and the only barrier to my nomination was Karzai's friends Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Younis Qanuni and Abdullah.

"Now I have nominated myself. If I am selected as president, I will remove the present administration, including Fahim, Qanuni and the rest of their friends."

Mansoor caused a storm in September when he said in a televised campaign speech, "I am not an Afghan… I am an Afghanistani," a reference to the older usage of the word "Afghan" to mean the Pashtuns only, as opposed to Tajiks and other groups.

Siddiq Patman, a political analyst who was involved in drafting the constitution approved at the beginning of this year, said, "I can't see what percentage of people will vote for him, because he doesn't call himself Afghan, he doesn't respect women's rights and he doesn't accept power-sharing with other ethnic groups in the government."

Patman believes that these tactics - which he defines as playing the ethnic card and denying that Afghans share a common historical past - is a calculated move by the candidate designed to "make friends among local warlords… and get them to support him".

On the streets of Kabul, it was hard to find anyone who has anything positive to say about the candidate. Wahidullah Shams, a 28-year-old man, said, "Since Mansoor doesn't call himself Afghan, has no respect for women, and seems to be anti-Pashtun, it would be better for him to drop his candidacy, because he will get less votes than any of the others."

Munir Ahmad, 22, from Nangarhar province in the east of Afghanistan, said, "The supreme court and the interior ministry should have taken Mansoor's name off the candidate list, because a person who does not describe himself as an Afghan should not only be barred from holding the post of president, but should not be allowed to hold even a low-level government job."

Mansoor wants to see a strong Islamic flavour to any future government - and his views on religion and the role of women have drawn as much criticism as support.

"In Afghanistan, the easiest way to create a system of government is to use religious principles," he told IWPR.

Rauf Khan, a former mujahedin fighter and Jamiat member, is a keen supporter, "In my opinion, Mansoor is not only a great mujahedin, but a great scholar too - he has written many books. I've known him for a long time: he's a religious person and a follower of the precepts of [the Prophet] Mohammad."

But Mohammad Jalil, 42, a Kabul resident originally from Ghazni, took the opposite view, saying, "Mansoor is one of the key figures of the jihad…. He is against women who don't act according to Islamic rules and regulations. The people who vote for him will be those who want a strong Islamic role in the government. "

In terms of more general policies, Mansoor is promising sweeping changes to the way Afghanistan is governed.

In a speech opening his election campaign in September, Mansoor said he would replace the presidential system with a parliamentary one, "If I become president I will recall the Loya Jirga and make a new parliament and constitution. I will have the present constitution annulled."

He told IWPR, "We are against the current government; we will change the presidential system to a parliamentary one. It is also worth saying that I want the presidency not to gain power, but in an effort to distribute that power."

With the strong parliamentary state he is proposing, Mansoor promises that "we will make a system such that even if Satan were to become president, he would be unable to do anything".

"People have the right to take part in choosing their own destiny, and their participation in the system will prevent a single person, family or party from holding all power in its hands," he said.

Born in 1963 in the Rukha district of the Panjshir valley, Mansoor went to a local school before going to university - when events changed his life.

"Until 1978, I was a regular student and wanted to complete my education and become a doctor. But [in 1979] the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan and the jihad began. That's how I switched to politics: when I chose politics, it chose me, too," he said.

Mansoor was part of the Jamiat mujahedin structure of which Ahmad Shah Massoud was military commander. He served in a backroom role, eventually becoming head of political and cultural affairs and running the party's Mujahed newspaper.

When the mujahedin factions took Kabul and drove the communists from power in 1992, Mansoor was made head of the new regime's official news agency Bakhtar.

The Jamiat-led government retreated from the capital in the face of a Taleban onslaught in 1996, holding out for years in north-eastern areas.

After the collapse of the Taleban regime in 2001, Mansoor was back in Kabul, this time as acting minister of information and culture, but was soon shifted to the post of head of Radio and Television of Afghanistan. Removed from that post a year later, in 2002, he became head of the weekly Payam-e-Mujahid.

He also served as an elected representative to the first and second Loya Jirgas, held in 2002 and 2003 respectively.

Mansoor admits his election platform differs from those of his rivals - but insisted he would drop out of the race if any of them were to back his policies.

Patman doesn't hold out much hope for the Panjsheri journalist, "Kabul residents, like those of other provinces too, don't have a positive image of him and won't vote for him."

Amanullah Narsat is an IWPR reporter in Kabul.

http://iwpr.net/repo...dins-journalist

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Posted 30 March 2011 - 04:05 PM

اوضاع کنونی کشور ما چیست؟ و چه بایدکرد؟


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اوضاع درسراسرکشور مصیبت زده وبحران زاء جنگ،غارت،چور چپاول و غصب ملکیت های دولتی و غیر دولتی توسط زورمندان مسلح ومافیهای زمین و مواد مخدر و قاچاق آن، ترور وانفجار، اختطاف و سرقت های مسلحانه، تجاوز جنسی، آدم رباي، فساد اداری و تمامآ جنایات سازمان یافته ضد بشری روز افزون در کشور ما وجدان بیدارهر انسان با احساس راتکان میدهد و ملت ما رابجان رسانیده است.
وهمگی دریئس و ناامیدی بسر میبرند. و ازانتخابات های جعلی وتقلبی ریاستی و پارلمانی و دیگر شوراها بنام جرگه های صلح وسایرجلسات در داخل و خارج کشور مردم نا امید شدند. امروز هرکس در دهات و شهرها اگر غنی یا فقیراند مرگ نابه هنگام خود را انتظار میکشند که دشمن در کمین است. حال میآیم که عامل این فاجعه چیست؟ واز کجا سرچشمه میگیرد؟
جواب: افغانستان معبر استراتیژیک گذرگاه کشورگشایان، تقاطع جاده ابریشم، بام دنیا، دروازه هند، دروازه شرقی جهان اسلام ، منطقه حاءل، چارراه تمدنها، دروازه بزرگ تجارت جهانی وبالاخره قلب آسیا نامیده اند. افغانستان گرچه برای فعلآ منابع نفتی و گاز سرشاری ندارد ولی نزدیکی این کشور به منابع بزرگ نفت و گازآسیای مرکزی و نزدیکی اش به خاورمیانه و جنوب آسیا و در همسایگی آسیای مرکزی بر دهانه، آتشفشان نفتی بحیره کسپین قرار گرفته است. اهمیت افغانستان امروزی از منابع نفت وگاز و راه های انتقالی آن سرچشمه میگیرد.

زیرا نفت منبع کلیدی اقتصاد و ماده انرژی زایی است که هم چرخش صنعت تکنالوژی مدرن وهم ماشین جنگی رابکار می اندازد همه چیزما به گازونفت مربوط است. ازاین لحاظ جنگ را استعماربوسیله طالبان والقاعده سازمان دهی مینماید ودامنه آنرا گسترش میدهد تا پایگاه نظامی خودرا به نقاط استراتیژیک دایم مستحکم نماید. افغانستان درطول تاریخ میدان کشاکش رقابت های جهانگشایان ونام آوران حریص وخود خواه درمسیرسیاسی اش بوده است. گاهی ازطرف شمال وگاهی ازطرف جنوب مورد تهاجم وتجاوز واشغال قرارگرفته ونقشه های شوم استعماری انگلسی از(250)سال بدینسو در دستور روز قرار دارد. ملت قهرمان و مجاهد پرورما درمقابل شان ازهیچگونه فداکاری و جانبازی دریغ نکرده اند. تجاوزی راعقب زده اند ولی متجاوز دیگری خیال تسخیرآنرانموده است. بالاخره این سرزمین به آتش زیر پای شان مبدل گردیده است.

خصلت امپریالیزم انحصاروالیگارشی درجهان عقب مانده و ممالک اسلامی بوده میخواهد منابع طبیعی آنهارا استخراج نموده و مردم انرا برده، فقیر و ناتوان ساخته. وزمانیکه به اثر رشادت ودلیری مردم تاب مقاومت کرده نتوانست. باپلان جدید دیگرش مزدوران مخفی استخباراتی دیگرش را روی صحنه میآورد. ودولت دست نشانده وبوسیده اش بجای آنکه عناصردموکرات و مترقی وآزادیخواه واستقلال طلب رایاری رساند برعکس پیشنهادات و مذاکرات صلح را با دشمن ملت همواره مینماید وآنها کدام ارزش قایل نمیشوند وازوحشت دست بردارنیستند. وظیفه عناصرصدیق و دلسوز وطن افشای چنین حقایق بوده و در راه مبارزه درونی و بیرونی روشنفکران وقت گذارنی نگردد. زیرا یکعده ازروشنفکران زیرتاثیرقدرتهای اهریمنی رفته وطن رافراموش کردن بدامان کشور های استعماری افتیده ویکعده دیگربه انجوها وموسسات خارجی بخاطرکسب منفعت وجاه طلبی وزراندوزی و ساختن قصرهای مجلل و باشکوه تن به هرنوع پستی میدهند وعده دیگری به ساختن احزاب سیاسی دست بکار شدند که در ماهیت اش هیچ چیز وجود ندارد.

امروزعادی ترین انسانها سوال به ذهن اش خطورمیکند که این ثروت را ازکجا پیدا کردی یا قاچاق برهستی،یا وطنفروش،یا دزد،یا رشوت خور و یا معامله گرهستی، عده دیگری از روشنفکران درسازش کاری با همه کس اند که این خصلت اپورتونیستی است.

اپورتونیسم در خدمت ارتجاع وامپریالیزم است. مردم از نوکران استعمار که از 10 تا 7 ثور 1357 تا نوکران استعمار موجوده کینه و نفرت دارند و قابل اعتماد نمیباشند. ماتاکنون قادربه ساختن یک حزب نیرومند نه شدیم. پس ضرورت به تشکیل یک جبهه متحد ازعناصر صدیق، دلسوز وطندوست مسلمان و باخدا میباشد. وبخاطرریشه کن ساختن دشمنان درچنین شرایط ضرورت به دسته جات چریکی ازدهات میباشد. زیرا که اردوی ملی وپولیس ملی واستخبارات دولتی که ساخته وپرداخته استعمار میباشد نتیجه نداده هرروز قوت دشمن زیاد میگردد و به تمامآ ولایات جا گرفته است.

ماباید ازتعصب و بدبینی و خودخواهی که برسر مقام رهبری بوده اجتناب نمایم شخصیت و لیاقت و درایت، تقوای سیاسی و پشتکار داشتن وعملکرد سابقه آن تعین کنند مقام رهبری آنست. مبارزه تنهابه حرافی، مقاله نویسی طویل وعریض اکتفاء نمیگردد مبارزه دعوت های اشرافی ومشروبات نوشی ورفتن به دروازه قدرتمندان دولتی نیست و دست طمع پیش کردن به آنها باعث بی اعتمادی میگردد. مبارزه خون دل خوردن ورنج کشیدن به خواستهای مردم است تا از آزمون زمان بدرآید. باید کمرهمت بسته در راه آزادی،استقلال، ترقی وپیشرفت وطن به پیش.

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Posted 31 March 2011 - 06:57 PM



Parsi-e Darbari (Dari) Naat for all true Muslims and true non-Pashtuns. We have to get apart of evil Pashtuns. Pashtuns are the nation of Dajjal, known in the west as ''The Anti-christ''. We have to apart our self from these infidels, the army of Satan and his demonic generals. We have to create our own Khorasan, our own state to prepare ourself for the long fight against the evil. Otherwise they will drink the entire world to a dry desert. Muhammad pbuh prophecized that the Dajjal will appear from mountains in Khorasan and from Khorasan the Guardian of the world, al-Mahdi, will also appear and kill the best. AWGHANISTAN IS A HARAMI STATE, CREATED BY KAFARS, not by MUSLIMS. whereever kafars created states (like Israel, Laos, AFgh etc.) there is still war, barbarism .... and god still stay away from that part of the world.
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Posted 01 April 2011 - 12:54 PM

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Khurasan Studies and Research Centre (KSRC) is proud to announce that it has held its third major conference on Sunday 14 June 2008 in London. The main speaker of the conference was Mr Zalmai Nishat who presented the results of his research entitled: ‘The Emergence and Evolution of Ethnic Nationalism in Afghanistan.’
More than 100 intellectuals, professors, students, researchers, social activist and community leaders participated there.
The program was chaired by Mr. Adul Jabar Ariyaee who initially invited Mr Abdul Ali Faiq to inaugurate the conference with the recital of some verses of the Holy Koran.
Mr Ariyaee after welcoming the participants of the conference, made clear that the Khurasan Studies and Research Centre provides a platform for academics and researchers to share the results of their studies with the people. He went on to say that the Research Centre will try to remain a neutral organisation as much as possible by providing an equal opportunity to different scholars to put forward their academic research to the society at large.
Then Mr Ariyaee argued that the issue of ‘ethnic nationalism’ in Afghanistan is one of the most important areas and very little research has been conducted on this matter. Thus Mr Ariyaee found the work of Mr Nishat on the issue of ‘ethnic nationalism in Afghanistan’ very timely and appropriate and thought that without any doubt Mr Nishat’s work will contribute immensely for our understanding of this particular problem and indeed his study will enable us to reflect critically on this important debate. After his instructive introduction Mr Ariyaee asked the main speaker – Mr Nishat – to present his research.
The main speaker, Mr Nishat, first started by illustrating what he meant by the ‘Emergence and Evolution of Ethnic Nationalism in Afghanistan.’ He made it clear that his study covers one century of state–building and nation–building by different Pashtun ruling elites (1880–1978) in Afghanistan. Throughout this one century a Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism emerged as an important element of nation–building during the twentieth century.
Then he divided his study to four parts: 1) the theoretical part which dealt with theoretical debate on nationalism – primordial, modernist, ethno-symbolist, and finally post–structuralist and he maintained that his point of departure is the latter view (e.g. post–structuralism). He also explained different models of nationalism: assimilation; integration, and finally multi–culturalism. He argued that without ‘power’ there is no ‘identity’ and ‘objectivity ‘(Laclau 1990; also see Foucault and his notion of ‘power–knowledge’). For him then the overall question was ‘do nations make states or states make nations?’ Mr Nishat forcefully argued that always ‘states make nations’ and this is especially true in post–colonial third world. Mr Nishat argued that states make nations through different means and methods and the most outstanding techniques of nation–building are: re–writing of the history (by excluding some) and also making possible for the nation to forget parts of its history (Ernest Renan); creating national language; construction of national myths; generating national figures and event; crafting nation symbols (e.g. flag, national anthem etc.); building infrastructure (roads, train tracks, etc. to integrate society); using educational institutions to disseminate the national ideology and teaching the national language; utilising communication tools (print media, radio, TV, etc.) to spread the idea of the nation.
In the next three parts of his presentation Mr Nishat went on to show how then 2) a ‘centralised state’ is a post–colonial artefact in Afghanistan – like other post–colonial states; and 3) how then this phenomenon needs to appeal to legitimizing tools (nationalism among other things); and finally 4) how then nationalism becomes an official discourse in this process of state–building and later nation–building.
Mr Nishat claimed that Amir Abd al–Rahman Khan consolidated the ‘state centralisation’ which was beneficial both for colonial power (the British and the Tsarist Russia) as well as to the Pashtun ruling elites. For Mr Nishat this was the end of the process of ‘Afghanistanization of Khurasan.’ Mr Nishat claimed that Amir Abd al–Rahman Khan tried to establish his legitimacy on two pillars: ‘Islam’ and ‘Pashtun supremacy’ over the rest of ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The latter element (e.g. Pashtun supremacy), for Mr Nishat, was to become the root of the ‘Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism’ in Afghanistan for the next one hundred years.
For Mr Nishat the influx and formation of modern nationalism became possible by a group of intellectuals who were familiar to some extend with modern views of nationalism: the ‘Young Aghans.’ The Young Afghans were an imitator of the ‘Young Turks.’ This group was led by Mahmud Beg Tarzi (1866–1935) who had lived and studied in Ottoman Empire where he became familiar with modern European views on nationalism. Mr Nishat claimed that Tarzi was the father of modern Pashtun Nationalism in Afghanistan. The nationalism Young Afghans had three pillars: pan–Islamism; developing the Afghan (Pashto) Language; and finally re-writing the Afghan history. Mr Nishat claimed that during the Amanullah Khan period the ‘Young Afghans’ were to become ruling elites (including the king himself) of the country and they started to institutionalise the modern Pashtun Nationalism for the first time. Later they abandoned one element of their nationalism: pan–Islamism.
Then for Mr Nishat, with the Young Afghans, the second stage of the centralised state–building starts to unfold (which was also an attempt of nation–building): the ‘Pashtunization of Afghanistan.’ These ethnic nationalist policies are continued by the Musahiban dynasty until 1978 (this was based on the model of assimilation: to Pashtunize the non–Pashtuns.
Mr Nishat argued that the Musahiban dynasty (1929–1978) undertook officially the Young Afghans brand of nationalism and attempted to create an ‘idea of nation’ by assimilating different ethnic groups to their vision. They also adopted the pillars of Young Afghans nationalism with some changes. For them there was four aims: 1) re–writing the Afghan [Pashtun] history establishing the History Academy to re-write a history based on Afghan [Pashtun] traits); 2) the study of Pashtu Language, Literature and Folklore (re–opening the Pashto Academy Pashto Tolana); 3) dissemination of Pashtu Language; and finally 4) to spread knowledge about Afghanistan and its culture: to present a false image of Afghanistan to the outside world based merely on Pashtun character.
Their efforts of constructing a nation included among other things: the re–writing of the history on the Pashtun character (by excluding other); creating national language (Pashto Language); construction of national myths (based on Pashtun trait); generating national figures (mostly Pashtuns) and event (wars which the Pashtun have bravely fought against the British; three Anglo–Afghan wars); crafting nation symbols (e.g. flag, national anthem etc again based on Pashtun peculiarity); using educational institutions to disseminate the national ideology and teaching the national language (Pashto); utilising communication tools (print media, radio, TV, etc.) to spread the idea of the nation (based on Pashtun character); the issue of Pakhtunistan was the exemplar of Pashtun nationalism; developmental projects were based mostly in Pashtun populated areas, but when they were established in a non–Pashtun areas, the Pashtuns were moved to these sites for settlement (as part of the long–standing internal colonisation of the country).
At the end, Mr Nishat concluded that even before the communist coup d'état of 1978, the Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism had failed and Afghanistan was facing a crisis of identity: there was a widespread loyalty to sub–national group identities rather than to a single Afghan nation. For Mr Nishat there were, at least, five major reasons for the failure of the Pashtun Nationalism: 1) negation of the non–Pashtun cultures, languages and histories proved very difficult, if not impossible, to succeed; 2) almost a total exclusion of other ethnic groups from the processes of nation–building (this was evident in the re-writing of the history, creation of myths, symbols, etc.); 3) weakness of Pashtu Language and culture compared to other rather well–established and natural cultures and languages (i.e. Farsi, Uzbek etc.); 4) underdevelopment (almost a non–existence of infrastructures like roads, train tracks, schools, also a very underdeveloped media and communication, etc.); 5) in the eyes of non–Pashtun ethnic groups (e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc.) the Pashtuns had emerged, compared to them, in the history of the land rather recently. This was also a major factor in their dislike of the Pashtun Ethnic Nationalism. Thus – for Mr Nishat – the project of Pashtunization of Afghanistan failed rather miserably.
After Mr Nishat’s speech a half–hour break was announced for tea and coffee. Then an open question and answer session followed. Mr Nishat answered the questions patiently and listened to the comments and criticism attentively.

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Posted 01 April 2011 - 04:56 PM

I think the South Sudan referendum sets a crucial precedent for the kind of partition we want to see in Afghanistan.

If a partition becomes inevitable, we must take care to closely study the Sudan example; we would have a general referendum in the areas of the North where Persians predominate and smaller-scale referendums in ethnically-mixed areas.
We can then use population exchanges (like the famous Greek-Turkish population exchange) to engender ethnic homogeneity in the resulting entities.
There is bound to be conflict in the ethnically-mixed regions and we should sparingly use military action to resolve these disputes to our advantage. We dont need to use an excessive amount of force and usually just the threat of violence will be sufficient to trigger population movements.

We should consider implementing this same policy in regards to the ethnic Uzbek population in south-eastern Uzbekistan in the area surrounding Samarqand. I typically like to avoid forming enclaves when it can be avoided; Bukhara (which is completely surrounded by non-Tajiks) is really the only case where we have no choice but to form an enclave.
هیچ وقت به خدا نگو یه مشکل بزرگ دارم
به مشکل بگو من یه خدای بزرگ دارم


Go tell the wolves that although the father has been killed,
The father's gun is with us still
Tell them that although all the men of the tribe have been killed,
There is a young boy in the cradle still

Bakhtiari Proverb
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Posted 01 April 2011 - 06:23 PM

Yes, your right but if partition appears we will send Pashtun nomads back to the south and bring Tajiks from Kandahar (some 100 000 souls) to north. That´s so easy. Pashtuns in the north have no power and no might or political security. But at the same time they are a threat for us in the name of Taliban and any other barbaric acts.


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Posted 03 April 2011 - 01:03 PM

70% of Afghanistan want a partition of North from South. Read the following article and vote too for a partition

http://www.kabulpres...nnee=3680#form3
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Posted 07 May 2011 - 11:34 AM

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Osama bin Laden death: Afghanistan 'had Abbottabad lead four years ago'

Afghan intelligence believed Osama bin Laden was hiding in an area close to Abbottabad four years ago – but no action was taken after the claim was furiously rejected by Pakistan's president, Afghanistan's former intelligence chief has said.

Agents working for the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the country's intelligence service, worked out that the world's most wanted man must be inside Pakistan proper, rather than the semi-autonomous tribal areas, as early in 2004, Amrullah Saleh told the Guardian.

He said they believed Bin Laden must be there based on "thousands of interrogation reports" and the assumption that Osama – "a millionaire with multiple wives and no background of toughness" – would not be living in a tent.

"I was pretty sure he was in the settled areas of Pakistan because in 2005 it was still very easy to infiltrate the tribal areas, and we had massive numbers of informants there," he said. "They could find any Arab but notBin Laden."

Their intelligence became more precise in 2007 when they believed he was hiding in Manshera, a town a short distance from Abbottabad where the NDS had identified two al-Qaida safe houses.

But the former spy chief said that Pervez Musharraf, then president of Pakistan, was outraged at the suggestion that Bin Laden was hiding in such a prominent part of the country.

In a meeting with Musharraf and Hamid Karzai the Pakistani president became furious and smashed his fist down on the table. "He said, 'Am I the president of the Republic of Banana?'" Saleh recalled. "Then he turned to President Karzai and said, 'Why have you have brought this Panjshiri guy to teach me intelligence?'"

He said Karzai had to intervene as Musharraf got increasingly angry and began to physically threaten Saleh.

Afghanistan's former top spy – who has long been a hate figure in Islamabad among officials who believed he was implacably anti-Pakistani – also said he had no doubts that Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban movement, was hiding in a safe house owned by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani spy agency, in the city of Karachi.

"He is protected by ISI, General Pasha [Lieutenant-General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, director-general of the ISI] knows as I am talking to you where is Mullah Omar and he keeps daily briefs from his officers about the location of senior Taliban leaders, simple," he said.

Saleh was speaking to the Guardian soon after addressing a rally of several thousand Afghans in Kabul organised as a show of strength of what he called Afghanistan's "anti-Taliban constituency" who are alarmed at the prospect of peace talks with insurgents.

The killing of Bin Laden, who was sheltered by the Taliban regime in the 1990s, has prompted heady speculation that an "end game" to the 10-year conflict is now at hand, with the Afghan government and the Taliban-led insurgency striking a deal.

But "deal making" were dirty words to the crowd gathered in a huge tent in Kabul lined with banners saying "We didn't vote for Karzai to make deals" and "Don't sacrifice justice for dealing".

Speeches were interrupted several times by chants from the crowd of "Death to the Taliban! Death to the suicide bombers! Death to the Punjabis!" – a reference to the protesters' view that the Taliban are under the control of the ISI.

Saleh is a burly and comparatively young man who earned the respect of the CIA during his sometimes brutal leadership of Afghanistan's intelligence service. He received a rapturous reception from the flag-waving crowd when he marched into the tent

Saleh lambasted Karzai for calling the Taliban disaffected "brothers".

"They are not my brother, they are not your brother – those are our enemies," he declared, to cheers.

Saleh warned the government that his movement would not remain content with peaceful demonstrations if Karzai did not change course. Later he told the Guardian that if Karzai "sold out in order to bring the Taliban" there would be no choice but to "rise up".

"We have been exposed to a lot of weapons, it is not very difficult to resort to fighting and create influence," he said.

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Posted 18 May 2011 - 03:00 PM

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Posted 19 May 2011 - 07:10 AM




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